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Does the Cold Nose Know? The Unscientific
Myth of the Dog Scent Lineup
by
ANDREw E. TAsLITz*
Murderers and robbers have been, ere now, convicted,
and suffered death under such evidence, and men have
said that the finger of God was in it.
-Sir Walter Scott'
Is the "finger of God" really behind a dog's identification of
a criminal suspect? A deep human faith in the purity and accuracy
of the dog has long said so. This faith in the."inerrant inspiration"
of the dog's nose2 has led to the dog's rapidly expanding use in lo-
cating avalanche victims, finding lost children, detecting bombs, lo-
cating drugs, and tracking escapees .3 But the most controversial use
of the canine olfactory sense remains the dog scent lineup.
In a "dog scent lineup" a dog sniffs an object imbued with a
scent known to be from a wrongdoer and then sniffs a line of either
objects or people. 4 If the dog "alerts"-that is, barks at, sniffs and
paws at, sits near, or mouths a suspect, or an object touched by a
suspect-the "alert," in the form of an alleged match of the object's
scent with that of the suspect, is admitted as substantive evidence
that the person identified committed the crime.
5
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1. W. SCOTT, THE TALIsmAN 256 (1973).
2. State v. Streeper, 113 Idaho 662, 666, 747 P.2d 71, 75 (1987) (quoting IA J.
WIOMORE, EVIDENCE § 177, at 1852 (Tillers rev. ed. 1983)).
3. S. BRYSON, SEARCH DOG TRAiNINa 4-6, 18 (1988); M. PEARSALL & 13. VERBRUGOEN,
M.D., SCENT: TRAinNIo TO TRACK, SEARCH, AND REscuE 161-62, 179-86 (1982); Stein, Dogs
Dig In to Sniff Out Victims at Crash Site, L.A. Times, May 13, 1989, at 32, col. 1.
4. Annotation, Dog Scent Discrimination Lineups, 63 A.L.R.4TH 143 (1988 & Supp.
1989). This annotation distinguishes between a "people lineup," in which the dog identifies
the person in a line whose scent the dog determines matches that of an object, and an
"inanimate object" lineup, in which a dog uses its scent to identify one object in a line of
many objects and determines that it matches that of a particular person. Id. at 144.
5. See, e.g., S. BRYSON, supra note 3, at 302 (defining "alert"); United States v.
McNiece, 558 F. Supp. 612, 613 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (lineup "alert" admitted as substantive
evidence of identity).
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For example, a witness sees a murder committed, and although
the murderer's face is hidden by shadow, his hat falls off as he es-
capes. The police have a witness who can identify the murderer's hat
but not the murderer himself. An extensive investigation is conducted
and, based purely on circumstantial evidence, a group of suspects
is assembled into a line. A trained dog sniffs the hat, sniffs each
person in the line, and then barks at suspect number three. Literally
upon the "nod of [the] dog's head, ' 6 the suspect is convicted and
sentenced to death.
7
This illustrative scenario is based on reality. Since the first such
reported dog scent lineup took place during the 1920s,l thousands
have been conducted in the United States. 9 Individuals have been
convicted of robbery, 0 rape," and even murder12 when the primary
evidence identifying them as the culprit was a dog scent lineup iden-
tification. 3 Indeed, lineups conducted as many as twenty-one months
after the crime14 and in which there was significant evidence that the
lineups were not reliable have resulted in convictions.' 5 Some of those
convicted were sentenced to life imprisonment or even death.'
6
6. United States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733, 756 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting the defendant's
characterization of narcotics detector dog evidence), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985).
7. See State v. Roscoe, 145 Ariz. 212, 700 P.2d 1312 (1984) (death penalty), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1094 (1985). Roscoe still waits on death row. Although he has exhausted
his rights on direct appeal, a collateral attack on his conviction still is pending, thus delaying
his execution. See infra note 153 (discussing Roscoe's fate in greater detail). Cf. Roberts v.
State, 298 Md. 261, 469 A.2d 442 (1983) (defendant convicted of rape and sentenced to 50
years imprisonment based on a dog's selection of the defendant in a lineup in which the
animal scented a cap worn by the rapist; the victim was unable to confirm this identification).
8. State v. Grba, 196 Iowa 241, 194 N.W. 250 (1923).
9. In United States v. McNiece, 558 F. Supp. at 612-13 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), one lineup
expert testified that he alone had conducted over 1000 scent lineups. Cf. Letter from
Brigadier Jan de Bruin of the Rotterdam Municipal Police to Andrew Taslitz (undated but
received Oct. 1989) [hereinafter Letter I] (on file at the Hastings Law Journal office) (noting
that about 300 scent lineups are conducted each year in Rotterdam, Holland).
10. United States v. Gates, 680 F.2d 1117 (6th Cir. 1982).
11. Roberts v. State, 298 Md. 261, 469 A.2d 442 (1983).
12. State v. Roscoe, 145 Ariz. 212, 700 P.2d 1312 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1094
(1985); Epperly v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 214, 294 S.E.2d 882 (1982), habeas corpus
proceeding sub nom. Epperly v. Booker, 235 Va. 35, 366 S.E.2d 62 (1988) (denying the
habeas writ).
13. See Roscoe, 145 Ariz. 212, 700 P.2d 1312; Roberts, 298 Md. 261, 469 A.2d 442;
Epperly, 224 Va. 214, 294 S.E.2d 882.
14. United States v. McNiece, 558 F. Supp. 612, 617 n.6 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); see also
Gates, 680 F.2d at 1119 (more than eight months' delay); Epperly, 224 Va. at 220-22, 226-
27, 233, 294 S.E.2d at 884-86, 889-90, 893 (13 to 14 days' delay, incorrectly described by
the court as an 11-day delay).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 289-295, 417-420, 477-487.
16. Roscoe, 145 Ariz. 212, 700 P.2d 1312 (death sentence); Epperly, 224 Va. 214, 294
S.E.2d 882 (life imprisonment).
Scent lineups have proven surprisingly resistant to legal chal-
lenges, surviving attacks on the dog's accuracy 17 and the sugges-
tiveness of the procedure,' as well as allegations that the lineup
violated the accused's constitutional right to confront the witnesses
against him. 19 This resilience is the result of the courts' persistent use
of standards that are used to determine the admissibility of more
traditional forms of dog identification evidence such as tracking and
narcotics detection. In borrowing these standards the courts not only
are relying on standards that are themselves ill-reasoned but also are
drawing inappropriate analogies between dog scent lineups and other
forms of dog identification evidence. The courts' irrational handling
of scent lineups also reflects the judiciary's fundamental failure to
recognize the mythic qualities of the supposedly infallible dog's power
and to understand the role science plays in the law of evidence.
This Article seeks to address these judicial failures. The Article
begins in Part I with a discussion of the role of myth in the law of
evidence, with emphasis on the mythic dog. The biology and psy-
chology of scenting are explored in Part II, which introduces the
scientific nature of dog scent evidence and describes the differences
between scent lineups and other types of dog scent evidence. Part
III examines the possible evidentiary objections to scent lineups. Part
IV considers "full disclosure" to the jury of the relevant scientific
data as an alternative to the exclusion of potentially prejudicial and
unreliable lineup evidence. Finally, the Article concludes that sci-
entific research is in too early a stage to justify admitting scent line-
ups as identification evidence in criminal trials, and even if scientific
research eventually supports the use of scent lineups, there are nu-
merous alternative approaches to the screening and presentation of
such evidence that must be followed to ensure that defendants receive
fair trials.
17. See, e.g., McNiece, 558 F. Supp. 612; Roscoe, 145 Ariz. 212, 700 P.2d 1312;
Epperly, 224 Va. 214, 294 S.E.2d 882. But see Ramos v. State, 496 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 1986)
(first degree murder conviction reversed because there was insufficient evidence that scent
lineups are an accurate method for proving identity and because the particular lineup
involved was conducted in an unfair manner).
18. Roberts v. State, 298 Md. 261, 268-75, 469 A.2d 442, 445-48 (1983).
19. Cf. Commonwealth v. Michaux, 360 Pa. Super. 452, 454, 461-62, 520 A.2d 1177,
1177-78, 1181-82 (1987) (tracking and informal, on-the-scene lineup).
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1. The Mythic Infallibility of the Dog
A. Why Myth Matters
Historians understand "myth" to be a unifying concept and rec-
ognize that human behavior often is shaped more by perceptions than
by objective reality. 20 The concept of myth also is useful in the law
of evidence precisely because myth focuses on the perceptions of peo-
ple. Classifying an idea as a "myth" is not necessarily pejorative.
A myth is a "large, controlling image that gives philosophical mean-
ing to the facts of ordinary life; that is, which has organizing value
for experience. ' 21 A myth makes abstract ideas concrete and or-
ganizes reality by means of generalizations; generalizations that often
are charged with emotion. 22 Myths need not necessarily be grand or
fit a "scholarly typology," 23 and consequently images of cowboys
and movie stars are as much a part of American mythology as the
beliefs in manifest destiny or the classless society.
24
While myths are often an important part of the social fabric and
a way of tying people together by common values and beliefs, 2 "there
is, of course, always a danger of illusion, a danger that in ordering
one's vision of reality, the myth may predetermine the categories of
perception, rendering one blind to things that do not fit the mental
image. ' 26 This danger of blindness is precisely why myths must be
20. This "mythic" view of history is discussed in depth in, among other sources, MYTH
AND SOUTHERN HISTORY: THE OLD SOUTH (P. Gerster & N. Cords 2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter
MYTH AND SOUTHERN HISTORY]; J. ROBERTSON, AMERICAN MYTH, AMERICAN REALITY (1980).
21. Tindall, Mythology: A New Frontier in Southern History, in MYTH AND SOUTHERN
HISTORY, supra note 20, at 2 (quoting Schorer, The Necessity for Myth in MYTH AND
MYTHMAKINO 355 (H. Murray ed. 1960)). Professor Robertson has similarly, if more simply,
defined "myths" as:
the patterns-of behavior, of belief, and of perception-which people have in
common .... [M]yths are often couched in good stories, very often told of heroes
and heroines.
But the "truth" about a people, the "truth" about America and Americans,
resides both in American myths and in American realities. The myths are part of
the world we live in; so were they part of our grandfathers' world. If we would
understand our world, or anyone else's, we must understand its myths as well
as-indeed as part of-its realities.
J. ROBERTSON, supra note 20, at xv-xvi.
22. See Tindall, supra note 21, at 2.
23. See J. ROBERTSON, supra note 20, at 6.
24. See id. at 6, 72, 74-75, 258-59. See generally J. CAMPBELL, THE POWER OF MYTH
(1988) (addressing the importance and scope of myth).
25. See J. ROBERTSON, supra note 20, at xv-xvii, 9-18.
26. Tindall, supra note 21, at 2.
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identified when they become 'a part of a judicial proceeding in a
courtroom. In this setting there are two particular dangers: first, a
jury may reach a decision that is based substantially on the unex-
amined assumptions, images, and feelings that constitute the myth;
second, a judge, who after all is a member of'our myth-laden society,
may be so influenced by the myth that he makes critical evidentiary
rulings based more on those views than on any reasoned, probing,
analytical effort at divining reality.27
Although neither legal scholars nor the courts expressly have
recognized "myth" as a general concept, the importance of exposing
specific, individual myths has been the implicit or explicit subject of
recent litigation and scholarly commentary. For example, some courts
now admit evidence of child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome
as a way of rebutting certain myths about sexually abused children,
notably that "true" victims immediately report the crime to an adult.2
Similarly, some courts permit psychologists to testify about the weak-
nesses of eyewitness identifications to challenge the myth that wit-
nesses expressing certainty about identifications are highly reliable.
29
When employed in the evidentiary context, a myth as an idea
is a particularly powerful analytical tool because of the absence of
a more concrete, "scientific" way to approach many evidentiary is-
sues. Controlled research on the psychology of juries and judges is
in its infancy.30 Moreover, given the infinite variety of types of ev-
idence and the expense of psychological research, it is improbable
that empirical data soon will be amassed regarding the likely effects
of each possible piece of evidence on jury members. Myths therefore
provide an alternative, or at least a supplement, to psychological re-
search, for evidence identified as imbued with mythic qualities prob-
ably will be overvalued, misunderstood, and misused by jurors. Such
27. Cf. Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility, and Rape: The Rape Trauma Syn-
dromle and Its Implications for Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 MINN. L. REv. 395,
402-10 (1985) (discussing the mythology of rape and the impact of that mythology on
evidentiary matters within judicial decision-making).
28. Note, Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A Spectrum of Uses,
68 B.U.L. REv. 155, 156-63 (1988) (authored by Veronica Serrato); cf. Massaro, supra note
27 (discussing the potential use of expert testimony in debunking the mythology of adult
rape).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985) (discussing the
problem of preconceptions regarding eyewitness testimony without explicitly describing the
problem as one of "myth"); People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 690 P.2d 709, 208 Cal.
Rptr. 236 (1984) (same).
• 30. E.g., McCord, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony Regarding Rape Trauma
Syndrome in Rape Prosecutions, 26 B.C.L. Rav. 1143, 1205 (1985) (bemoaning the dearth
of empirical research on whether jurors overvalue expert testimony).
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evidence must be excluded, or special efforts must be made to control
the wayward jury.
How can myths be identified? Myths by their nature permeate
literature, history, television, movies, and many other forms of pop-
ular culture.3' Moreover, because law deals with human perceptions
and misperceptions as well as struggles and compromise, case law
often reflects the substance, or is the result, of myths.3 2 Identifying
myths, therefore, requires only a sensitivity to the concept and a will-
ingness to search in the daily life of our society. 33
Such a search through the work and literature of artists, his-
torians, writers, police, dog trainers, movie buffs, and judges leaves
little doubt of the existence of a belief in the "mythic infallibility"
of the dog's nose.
31. See J. CAMPBELL, supra note 24; MYTH AND SOUTHERN HISTORY, supra note 20; J.
ROBERTSON, supra note 20.
32. See Massaro, supra note 27, at 398, 404, 413 (trial judge's remarks illustrated
judicial acceptance of rape myths).
33. "All of us are aware of our myths. They are part of the world we live in." J.
ROBERTSON, supra note 20, at xv. Being aware of our myths does not necessarily mean
consciously aware. Thus part of the work of historians specializing in the mythic perspective
is to identify myths explicitly by finding them in literature, history, and art. Historians then
confront us with what we subconsciously knew all along. See id. at xv-xvii, 351.
The United States Supreme Court, while not speaking in terms of a "mythic perspective"
on the law, also has inquired into the teachings of history, literature, and philosophy in an
attempt to divine fundamental Western values and preconceptions. See Coy v. Iowa, 487
U.S. 1012 (1988). In Coy, the Court cited Roman history, Shakespeare, and other "quo-
tations from antiquity," as well as the words of former President Eisenhower and modern
colloquialisms, to demonstrate the existence of the basic "human feeling" that face-to-face
confrontation with accusers is necessary for fairness. Id. at 1015-19; cf. Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 173, 176-82 (1976) (Court survey of history, jury verdicts, and legislation in
a search for "objective indicia that reflect the public attitude" toward the death penalty).
Interestingly, the Court in Coy and Gregg did not require the taking of expert testimony
on history and philosophy. Similarly, the process of identifying a myth that is suggested by
this Article assumes that the courts will not look to expert testimony, for courts are well-
equipped to find "social" or "legislative" facts (facts involved in deciding questions of law
or policy) without the taking of testimony. See Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence
in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REv. 364, 402 (1942) (defining "legislative"
facts). The parties may seek to inform the courts' judgment by filing "Brandeis"-type
briefs, but the taking of expert testimony on the question of myth generally would be time-
consuming and unnecessary, particularly because a myth, even more so than other legislative
facts, involves the courts in a very traditional role: using history and philosophy to craft
and apply legal rules. Cf. Monahan & Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating,
and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 510-12 (1986) (recom-
mending that courts rely solely upon briefs and independent judicial investigation when
using social science research as authority on questions of law or policy). Of course, exceptions
might be made to this general rule when a court finds the relevant research on the myth
complex, the assistance of the lawyers incomplete, and the time for making a decision brief.
See id.
[Vol. 42
B. The Myth of the Dog
The "loyalty and utter fidelity" of the dog has been an article
of faith in Western culture. 34 Homer's Odyssey tells of Odysseus'
dog, Argus, an aged canine wio, though parted from his master some
twenty years, struggled to rise and greet the returning Odysseus. The
animal died making the effort.35 In the Congress of the United States,
a Senator publicly praised the "one absolutely unselfish friend that
man can have in this selfish world, the one that never deserts him,
the one that never proves ungrateful or treacherous, his dog." ' 36 And
Mark Twain, some ten "years after this senate speech, wrote in
Pudd'nhead Wilson: "If you pick up a starving dog and make him
prosperous, he will not bite you. That is the principal difference be-
tween a dog and a man."
'37
The myth of the dog as it now exists in our legal proceedings
was developed out of a combination of the ancient human love of
the canine and the centuries of tales of dogs' great scenting feats.
38
34. Asimov, Preface to HoUND DtmuNNT at viii (I. Asimov, M. Greenberg & C. Waugh
ed. 1987). Professor Asimov provides an excellent summary of several of the tales of canine
affection noted below. See also infra notes 35-65 and accompanying text.
35. HoMER, THE ODYSSEY 319-21 (R. Fitzgerald trans. 1963).
36. Asimov, supra note 34, at viii. The Senator continued:
A man's dog stands by him in prosperity and in poverty, in health and in sickness.
He will sleep on the cold ground where the wintry winds blow and the snow drives
fiercely, if only he may be near his master's side. He will kiss the hand that has
no food to oTfer, he will lick the sores and wounds that come in encounter with
the roughness of the world. He guards the sleep of his pauper master as if he
were a prince.
When all other friends desert, he remains. When riches take wings and reputation
falls to pieces, he is as constant in his love as the sun in its journey through the
heavens.
If misfortune drives the master forth an outcast in the world, friendless and
homeless, the faithful dog asks no higher privilege than that of accompanying him
to guard against danger, to fight against his enemies.
And when the last of all comes, and death takes the master in its embrace, and
his body is laid away in the cold ground, no matter if all other friends pursue
their way, there by the graveside will the noble dog be found, his head between
his paws, his eyes sad, but open in alert watchfulness, faithful and true, even in
death.
M. LORING, Yout Doo AND THE LAW vii (1983) (quoting an 1870 tribute by Senator George
Graham Vest of Missouri).
37. M. TwAiN, PUDD'NHEAD WILSON 99 (1984); see also People v. Malgren, 139 Cal.
App. 3d 234, 243, 188 Cal. Rptr. 569, 575 (1983) (Feinbeig, J., dissenting) (emphasizing
the danger that jurors will, because of the natural human affection for dogs, overvalue dog
scent evidence).
38. See infra text accompanying notes 39-65. This Article centers on the development
of the myth in Western, English-speaking societies, but the myth has force in other cultures
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Many of the tales of canine scenting prowess are true; some simply
are legend. Yet by the modern age, dogs have acquired a mythic im-
age of an infallibly sensitive nose that will unerringly lead to evil-
doers.
The earliest known report of the canine as detective dates from
300-272 B.C. Two men had murdered a slave and fled, leaving the
slave's dog, the sole eyewitness, by the body. The King, passing by
on a royal progress, ordered the body buried and took the dog in
as his own. After some time passed, the dog accompanied his new
master on a review of his troops. As two of the soldiers marched
past, the animal flew at them in a rage. " 'No further evidence was
needed, for, in order to escape from the dog, the criminals confessed
their guilt.' "39
Another well known tale of the dog's prowess in sniffing out
the guilty comes from Sir Walter Scott, writing in the nineteenth cen-
tury about the twelfth century crusades. In Blair v. Commonwealth,4 0
the court summarized Scott's tale:
In "The Talisman" it is related that in the joint crusade of Richard
I of England and Phillip II of France, Roswell, the hound, pulled
from the saddle Conrade, Marquis of Montserrat, thus mutely ac-
cusing him of the theft of the banner of England. Phillip defended
the Marquis with the remark, "Surely the word of a knight and a
prince should bear him out against the barking of a cur." To which
Richard replied, "Royal brother, recollect that the Almighty who
gave the dog to be companion of our pleasures and our toils, both
invested him a nature noble and incapable of deceit. He forgets
neither friend nor foe; remembers, and with accuracy, both benefit
and injury. He hath a share of man's intelligence, but no share of
man's falsehood. You may bribe a soldier to slay a man with his
sword, or a witness to take his life by false accusation; but you
cannot make a hound tear his benefactor; he is the friend of man
save when man justly incurs his enmity. Dress yonder Marquis in
what peacock robes you will, disguise his appearance, alter his com-
as well. The Winnebago Indians, for example, date the dogs' keen scent from the first feast
made on this earth by the first four sons of Earthmaker, the Creator:
The first thing the four brothers did when they arrived on the earth was to start
their fire. Earthmaker sent them a deer right away, and the youngest brother shot
it with an arrow and began to prepare the deer meat for food. Something alighted
on the deer meat. "What is that?" they said. "It is a wasp," said the oldest
brother. "And when I get a dog, if it is black, I shall name it Wasp, like this
one. And because the wasp has the keen scent to find the deer meat, so shall the
dog have the keen scent to discover other animals."
M. LEACH, GOD HAD A DOG: FOLKLORE OF THE DOG 220 (1985).
39. S. CHAPMAN, POLICE DOGS IN NORTH AMERICA 9-10 (1990) (quoting M. Ross, THE
BOOK OF NOBLE DOGS 34 (1922)).
40. 181 Ky. 218, 204 S.W. 67 (1918).
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plexion with drugs and washes, and hide himself amidst a hundred
.men, I will yet pawn my sceptre that the hound detects him, and
expresses his resentment as you have this day beheld."1
4'
The almost mystic qualities with which history and literature long
have painted the dog continue to the modern day. 42 Thus, in the sto-
ries of Arthur Conan Doyle, the dog was portrayed as possessing an
uncanny talent for finding evildoers. 43 And Rin-Tin-Tin, of course,
never failed to find the wrongdoer or the wounded, missing child. 44
The belief in the dog's infallibility arises not only from fictional
accounts, but also from real life experiences including the widespread
use of dogs in hunting slaves,45 tracking down fugitives, 46 and hunting
game. 47 Dogs also have found dead bodies, victims of crime, and
earthquake victims.
48
Particular examples of these uses of the dog's nose have fortified
the dog's image in the American psyche as an unerring best friend
of humans. A well-known non-fictional example is the 1977 tracking
of James Earl Ray, the convicted killer of Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr.49 Ray was able to escape from the Brushy Mountain State Pen-
itentiary in Petros, Tennessee, by eluding armed guards and circum-
venting an electrified fence, but he could not escape *the noses of two
41. Id. at 220-21, 204 S.W. at 68 (quoting W. SCOTT, supra note 1). Sir Waiter Scott's
story retains its appeal for the modern audience. See, e.g., People v. McPherson, 85 Mich.
App. 341, 346-47, 271 N.W.2d 228, 230-31 (1978) (although finding dog tracking evidence
is insufficient alone to support a conviction, the court cited Scott's story for the proposition
that dog scent evidence "has been held in high esteem for centuries"); Buck v. State, 138
P.2d 115, 123 (Okla. Crim. App. 1943) (relying on Sir Walter Scott's story as being equally
a tribute to "Old Boston," thus justifying the admission of "Old Boston's" tracking efforts
at trial).
42. "Whether it's in real life or in the movies, the escaping con usually has the head
start, but just until the law brings in the dogs." 20/20: Tracking the Tracker (ABC television
broadcast, Oct. 3, 1985) [hereinafter Tracking the Tracker] (voice of Geraldo Rivera).
43. A. DOYLE, The Sign of the Four, in SHERLOCK HoLMEs: THE LONG STORIms 187
(Galley Press 1987) ("I know a dog that would follow that scint to the world's end. If a
pack can track a trailed herring across a shire, how far can a specially-trained hound follow
so pungent a smell as this?"); B. LowE, HuNTI THE CLEAN BOOT: THE WoRKING
BLOODHOUND 203 (1981) (" 'for olfactory scenting the bloodhound is everything that authors,
such as Conan Doyle, have implied .... .' ") (quoting Chief Inspector Wilkinson of the
Metropolitan Police Dog Training Establishment at Keston, Kent).
44. "What do we know about dogs, you know? ... Lassie, Rin Tin Tin-we think
dogs can do everything, and dogs are so friendly and sweet .. 1.." Tracking the Tracker,
supra note 42 (voice of Geraldo Rivera).
45. An ignominious use for the unwitting canines, but a part of the canine mystique
nonetheless. S. CHAPMAN, supra note 39, at 4; B. LowE, supra note 43, at 12. Canine slave
hunting also is depicted frighteningly in H. STOWE, UNCLE ToM's CABN (1985).
46. S. CRMPmAN, supra note 39, at 8-9, 161-64..
47. B. LowE, supra note 43, at 10-12.
48. Id. at 12, 63, 65.
49. S. CHAPmAN, supra note 39, at 65.
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bloodhounds. The hounds led their handlers straight to Ray, who had
covered himself with leaves to avoid his pursuers. 0
The best known modern use of the dog's olfactory talents, how-
ever, probably has been in drug trafficking. Dogs are responsible for
seizures of drugs worth hundreds of millions of dollars. In Miami
from 1973 through 1975, for example, a single golden retriever, Trep,
sniffed out sixty-three million dollars worth of drugs, resulting in the
conviction of twenty drug dealers." These stories regularly are re-
inforced in the popular consciousness as they find their way into
newspapers across the country.1
2
The use of dogs to locate drugs is a recent phenomenon. 3 The
use of dogs' scenting abilities in ferreting out criminal activity, how-
ever, is not an entirely new idea. In a use that closely parallels the
use of dogs in drug trafficking cases, canines were used during Pro-
hibition to track down moonshiners. One famous team, Pete, a mas-
sive bulldog, and his partner, Snake Thompson, captured more
moonshiners and destroyed more stills than any other enforcement
team. Pete was so successful that a "contract," which luckily failed,
once was taken out on the dog's life.5 4 Similarly, dog-sniffing abilities
have been employed in the detection of explosives. Man-dog explo-
sive detection teams save thousands of police personnel hours and
many lives each year.5 5 Again, these stories often are recounted in
newspapers.1
6
While each of these instances of the dog's scenting prowess has
contributed to the canine's mythic stature, the greatest canine my-
thology has surrounded a single breed: the bloodhound. The hound
50. Id.
51. Id. at 71.
52. E.g., Use of Drug Sniffing Dogs Challenged, Wash. Post, May 6, 1990, at D1, col.
2 (drug-detecting dogs used to search cars); Stepped-Up Drug War to Focus on S.D. Border,
L.A. Times, Jan. 26, 1990, at A18, col. 1 (San Diego County ed.) (Administration plans to
assign additional teams of drug-sniffing dogs to protect the U.S.-Mexican border).
53. The U.S. Customs Service did not begin using dogs as drug-detectors until 1970.
Note, Dog Sniff Searches and United States v. Thomas, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 1097, 1099
n.16 (1986); see also United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 1976) (the "recent
proliferation of crimes involving the transportation of drugs ... has led naturally to the
training and use of dogs ... to detect the presence of such contraband").
54. S. CHAPMAN, supra note 39, at 73-74.
55. Id. at 32-33; Crowley, Putting Some Teeth Into the Law, POLICE MAo., July 1982,
at 61, 63-64. Interestingly, explosives-detection training requires each dog to select the one
canister containing explosives from among many, a task that might be characterized as a
type of inanimate scent discrimination object lineup. See id. at 61, 64.
56. Wanted: Lost Bomb Used in Airport Security, Chicago Trib., Apr. 30, 1990, at
C9, col. 1 (dog located half-pound package of explosives planted in luggage); Stalled Talks
Delay Airport Detectors, San Francisco Chron., Mar. 29, 1990, at A4, col. 6 (describing
dogs as 9570 effective in detecting explosives at airports).
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not only has been described as "an almost mystical breed, destined
for moments of truth, ' 57 but its nose unqualifiedly has been declared
"two million times as sensitive as a human's. ' 58 Many have dubbed
the hound "unerring ' 5 9 and tell amazing stories of the hound's suc-
cessesA 0 This image too has reached the public mind, as one com-
mentator has noted:
[A]mongst the uninformed he was and is sometimes regarded as a
ferocious monster endowed with miraculous scenting attributes; ca-
pable of pursuing his victim successfully under any conditions till
caught, when he would certainly tear him limb from limb. This may'
probably be accounted for partly by his name, which is calculated
to inspire awe and partly by recollections of slave hunting tales in
Uncle Tom's Cabin.61
In a 1968 statement, the American Bar Association recognized the
risk that a jury will be swayed by a "superstitious faith" in the blood-
hound's' accuracy 2 This same faith or "superstitious awe", occa-
sionally has been noted in the cases. 63 The best summary, however,
57. Caras, Bloodhound, Smi. DiG., Nov. 1977, at 62.
58. Id. at 64. The following quote, if somewhat sarcastic, nevertheless captures well
the popular image of the bloodhound:
Over all, the bloodhound boasts superior skill, To scent, to view, to turn and
boldly kill-His fellows' vain alarms rejects with scorn, True to his master's voices
and learned horn; His nostrils oft, if ancient fame sings true, Traced the sly felon
thro' the tainted dew; Once snuff'd, he follows with unaltered aim, Nor odours
lure him from his chosen game; Deep mouthed, he thunders and inflamed he
views, Springs on relentless and to death pursues.
McWhorter, The Bloodhound as a Witness, 54 Am. L. Rv. 109, 117 (1920) (quoting an
anonymous poem).
59. E.g., B. LowE, supra note 43, at 11 (quoting NnImoD, HORSE AND Tm HouND
(1842)) (noting that the bloodhound " 'possessed the property of unerringly tracing the
scent he was laid upon, amongst a hundred others' ").
60. Roger Caras, an ABC network correspondent who has hosted "Pets and Wildlife,"
a radio program, tells one such story:
I once helped the New York City police run tests in Central Park with a State
Police bloodhound. They wanted to see if the dog could be used in the city
environment. Following a trail laid down by a detective, the hound ran right
through four softball games and across an area known as the Sheep Meadow. The
evening before, 55,000 had attended a rock concert in that field. The dog was
able to sort out that one trail out of the lingering 55,000 scents and stay with it.
Caras, supra note 57, at 63.
61. B. Lowa, supra note 43, at 12 (quoting Edwin Brough). Brough discussed the
popular perception of bloodhounds as slave hunters. The reality is that foxhounds of the
country, sometimes crossed with the Cuban mastiff (nicknamed the "Cuban bloodhound")-
not true bloodhounds-generally were used in hunting slaves. Id.
62. S. CKx'mAN, supra note 39, at 67.
63. E.g., People v. Perryman, 89 Mich. App. 516, 524, 280 N.W.2d 579, 582 (1979);
accord, Cook v. State, 374 A.2d 264, 270 (Del. 1977) (speaking in terms of "the undue
prejudice such evidence has upon the jury," a fear that the court recognized but that did
not persuade the court to exclude dog tracking evidence from criminal trials).
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of the popular view of the dog's nose and of the connection between
that view and the law of evidence comes from Wigmore:
[I]n actual usage, evidence of the conduct of animals is apt to be
highly misleading, to the danger of innocent men. Amidst the pop-
ular excitement attendant upon a murder and the chase of the sus-
pect, all the facts upon which the trustworthiness of the inference
rests are apt to be distorted .... Moreover, the very limited nature
of the inference possible is apt to be overestimated-a consequence
dangerous when the jurors are moved by local prejudice .... The
hesitation shown in some courts to the use of this evidence is due
to the risks of its misuse by the jury, for in some regions of our
country the mysteriously accurate operation of the dogs' senses has
given rise to a superstitious faith in the dogs' inerrant inspiration,
and this gross popular creed might in a jury mislead them into giv-
ing excessive credit to the evidence of the dogs' itinerary.
4
Despite Wigmore's well-known views and the occasional citation of
this passage in the case law, 65 for the most part the courts either ig-
nore the myth, deny its existence, or uncritically accept its truth. The
result has been that courts often have judged, with little justification,
the accuracy of dog scenting evidence by unique standards not ap-
plied to analogous types of evidence. This unique treatment has led
courts to accept arguably unreliable evidence in drug detection, track-
ing, and scent lineup cases without serious inquiry into the wisdom
of doing so. This Article argues that this unique treatment stems from
the impact of canine mythic infallibility on the courts, a subject to
which this Article now turns.
C. How Judges Apply the Myth
(1) The Narcotics Cases
In cases involving dog sniffing for narcotics it is particularly
evident that the courts often accept the mythic dog with an almost
superstitious faith. The myth so completely has dominated the ju-
dicial psyche in those cases that the courts either assume the relia-
bility of the sniff or address the question cursorily; the dog is the
clear and consistent winner. The courts' failure is due to more than
sloppy reasoning; the mythic underpinnings of the cases are revealed
in the grand language chosen to describe the dog's olfactory sen-
sibilities.
In United States v. Waltzer,66 for example, Kane, a federal De-
partment of Enforcement Agency narcotics detector dog, alerted
64. IA J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 177, at 1852 (1983).
65. State v. Streeper, 113 Idaho 662, 666, 747 P.2d 71, 75 (1987).
66. 682 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210 (1983).
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agents to a suspect's luggage at an airport and the alert resulted in
the suspect's arrest. A later search of the suspect's luggage revealed
cocaine. The district court denied the defendant's motion to suppress
the cocaine and the court of appeals affirmed, concluding that canine
identification is a discriminating and, "in cases such as Kane," a
reliable method of identifying packages containing narcotics. 67 But
a dog is not necessarily either discriminating or reliable. The ap-
pellate court briefly addressed Kane's accuracy by simply noting that
he had a "perfect record.' '6 Similarly, Judge Oakes in his concurring
opinion described the prosecution's key witness as "the able, canny
canine Kane, with the perfect record-all hits and no misses. "69 Es-
sentially, the sniff itself was sufficient to establish probable cause
for the arrest.
The reference to Kane's "perfect record" was meaningless, how-
ever, because the court failed to ask any questions about Kane's re-
liability or skill beyond noting his "perfect record." For example,
what was Kane's earlier scenting experience? Had he previously alerted
to known quantities of cocaine or only to other drugs? Did "perfect"
mean that he had been tested and correct twice, a figure of little
value, or had he been correct on hundreds of occasions? Further-
more, were the circumstances of the search in any way suggestive, 70
or were there "handler cues ' 71 that might have caused Kane to iden-
tify certain persons even though Kane did not himself recognize the
scent of cocaine? The facts of United States v. Young72 illustrate that
asking these kinds of questions is critical to identifying those dog
sniffs that deserve to be relied upon.
In Young, Kane broke his "perfect record" when he erroneously
alerted to narcotics at the defendant's apartment. The defendant
sought to suppress evidence of firearms found during the search on
the ground that Kane's unreliable sniff was inadequate to establish
probable cause for the arrest.73 Specifically, the defendant argued
that dog sniffs of apartments are less reliable than sniffs of luggage;
67. Id. at 372-73.
68. Id. at 371.
69. Id. at 374 (Oakes, J., concurring).
70. For example, did the luggage contain cheese or meat, scents that might attract the
dog's attention? Was the luggage so different in appearance from the other pieces of luggage
that the dog may have chosen it based on sight, not scent? See generally infra notes 471-
548 and accompanying text.
71. "Handler cues" are the conscious or subconscious handler suggestions to the dog
that the dog should identify a particular person or object. See infra notes 205-208 and
accompanying text.
72. 745 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985).
73. Id. at 741.
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that there are physical differences between a sniff in a small, confined
area and a sniff at the entrance of an apartment; and that a search
warrant therefore must provide, at the very least, a detailed account
of the searching dog's track record with respect to apartments and
homes. 74 The investigating agent's search warrant affidavit in Young
stated only that Kane was successful in two similar incidents but did
not state how many times Kane had failed.
7
1
In dicta, the appellate court suggested that it might agree with
the defendant's argument. The court characterized Kane's sniff as
an "arguably unreliable, or at least unsubstantiated, technique.
' 76
The court skirted the issue, however, by affirming the defendant's
conviction on the theory that the search was supported by probable
cause even without the dog's erroneous signal.
77
Other courts have displayed even less sensitivity to the question
of accuracy. In Doe v. Renfrow, 78 a school system's administrators
conducted a mass sniffing expedition to uncover student drug use.
The dog alerted to fifty students but only seventeen were found in
possession of drugs, an accuracy rate of thirty-four percent. The
plaintiff brought suit against school officials for allegedly violating
her fourth amendment rights. Although the dog's accuracy rate dur-
ing the search was very low, the court concluded that the alerts es-
tablished reasonable cause to believe that the students identified were
concealing narcotics. The court praised the nose of the dog: "It is
well known that a patrol dog is endowed by nature with qualities of
hearing and smell that appear to be superior to those of humans."
79
The court declared that the dog's "keen olfactory sense" had "led
naturally" to the training of dogs to detect contraband, a task that
the court concluded without explanation was similar to the tradi-
tional use of dogs in search and rescue missions.80 Consequently, the
court found that the conduct of a properly trained dog can "standing
alone" provide the basis for reasonable, and even probable, cause. 8'
Significantly, the court in Renfrow never addressed the dog's
accuracy rate before the search, a matter clearly relevant to probable
cause. Nor did it consider that tracking human scent, as is done in
74. Id. at 756.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 758.
77. Id. at 756.
78. 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1981).
79. Id. at 1025.
80. Id. at 1026 (quoting United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 1976)).
81. Id.
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search and rescue missions, may be different from tracking drugs,
a difference that potentially requires an independent scientific inquiry
whether dogs are better or worse at tracking contraband than track-
ing humans. Finally, the court failed to address in any depth whether
the dog had been "properly trained ' 82 and it completely ignored the
non-discriminating nature of this particular dog's training. The dog
apparently reacted to the plaintiff primarily because that morning
she had been playing with one of her dogs who was in heat.
83
The United States Supreme Court has contributed to the lower
courts' willingness to assume that a dog's alert to narcotics is in-
herently reliable. 84 Although the Court in reality has addressed re-
liability questions only, tangentially or in dicta,8 5 lower courts have
viewed the Court's comments on the question as authoritative state-
ments on the subject.8 6 Three cases in particular have guided the lower
courts.
In United States v. Chadwick,8 7 a marijuana detection dog sig-
naled the presence of marijuana inside a footlocker. Although the
Court declared the subsequent opening of the locker and inspection
of its interior unlawful because the police had not first obtained a
warrant, the Court suggested that had the police asked, a warrant
unquestionably would have issued based solely on the dog's alert.88
A plurality of the Court made similar assumptions regarding the
reliability of canine sniffing in Florida v. Royer.8 9 Royer involved
a suspected drug courier who was questioned in an airport concourse
and then required to accompany the police forty feet to an office,
where he consented to a search of his suitcases. The Court held that
the consent was the fruit of an arrest without probable cause. In
emphasizing that the police had less intrusive means than searching
the suitcases to confirm their suspicions, the Court noted that:
The courts are not strangers to the use of trained dogs to detect
the presence of controlled substances in luggage. There is no in-
82. While the court found "no fault with the school administrators using.., the senses
of properly trained outside personnel and dogs," id. at 1027, the only indirect reference to
the dog's training was that the dog's trainer, Ms. Little, had "vast experience" and ran a
legitimate enterprise. Id. at 1026.
83. See id. at 1017.
84. See infra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
85. See infra notes 89, 92.
86. See infra notes 89, 92.
87. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
88. See id. at 15.
89. 460 U.S. 491 (1983); see also United States v. Knox, 839 F.2d 285, 291, 294 n.4
(6th Cir. 1988) ("[U]nder Royer, the positive reaction of the Narcotics Unit dog alone
would have established probable cause to not only search defendants' luggage, but to arrest
them immediately."), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1742 (1989).
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dication here that this means was not feasible and available. If it
had been used, Royer and his luggage could have been momentarily
detained while this investigative procedure was carried out . . . . A
negative result would have freed Royer in short order; a positive
result would have resulted in his justifiable arrest on probable cause. 9
Finally, in United States v. Place,9' the Court held that a dog
sniff is not a "search" within the meaning of the fourth amendment
and does not, therefore, require probable cause. In doing so, the
Court assumed that a sniff is a discriminate, accurate method for
disclosing the presence or absence of narcotics. 92 The Court, how-
ever, reversed Place's conviction on another ground. Two DEA agents
had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that when Place deplaned at
LaGuardia airport, he carried narcotics. Although that suspicion jus-
tified a brief detention that was limited in scope and designed to
investigate circumstances surrounding that suspicion, the Court held
that the officers went beyond such limited detention by moving Place's
luggage to Kennedy airport in order to conduct the dog sniff, thereby
delaying the luggage for ninety minutes. 93 In reaching this conclusion,
the court relied upon Royer and suggested that a better solution would
have been to bring the dog to LaGuardia for a brief sniff, thus min-
imizing the intrusion while enabling the officers to confirm their sus-
picions. 94 Once again, the Court's implied assumption was that the
sniff itself would be highly reliable.
One final point should be noted. The myth has not been com-
pletely monolithic and a few cases have challenged the assumption
of the dog's infallibility. 95 These cases, however, have done little more
than flag the issue, and have offered no serious, coherent method
90. Royer, 460 U.S. at 505-06 (emphasis added).
91. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
92. Id. at 707; see also United States v. Brown, 731 F.2d 1491, 1492 n.1 (11th Cir.
1984) (citing Place for the proposition that the "Supreme Court has assumed that dog-sniff
tests are highly reliable").
93. Id. at 709-10.
94. Id. at 709.
95. See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez, 772 F.2d 495, 497-98 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1985)
(noting in dicta that, because there was no evidence of "Marc the Narc's" reliability, the
court was unable to determine whether the dog's "hit" established probable cause to search
luggage for narcotics); Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. School Dist., 693 F.2d 524, 525 (5th
Cir. 1982) (remand for trial court to evaluate dog's reliability before determining whether
an alert gave rise to reasonable suspicion), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983); cf. People
v. Mayberry, 31 Cal. 3d 335, 342, 644 P.2d 810, 814, 182 Cal. Rptr. 617, 621 (1982)
(cautioning that adequate demonstration of a narcotic detector dog's training and experience
is necessary before its reaction to an object may be admitted into evidence). See generally
Annotation, Use of Trained Dog to Detect Narcotics or Drugs as Unreasonable Search in
Violation of Fourth Amendment, 31 A.L.R. FED. 931 (1986 & Supp. 1989) (collecting cases).
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for resolution. The courts have made a more serious, if equally flawed,
effort to address the problem in the dog-tracking cases.96
(2) Tracking the Truth
a. The Dog as Sui Generis
In concluding that a dog's sniff is not a search, the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Place declared that the canine
sniff is "sui generis." ' 97 This same conclusion-that a dog's sniff is
unique-had been reached before by courts deciding a very different
question: what foundation is necessary before evidence of canine
tracking may be admitted as proof of a defendant's guilt? 98 In an-
swering this question the majority of courts have required a showing:
(1) [That ... [the dogs] are of pure blood, and of a stock char-
acterized by acuteness of scent and power of discrimination; (2) that
they possess these qualities, and have been accustomed and trained
to pursue the human track; (3) that they have been found by ex-
perience reliable in such pursuit; (4) and that in the particular case
they were put on the trail of the guilty party, which was pursued
and followed under such circumstances and in such way as to afford
substantial assurance, or permit a reasonable inference, of iden-
tification. 99
Modern statements of the rule sometimes delete the requirement that
the dogs be of a particular breed but add requirements that the han-
dler be proven qualified to use the dog and that the trail not be so
stale or contaminated as to be beyond the dog's ability to follow.00
Whichever variant of the test is used, the courts often require
little in the way of foundation to pass it.101 The courts offer minimal,
96. See infra notes 97-132 and accompanying text.
97. 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
98. See Annotation, Evidence of Trailing by Dogs in Criminal Cases, 18 A.L.R.3D 1221
(1968 & Supp. 1989).
99. State v. McLeod, 196 N.C. 542, 545, 146 S.E. 409, 411 (1929).
100. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Michaux, 360 Pa. Super., 452, 457, 520 A.2d 1177,
1179 (1987); Annotation, supra note 98, at 1230-37 (surveying foundational requirements).
Not all modern cases disregard breeding; some indeed place heavy emphasis on that factor.
See, e.g., State v. Maya, 126 N.H. 590, 598, 493 A.2d 1139, 1145 (1985). For a summary
and commentary upon the many variations on the majority approach, see Terrell v. State,
3 Md. App. 340, 239 A.2d 128 (1968).
101. See, e.g., State v. Streeper, 113 Idaho 662, 667, 747 P.2d 71, 76 (1987) (foundational
requirements met when two dogs had only 75% and 80% success rates respectively, and the
tracking was done three to five hours after the crime with no inquiry into possible changes
in the trail during that period or into the general ability of dogs to track after the passage
of a significant period of time); State v. Harris, 25 Or. App. 71, 77, 547 P.2d 1394, 1398
(1976) (tracking within 48 hours of crime not "stale").
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if any, discussion of what controlled experimentation should be used
to determine the general accuracy of dogs in tracking or to determine
the factors that may explain why dogs are sometimes wrong.
02
Dogs with tracking records far from perfect frequently are
deemed reliable. 0 Even these less-than-perfect tracking records are
misleading, since they apparently are based on the number of times
that a dog who is instructed to track actually finds a "match." The
courts do not mention the number of times that a false "match" is
made, nor do they describe experiments that would determine the
reliability of the particular dog's scenting abilities.' °4 Ultimately, re-
liability questions often turn on the conclusory testimony of the dog's
handler, an individual who is not required to have academic training
in canine psychology or any other related discipline. 105 Furthermore,
discussions regarding trail "staleness" are cursory and fail to address
important physics issues, for example, the rate at which human scent
may dissipate in hot, dry weather, as opposed to rainy, windy
weather. °6 Indeed, many courts reject the notion that tracking should
be a scientific process, the accuracy of which can be appreciated only
by understanding the nature of scent and the biology and motivation
of the dog.10 7 Moreover, the courts are not worried about erroneous
tracking, because they deem it a danger largely eliminated by the
"corroboration requirement."
The "corroboration requirement" is a rule articulated by the
courts in most states requiring that dog tracking evidence be cor-
roborated by other evidence before a conviction based on that track-
ing evidence can be sustained. 0 8 The meaning of this requirement is
102. See infra cases cited at notes 103-132. The absence of such a discussion is truly
remarkable because scientific research, however skimpy, has been available at least since the
1920s. See infra text accompanying notes 363-372.
103. See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 180 Conn. 481, 488, 429 A.2d 931, 934 (1980) (80%
success rate in tracking); People v. Perryman, 89 Mich. App. 516, 522, 280 N.W.2d 579,
582 (1979) (only 11 out of 36 successes, a success rate of under 30076).
104. See supra cases cited at notes 100-101, 103.
105. E.g., People v. Malgren, 139 Cal. App. 3d 234, 238-39, 188 Cal. Rptr. 569, 572
(1983) (handler/police officer's testimony); Wilson, 180 Conn. at 487-88, 429 A.2d at 934
(handler/state trooper's testimony).
106. M. PEARSALL & H. VERBRUGGEN, M.D., supra note 3, at 35-44 (summarizing the
effects of air temperature and humidity on a dog's ability to follow a track).
107. See People v. Craig, 86 Cal. App. 3d 905, 915-16, 150 Cal. Rptr. 676, 682-83 (1978)
(rejecting the need to prove the demonstrable scientific reliability of dog tracking); Wilson,
180 Conn. at 481, 487-89, 429 A.2d at 934-35 (1980) (effectively ignoring the defendant's
claim that no scientific basis had been proved to support a state trooper's testimony as to
the accuracy of his tracking dog).
108. E.g., Commonwealth v. Michaux, 360 Pa. Super. 452, 458-59, 520 A.2d 1177, 1180
(1987); Annotation, supra note 98, at 1237-40 (collecting cases).
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unclear in states where courts declare that tracking evidence is "cu-
mulative only"' 9 and must be corroborated by other "direct" 110 ev-
idence of identity. Such language suggests that tracking evidence only
will be admitted if there is independent evidence that, standing alone,
could support the defendant's conviction."' Other cases, however,
clearly hold that the "other evidence" required for corroboration
may be circumstantial and need not be sufficient to establish a de-
fendant's guilt.112 In effect, these latter cases hold that tracking ev-
idence is more than merely "cumulative," thus permitting- a court
to send the question of the wrongdoer's identity to the jury in a case
in which otherwise there would be insufficient evidence to do so."
3
In practice, this interpretation of the rule has meant that little "other
evidence" is necessary to support a conviction.1
4
109. Michaux, 360 Pa.-Super. at 458, 520 A.2d at 1180 (quoting State v. Loucks, 98
Wash. 2d 563, 567, 656 P.2d 480, 482 (1983)). "Cumulative evidence" is "[aidditional or
corroborative evidence to the same point. That which goes to prove what has already been
established by other evidence." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 343 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis
added). By describing tracking evidence as "cumulative only," therefore, courts apparently
are saying that the guilty party's identity already has been shown. Tracking merely offers
additional support to the existing proof of identity.
110. People v. Perryman, 89 Mich. App. 516, 524, 280 N.W.2d 579, 583 (1979); accord
Loucks, 98 Wash. 2d at 567, 656 P.2d at 482 (1983) (noting that a large majority of
jurisdictions permit dog tracking evidence "only after other evidence has been introduced
clearly connecting the accused with . .-. the crime") (emphasis added). But see State v.
Ellis, 48 Wash. App. 333, 335, 738 P.2d 1085, 1087 (1987) (rejecting the assertion that
Loucks required that the "other evidence" produced must be sufficient by itself to convict
the accused).
111. See supra cases cited at note 110; see also State v. Cheatham, 458 S.W.2d 336 (Mo.
1970) (tracking evidence was insufficient to support a robbery conviction where circumstantial
evidence of the defendant's presence near the crime scene and association with an accomplice
did not, standing alone, link defendant with the crime).
112. People v. Malgren, 139 Cal. App. 3d 234, 239, 188 Cal. Rptr. 569, 573 (1983)
(corroborating evidence can be circumstantial); Ellis, 48 Wash. App. at 335, 738 P.2d at
1087 ("other evidence" need not itself be sufficient to convict).
113. This logic follows from the rationales of these cases despite not being articulated
clearly in their text. The evidence, other than tracking, need not be sufficient to convict;
but once tracking evidence is admitted, if there is sufficient evidence to take the case to the
jury, and the jury convicts (a verdict that is upheld on appeal), the tracking evidence is
precisely what tips the scales in favor of guilt. Thus the prosecutor's losing case is turned
into a winner. The tracking evidence is, therefore, much more than "merely cumulative"
because it serves not as proof of a fact already established, but rather as a necessary step
in proving the existence of that fact in the first place. See supra note 109.
114. For example, in Ellis, the police saw two men running from the scene of a burglary,
one wearing a brown leather jacket and darker pants, the other wearing a dark top and
lighter colored pants. The police pursued, but lost the men. A dog tracked and located one
man fitting the description of the first suspect, who wore a brown leather jacket and darker
pants. The same dog later tracked the defendant, who wore a rust-colored jacket and dark
gray pants and therefore did not fit the second suspect's description. Despite the defendant's
clothing differing from the description given by the officers, and despite the defendant's
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Moreover, even when the additional evidence offered is more
than minimal, the power of the tracking evidence often is undeniable
and actually may be the primary reason for the resulting conviction.
People v. Malgren"5 illustrates this proposition. In Malgren, two
teenagers returned home to find the knobs removed from their front
door. A crash came from their parents' bedroom, and they saw some-
one run out of the house. They called the police, who arrived with
a dog that spent thirty-five to forty minutes tracking over about seven-
tenths of a mile until he located the defendant in some bushes one
hour after the crime. The defendant was out of breath and per-
spiring, with leaves on his jacket, grass stains on his shoes, and wet
trouser legs. Later, both a penlight and pliers whose teeth matched
the spacing of marks on the doorknobs were found near the bur-
glarized residence. 1 16 At trial, the defendant testified that he had
hitched a ride with a woman, but they had quarreled, and thus he
left the car and was walking along the freeway when the dog came
after him, forcing him to run into the bushes to escape." 7 A jury
convicted the defendant of burglary.
On appeal, the defendant argued that, other than the dog's
tracking, there was no direct evidence of his guilt. The court rejected
his challenge and concluded that the circumstances of the case af-
forded sufficient "corroborating evidence" including, among other
factors, the location where the pliers and penlight had been found
and the defendant's sweaty condition." 8 Moreover, the court found
an additional circumstance showing consciousness of guilt because
the jury may have concluded that the defendant lied about how he
got into the bushes." 9
In his dissent Justice Feinberg took a very different view. 20 He
noted that the defendant's location, perspiration, lack of breath, and
the leaves on his jacket just as easily could corroborate his alibi as
the prosecution's case. After all, if the defendant was fleeing the
scene of the crime, why was he only seven-tenths of a mile away one
hour after the burglary occurred? Moreover, assuming that the jury
attempted alibi, he was convicted. Ellis, 48 Wash. App. at 333-36, 738 P.2d at 1086-87. On
appeal, the court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction. Id. at
336, 738 P.2d at 1087. The dissent sharply disagreed with the majority, concluding that
"besides the tracking dog evidence, there is little to support an identification of Ellis as the
perpetrator." Id. at 340, 738 P.2d at 1089 (Ringold, J., dissenting.)
115. 139 Cal. App. 3d 234, 188 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1983).
116. Id. at 237, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 571.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 240, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 573.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 242-47, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 575-78 (Feinberg, J., dissenting).
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believed that the defendant lied about how he got in the bushes, did
that fact show a consciousness of guilt about a burglary committed
an hour earlier at a residence almost a mile away? Furthermore, why
did the dog take a full forty minutes to track the seven-tenths of a
mile? 12 1 The prosecution explained that the delay in tracking resulted
because the vwind had blown the scent around, causing the dog to
lose it and forcing the dog to nose around before picking it up again.
Justice Feinberg, however, noted that if true this circumstance merely
lessened the already questionable reliability of the dog. He cautioned
that although the scientific validity of dog tracking evidence has not
been demonstrated "even as well as voice-printers,"'' the jury likely
would give undue weight to tracking because "evidence gleaned from
the efforts of dogs has been part of our folklore for centuries.' '2
Despite his criticisms, Justice Feinberg did not recommend a
total ban on admission of tracking evidence. Instead, he agreed with
the rest of the court that the tracking evidence had established a rea-
sonable suspicion of the defendant's involvement in the burglary and
therefore was relevant in determining the legality of police conduct.124
Furthermore, although he believed that the case before the court
should not have gone to the jury, Justice Feinberg indicated that he
would permit a jury to receive tracking evidence if the jury were in-
structed to view such evidence with caution and there was far greater
corroboration than in Malgren.'2
Indeed, many courts have followed an approach that is similar
to Justice Feinberg's proposal. 2 6 This approach, however, makes two
assumptions that may be seriously flawed. 2 7 Not only does it assume
that the "superstitious awe" with which juries view the dog can be
overcome merely by an instruction, but also that juries will be sup-
plied with sufficient information to evaluate tracking accuracy fairly.
The view espoused by the Malgren majority-that minimal cor-
roborating evidence is necessary where the traditional five-part track-
121. Id. at 237, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 571.
122. Id. at 246, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 577. The California Supreme Court has rejected the
use of voiceprint evidence because of its lack of acceptance in the relevant scientific field.
People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976).
123. Malgren, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 246, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 577.
124. Id. at 245-246, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 577. Other cases have held that under certain
circumstances, tracking evidence may be admitted as a factor tending to establish probable
cause even where the evidence is too unreliable to be admitted as proof of guilt at trial.
See, e.g., State v. Maya, 126 N.H. 590, 598-99, 493 A.2d 1139, 1145-46 (1985).
125. 139 Cal. App. 3d at 242-47, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 575-78.
126. See infra text accompanying notes 639-642, 675-684; cases collected at Annotation,
supra note 98.
127. See infra text accompanying notes 575-627, 664-685.
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ing test is met-is the view of the majority of courts that have
considered the question. 128 This standard must be credited with of-
fering at least some test of a dog's accuracy, an accomplishment that
generally has eluded the courts in the narcotics cases.12 9 Moreover,
the majority test is not wholly without teeth; there are indeed cases
in which the evidence failed to satisfy the test for admissibility3 ° or
was found insufficient to support the verdict.' These cases, how-
ever, tend to be extreme with only the barest evidence of reliability
or corroboration. 32 Most importantly, the majority view still lacks
a scientific basis for determining when tracking is accurate and it fails
to address convincingly the concerns raised by Justice Feinberg and
by the courts adopting the minority position.
b. Debunking the Dog
The minority view excludes all dog tracking evidence for reasons
similar to those expressed by Justice Feinberg. The seminal case is
Brott v. State,133 in which the court expressed concern over the sci-
entific basis for admitting evidence of a bloodhound's tracking of
a trail to a defendant's home more than twelve hours after a bur-
glary.134 The sun had been shining steadily on the trail for that time,
and "perhaps hundreds" had walked over or paralleled the course
of the trail. 35 These circumstances led the court to ponder whether
128. See cases collected at Annotation, supra note 98.
129. As noted earlier, a few narcotics cases have demanded some showing of reliability
but they have not offered clear guidelines on how to make this showing. See cases cited
supra note 95. The People v. Malgren five-part test at least offers minimal guidance on
how to determine scenting accuracy in the context of tracking. See supra notes 115-127 and
accompanying text (discussing the Malgren five-part test). As discussed throughout the
remainder of this Article, however, that guidance is inadequate and surely is ineffective in
screening unreliable evidence from the jury.
130. E.g., McDonald v. State, 145 Ark. 581, 583, 224 S.W. 976 (1920) (witness admitted
that he did not know much about bloodhounds and could not say whether they followed
the trail correctly); O'Quinn v. State, 153 Ga. App. 467, 470, 265 S.E.2d 824, 825 (1980)
(error to admit sheriff's testimony where he had not trained dogs, was not their handler,
and the dogs had not been put on the tracks at the scene of the crime nor followed the
tracks to the defendant); Pedigo v. Commonwealth, 103 Ky. 41, 51, 44 S.W. 143, 146 (1898)
(dog not shown to be trained and tested in tracking humans).
131. See, e.g., People v. McPherson, 85 Mich. App. 341, 271 N.W.2d 228 (1978) (no
evidence corroborating the tracking, and the fingerprints found at the scene of the crime
were not the defendant's); State v. Loucks, 98 Wash. 2d 563, 656 P.2d 480 (1983) (conviction
reversed where fingerprint and blood type evidence at the scene of the crime tended to
exculpate the defendant instead of corroborating the tracking of a dog).
132. See supra cases cited at notes 130-131.
133. 70 Neb. 395, 97 N.W. 593 (1903).
134. Id. at 397, 97 N.W. at 594.
135. Id.
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the scent had largely dissipated or been contaminated by other per-
sons' scents. The court feared that difficulties in tracking would not
deter a hound, who would track as best he could and always follow
some scent, even if not the right one. Although the court conceded
that the bloodhound frequently may be right, it also concluded that
he is frequently wrong. 136 As a consequence of these concerns the
court reversed the defendant's conviction. In doing so, the court rec-
ognized the power, but challenged the logic, of the mythic dog:
It is a commonly accepted notion that he will start from the place
where a crime has been committed, follow for miles the track upon
which he has been set, find the culprit, confront him, and mirabile
dictu, by accusing bay and mien declare, "Thou art the man." This
strange misbelief is with some people apparently incorrigible. It is
a delusion which abundant actual experience has failed to dissipate.
It lives on from generation to generation. It has still the attrac-
tiveness of a fresh creation. "Time writes no wrinkles on its brow."
But it is nevertheless a delusion-an evident and obvious delusion.
The sleuthhound of fiction is a marvelous dog, but we find nothing
quite like him in real life.
137
Few jurisdictions have followed Brott, and no modern case has
done so. 138 Nevertheless, Brott often is cited by majority courts to
show recognition of the problems in using tracking evidence 139 that
the majority believes to be less serious and more easily rectified than
the court did in Brott. '40 Of special significance for this Article, how-
ever, is the Iowa Supreme Court's adoption in 1923 of the minority
view in State v. Grba.'41 Grba is the first reported case involving both
tracking and what was in effect a dog scent lineup, although the ac-
tual term "lineup" was not used. 42 In Grba, a sheriff asked seven
136. Id. at 398, 97 N.W. at 594.
137. Id. at 396, 97 N.W. at 593-94. Brott's rationale was sharply challenged in Terrell
v. State, 3 Md. App. 340, 239 A.2d 128 (1968). The Terrell court's lengthy defense of the
majority position may be summarized as follows: The foundational and corroboration
requirements prevent the jury from acting out of ignorance and superstitious awe; the jury
need not know how a dog tracks so long as the jury knows that the animal does so
accurately; the dog's trainer can answer any questions regarding the accuracy and meaning
of the dog's behavior; and the danger of error is minimized by the corroboration requirement
and is no greiter than the similar danger with human eyewitness testimony. Each of these
aspects of the Terrell defense is addressed in Parts III.G. and IV. of this Article.
138. Only five jurisdictions have adopted the minority view. People v. Pfanschmidt, 262
Ill. 411, 104 N.E. 804 (1914); Ruse v. State, 186 Ind. 237, 115 N.E. 778 (1917); State v.
Grba, 196 Iowa 241, 194 N.W. 250 (1923); State v. Storm, 125 Mont. 346, 238 P.2d 1161
(1951); Brott v. State, 70 Neb. 395, 97 N.W. 593 (1903).
139. E.g., State v. Loucks, 98 Wash. 2d 563, 567, 656 P.2d 480, 482 (1983).
140. See, e.g., Terrell v. State, 3 Md. App. 340, 239 A.2d 128 (1968); supra note 137
(discussion of Terrell).
141. 196 Iowa 241, 194 N.W. 250 (1923).
142. Id.
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or eight men to walk by two bloodhounds who had been tracking
the suspected bomber of a home. The handler did not know whom
the sheriff believed to be the "right man." The hounds alerted to
the defendant, and he subsequently was convicted of the crime. Al-
though there was other evidence linking the defendant to the crime,
the appellate court reversed because "the bloodhound may be right
in what he does, and he may be wholly wrong. How is it possible
to know in any particular case whether he is right or wrong?"'
' 43
No other dog scent lineup cases were reported until the 1980s.'4
Subsequent cases largely have ignored Grba, and mainly have en-
grafted the majority tracking test onto the analysis of lineups.
The flaws in the majority approach to tracking are most evident
in the dog scent lineup cases. These cases, for the most part, have
applied the majority foundational requirements for tracking to the
arguably very different circumstances of the dog scent lineup. 45 This
approach exposes the substantial deference that the majority tracking
view gives to dog scenting, because lineups rarely fail the majority
test despite the courts' repeated claims that they recognize the dog's
fallibility. 46 Applying the majority tracking test to scent lineups
sometimes causes extreme results that raise serious doubts about the
ability of the tracking test to adequately screen unreliable evidence,
protect against juror misuse of questionable evidence, or ensure the
full disclosure of information necessary for the jury to evaluate such
evidence. 1
47
These extreme results, which include convictions based on po-
tentially suggestive lineups 41 and lineups conducted years after the
crimes, 49 show a judicial unwillingness to examine the biological and
psychological reasons for misidentification. By doing so, the courts
flatly reject the notion that lineups should be treated like scientific
evidence. 50 This rejection perpetuates the image of the dog as sui
143. Id. at 263, 194 N.W. at 259.
144. See infra notes 145-151 and accompanying text; Annotation, supra note 4.
145. E.g., United States v. Gates, 680 F.2d 1117, 1119 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v.
McNiece, 558 F. Supp. 612, 616 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); State v. Roscoe, 145 Ariz. 212, 220-
21, 700 P.2d 1312, 1320-21 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1094 (1985).
146. See supra cases cited at note 145.
147. See infra notes 469-567, 652-685 and accompanying text.
148. See infra text accompanying notes 471-523 for a discussion of suggestive lineups.
149. These lineups are conducted after so long a period of time that common sense
suggests the danger of the scent's dissipation and contamination. See, e.g., Gates, 680 F.2d
1117 (lineup eight months after crime); McNiece, 558 F. Supp. 612 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (lineup
21 months after crime).
150. Roscoe, 145 Ariz. at 219, 700 P.2d at 1319 (scent lineups are "not bottomed on
any scientific theory").
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generis. The result is judicial approval of canine identifications that
border on the miraculous and that in effect endorse the dog's mythic
infallibility. This endorsement brings the tracking and lineup cases
closely in line with the unarticulated assumptions of the narcotics
cases.'-"
The impact of those unarticulated assumptions on both courts
and juries is the subject of much of the remainder of this Article.
One interesting wrinkle is worth noting here. Many of the re-
ported cases that raise issues regarding scent lineups involve lineups
conducted by a particular handler, John Preston. Since at least 1984,
it has been alleged that Preston's testimony is fraudulent because
neither he nor his dogs have the training or experience that he claims
they possess. Geraldo Rivera presented a supposed expos6 of Preston
on ABC's 20/20 television program. Although he conceded that dogs
have an "extraordinary sense of smell" that has been invaluable in
law enforcement,152 Rivera challenged whether Preston had the for-
mal training that he claimed to have, noted that other dog handlers
were of the opinion that Preston's dogs clearly were not "working"
and that Preston's claims regarding dogs' scenting prowess were be-
yond the abilities of any dog, and offered stories of the absurd lengths
to which Preston maintained his dog's noses could go (for example,
pond-sniffing to uncover evidence hidden beneath the water). 153 The
allegations of fraud are not in themselves significant because there
is a danger of fraud in every trial, Preston denies the fraud charge,
15 4
151. But see Ramos v. State, 496 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 1986) (the only modern case challenging
the assumption of the dog's infallibility in a lineup).
152. Tracking the Tracker, supra note 42.
153. Id. Rivera's allegations soon are to be tested in a case involving what apparently
is one of Preston's most impressive achievements. In Roscoe, 145 Ariz. at 218, 700 P.2d at
1318, Preston described the following series of tests during his testimony. First, his dog
(Harass II) scented the victim's clothing and then selected the defendant's car from a line
of five cars. Second, the dog scented the defendant's clothing and then selected the victim's
clothing (thus indicating that the defendant's scent was on that clothing) from a line of five
items of clothing. Third, after being put on the defendant's scent, the dog alerted to the
victim'sbicycle in a line of five bicycles. Each of these tests was, according to Preston, run
blind: Preston was not told in advance which article or location was connected with the
crime. Id. Either Preston's dog, at least on this one occasion, demonstrated an impressive
talent for scent discrimination, or Preston was in cahoots with local officers who told him
in advance which items to select. Defendant Roscoe will soon have an opportunity to prove
that the latter version is closer to the truth, since the Arizona Supreme Court, in a collateral
attack on the conviction, has remanded the case for a hearing on whether Preston was a
"fraud and liar" who was "actually dishonest in the manner in which he investigated the
case." State v. Roscoe, No. CR-89-0160-PC, slip op. at 4 (Ariz. Oct. 19, 1989). That hearing
is scheduled for late October 1990. Telephone interview with Shari Altendorf, a paralegal
on the defense team representing Roscoe (Sept. 10, 1990).
154. Tracking the Tracker, supra note 42.
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and he still has strong supporters in both law enforcement and the
appellate courts.' 55 What is significant, however, is that Preston's
credibility, and therefore the prosecution's willingness to use him as
a witness, was substantially damaged when in a later unreported case
the court ordered, and Preston's dogs failed, a test designed to de-
termine the accuracy of his dogs. 156 That failure serves to underscore
the value of employing traditional rules of evidence to evaluate the
reliability of dog scent identifications and of actively involving the
trial judge in screening out possibly unreliable scientific evidence.
It is important to clarify, however, that neither the alleged fail-
ure of dogs in scent lineup cases nor the weaknesses in the courts'
analyses necessarily require wholesale rejection of scent lineup evi-
dence. To the contrary, some European researchers maintain that
they have designed training and testing procedures that avoid the
kinds of errors allegedly made by Preston (for example, using in-
adequately trained dogs and suggestive lineup procedures), thus
bringing strong scientific support to the lineup procedure. 5 7 An un-
derstanding of the research and of many of the legal issues raised
by the lineup cases, however, first requires a basic understanding of
the biology and psychology of scenting and tracking.
H1. The Science of Scenting
Even the briefest review of the scientific principles underlying
dog scenting reveals that, contrary to the conclusions of many courts,
there are significant scientific differences among the various uses of
scenting: tracking, narcotics detection, and scent lineups. These dif-
ferences make it dangerous to rely upon judicial precedent regarding
the reliability of one form of dog scenting when addressing the re-
liability of another form. Examination of the science of scenting also
highlights the courts' failure to adopt a rational approach to any
155. Judge Dean Moxley of Brevard County said of Preston:
I think dogs can do a lot of things that people at the outset say they can't do
and they don't try. For instance, pick an arbitrary time figure-just, dog [sic]
can't track after 24 hours, or dogs can't track on pavement, or dogs can't track
a person on a bicycle. But they never tried it, and Mr. Preston has tried it, and
he is relating things that he observed.
Tracking the Tracker, supra note 42. More recently, the Supreme Court of Virginia declared
that Preston "demonstrated the reliability of his dog's talents." Epperly v. Booker, 235 Va.
35, 41 n.1, 366 S.E.2d 62, 65 n.1 (1988).
156. Tracking the Tracker, supra note 42.
157. De Bruin, The Detection Dog and Science (Mar. 15, 1988) (unpublished manuscript
on file with the author of this Article); Frawley, Police Service Dog Work in Holland, Doo
SPORTS, Apr. 1989, at 10.
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form of dog scenting-"rational" meaning an approach that max-
imizes the likelihood of admitting only reliable scent evidence that
is useful to the jury. Finally, examination of the science of scenting
suggests tentative guidelines for the design of fair dog scent lineups.
Before addressing any of these matters, however, it is important first
to consider the threshold. question: How sensitive is the dog's nose?
A. The Dog's Nose
The dog's nose maximizes the area available for exposure of
chemical receptor cells to the air.- 8 Large supports called turbinate
bones form scroll-like passages that permit the air to come into con-
tact with millions more cells than would be the case were the nasal
passages simply straight tubes. 15 9
The total number of olfactory cells varies with the dog's size but
in all breeds the number is far greater than in man. 160 Thus, the Ger-
man Sheep Dog has 220 million such cells compared to man's five
million.' 6' Laid out, these cells cover an area in the dog's head that
is about the size of the skin on his body, compared to humans, whose
equivalent area of exposure of olfactory cells to air is the size of a
postage stamp. 62 Moreover, almost one-eighth of the canine brain
is devoted to olfaction while the human olfactory lobes comprise a
much smaller percentage of total brain size. 63
The effect of the vast number of canine olfactory cells is open
to dispute. Some researchers claim that the result is a canine olfactory
acuity-the ability to detect extremely small concentrations of odor-
ous material-between one-hundred thousand and one-hundred mil-
lion times greater than man's. 64 Others claim that there is little
difference in acuity but a great difference in the ability to discrim-
inate among odors. 65 Whichever view is accurate-and recent data
158. L. WHITNEY, Doo PSYCHOLOGY: THE BAsrs FOR DoG TRANING 57 (1973).
159. Id.
160. W. SYROTUCK, SCENT AND THE SCENTING DoG 13 (1972).
161. Id.
162. W. SYROTUCK, supra note 160, at 11; L. WHITNEY, supra note 158, at 57.
163. W. SYROTUCK, supra note 160, at 11.
164. Id. at 13. An example illustrates the magnitude of this conclusion. If a gram of
butyric acid evaporated evenly throughout a ten-story building, a man standing in one of
the rooms would barely be able to perceive the acid. However, if a gram of butyric were
diluted to fill the air above the entire city of Hamburg, the dog described by these researchers
still could perceive the acid at an altitude of three hundred feet. Id.; see also M. PEARSALL
& H. VERBRUGGEN, M.D., supra note 3, at 5.
- 165. W. SYRoTucK, supra note 160, at 13; Moulton, Ashton & Eayrs, Studies in Olfactory
Acuity: Relative Detectability of n-Aliphatic Acids by the Dog, 8 A mmA BEHAV. No. 3-4,
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suggest that the truth is somewhere between the two extremes'6-there
is little doubt that the dog can detect minute traces of certain odors
and has olfactory sensibilities far superior to humans.1 67 The accuracy
of those sensibilities depends to a great extent, however, on the con-
cept of "scent complexes" or "scent groups."
B. Scent Groups
Dogs distinguish among human scents by recognizing the group
of odors specific to each individual. 68 Thus, a person's scent is a
composite odor in which no single odor necessarily predominates.
69
The dog's olfactory sensitivity is such that minute quantities of a
substance may contribute to this scent group even if, standing alone,
the trace substance could not be detected by the dog. 70
An experiment by Neuhaus, a well-known researcher on canine
scenting whose experiments during the 1950s included the first precise
measurements of canine acuity,' 7 ' illustrates this concept. Neuhaus
found that a dog could distinguish between a base mixture of four
aliphatic acids and a second identical mixture in which only one as-
pect was changed-a fifth aliphatic acid, caproic acid, was added,
but in a concentration too small for the dog to detect were he smell-
ing the caproic acid alone. Neuhaus then repeated the experiment
with a base of four completely different chemicals but again added
117 (1960). The theory is that each olfactory cilia responds to one specific odor so that
more cilia means more sensory information and thus a greater ability to distinguish differ-
ences among odors. See M. PEARSALL & H. VERBRUGGEN, M.D., supra note 3, at 11.
166. Specifically, this data suggests lower levels of the dog's sensitivity between ten and
one hundred times greater than man's. W. SYROTUCK, supra note 160, at 13-15.
167. Id. at 15.
168. See infra notes 169-173 and accompanying text.
169. See S. BRYSON, supra note 3, at 94. See generally, W. McCARTNEY, OLFACTION
AND ODOURS: AN OSPHRESIOLoGIcAL ESSAY (1968) (which contains detailed summaries of
many of the classic experiments on dog scenting acuity and ability to discriminate among
odors). It is important to note that this "composite odor" theory and, indeed all the other
theories described in Part II of this Article reflect the prevailing descriptions in the literature
of what it is that dogs scent and how they do so. Some critics maintain, however, that
scientific research on canine olfaction is so primitive that we do not have any idea what it
is that dogs scent, in sharp contrast, for example, to the unquestioned understanding that
what dogs see is varying wavelengths of electromagnetic radiation ("light"). E.g., R. LUBOW,
WAR ANIMALS 143 (1977) (research has not approached a "comprehensive theory of odor
perception"). If these critics are right, of course, that simply strengthens the ultimate
conclusion of this Article: dog scent lineups should not be admitted as evidence of guilt at
criminal trials because science has yet to develop a clear understanding of what it is that
dogs scent, much less how accurate they are at doing so.
170. See S. BRYSON, supra note 3, at 94.
171. W. MCCARTNEY, supra note 169, at 28.
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caproic acid to this new base to create a second mixture. This time,
the dog could distinguish the new base from the base plus caproic
acid only when the caproic acid was added in a concentration higher
than that necessary for the dog to detect the caproic acid standing
alone. 172
Researchers also have applied the concept of scent groups when
analyzing potential sources of suggestiveness in dog scent lineups.
17
3
The concept of scent groups also must be kept in mind in order fully
to understand what it is that a dog follows when he traces "ground
scent" and how that differs from what a dog follows when he traces
"air scent."
C. Ground, Air, and Track Scents
Ground scent results from a person walking through a vegetated
area. 74 Each footstep physically disturbs the soil, releasing moisture
and the vapors of soil ingredients.' 7 Plant life also is killed, releasing
odorous vegetative fluids. 176 Moreover, the soil contains hundreds of
species of bacteria that decompose the dead plant cells and vegetative
fluids released by the footstep.177 The decomposition creates addi-
tional odorous by-products. 78 Thus, each footstep creates an odor-
ous vapor more intense than that of the ground surrounding the
footstep. 179 This vapor can last for a substantial period of time de-
pending on the life span of the bacteria, which in turn varies ac-
cording to air temperature, humidity, type of soil surface, and other
factors. 0
Air or "airborne" scent is windborne human body odor.'8 ' Body
odor comes from a variety of sources: sweat and sebaceous gland
secretions, cells shed by the respiratory and genito-urinary tracts,
172. S. Bryson, supra note 3, at 94; W. McCARTNEY, supra note 169, at 29.
173. See, e.g., F. BuvTrwux, THE MIND OF TH Doo 99-100 (1973).
174. See B. Lows, supra note 43 at 66, 149, 209; W. SYRtorUcK, supra note 160, at 53-
70. Some writers refer to "ground scent" as "track scent." G. JomsoN, TRACKING DOG
THEORY AND METHOD 23 (1977). The term "ground" scent is clearer because a dog often
"tracks" scents that include more than just the odors of crushed vegetation. See infra text
accompanying notes 181-204.
175. W. SYRoTucK, supra note 160, at 53.
176. Id. at 53, 58.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 53-54, 58-59.
179. Id. at 54. The relative strengths of vegetative and human scents will, of course,
vary with the passage of time. Id. at 55-69.
180. Id. at 57-69.
181. G. JomsoN, supra note 174, at 25; B. Lown, supra note 43, at 209. Vegetative
ground scent also may be carried by the wind. G. JomsON, supra note 174, at 23-25.
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gaseous secretions such as the odor of garlic on an individual's breath,
toiletries, clothes, shoes, and bacteria.
18 2
The bacterial source of airborne scent is the most important'83
because bacterial action on dead human skin cells in the environment
of skin secretions creates odorous by-products that increase the in-
dividuality of each person's odor. 84 Moreover, the survival time of
the scent created by the bacteria depends, like the survival time of
ground scent, upon a variety of conditions, including air temperature
and humidity.'85 Air temperature and humidity also affect the length
of time during which the bacteria-created scent is released by altering
the life-span of the bacteria and, therefore, the time period during
which a dog can track a person based on that person's body odor.
8 6
The bacteria-created and other components of human body odor
are transmitted by skin "rafts," cornflake-shaped skin flakes ap-
proximately fourteen microns in size. 87 On average, each flake car-
ries four microbes and may consist of one or more cells.' 88 Forty
thousand such cells are shed by the body each minute.18 9 Each raft
is surrounded by a vapor cloud and leaves the body in an upward
movement of rapid hot body air currents.' 90 The raft's vapor or scent
cloud will last as long as the active microbes on the raft last.' 9' The
airborne rafts constitute "air scent."'' 92 But many such rafts even-
tually fall to the ground, some close to or on the vegetative footstep
path created by the tracklayer.193 The odor of these rafts combines
with the ground scent to create what, for purposes of this Article,
we will call "track scent." 1 9 4
182. Compare W. SYROTUCK, supra note 160, at 23-36 (human scent comes from a basic
odor that is typical of each individual and that can be varied somewhat by emotions,
toiletries, clothing, and diet) with M. PEARSALL & H. VERBRUGGEN, M.D., supra note 3, at
13-19 (human scent is made up of particulate components, including skin oils and particles,
perspiration, and a gaseous component).
183. W. SYROTUCK, supra note 160, at 32-34.
184. Id. at 31-34, 36.
185. See id. at 32-43, 59.
186. See id. at 32-35, 48, 59-69.
187. Id. at 37; see also M. PEARSALL & H. VERBRUGGEN, M.D., supra note 3, at 14-15
(using the surgical term "scurf" to describe human body rafts).
188. W. SYROTUCK, supra note 160, at 37.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 37-41.
191. Id. at 38-39.
192. Id. at 48-54.
193. Id. at 54-56, 71-74.
194. See id. at 67-68 (discussing the "combined vapors" of vegetative and raft scents).
The term "track scent" is used here as a shorthand reference to distinguish the combining
of human and vegetative scents from any discussion of those scents individually.
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D. Time and Psychology: Two Factors Affecting Scenting Accuracy
When raft and ground scents combine to form track scent, there
is a brief period during which the human raft scent is stronger than
the ground scent.195 Raft scent, however, falls off rapidly while ground
scent persists for a much longer period of time. 196 Consequently, a
dog searching across vegetation cannot follow a particular human's
scent for a long period of time.197 There is substantial agreement that
while the human scent is fresh, a properly trained dog can discrim-
inate among the odors of different humans,' 98 but that once the hu-
man odor fades the dog can no longer so discriminate. 199 Nevertheless,
the dog still can distinguish one human trail from another because
of differences in the intensity of each track. 200 Varying levels of in-
tensity arise when the tracks are laid at different times as well as when
the weights and foot sizes of the tracklayers differ.
20 1
Glen R. Johnson's experiments illustrate these concepts. He found
that dogs easily were able to distinguish between two tracklayers lay-
ing track in an "X" pattern when the track was only thirty minutes
old. 202 This was true even when the weights of the tracklayers were
substantially identical. 203 The dogs also were successful in distin-
guishing between tracklayers of different weights where the track was
three hours old. The dogs were unsuccessful, however, on the older
track when the weights of the tracklayers were substantially identical.
Essentially, the experiment illustrates that the dogs were following
the older track based solely on differences in ground scent intensity,
not differences in human body odor. 20
4
The accuracy of a dog's scent work also may be affected by a
broad range of psychological factors, some of which are unique to
195. G. JOHNSON, supra note 174, at 51; W. SYROTUCK, supra note 160, at 61.
196. Id.
197. See G. JOHNSON, supra note 174, at 39-55.; W. SYRoTucK, supra note 160, at 68-
82.
198. See, e.g., G. JOHNSON, supra note 174, at 46-47. But see I. Brisbin, Jr. & S. Austad,
Testing the Individual Odor Theory of Canine Olfaction (1989) (unpublished manuscript on
file with the author of this Article). Brisbin and Austad challenge the "prevailing" theory
of scent, which assumes that rafts embody a unique scent for each human; They argue
instead that each person may have a unique scent for each portion of the body (for example
a unique "elbow" scent) but that there is no single, unique scent characteristic of each
person regardless of where on the person's body the scent is emitted.
199. G. JOHNSON, supra note 174, at 39-55; W. SYROrUCK, supra note 160, at 78.
200. G. JOHNsON, supra note 174, at 39-55; W. SYROrUCK, supra note 160, at 93-94.
201. See W. SvaorucK, supra note 160, at 53-54 and infra notes 202-204 and accom-
panying text.
202. G. JOHNSON, supra note 174, at 43-44.
203. Id. at 46-47.
204. Id. at 47-48.
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particular types of scent work. 205 One factor common to all scent
work, however, is the existence of "minimal cues. ' 20 6 These are sub-
conscious muscular twitches by the handler that suggest whom or
what the handler wants the dog to identify or muscular twitches by
the tracklayer or the suspect that attract the dog's attention to a par-
ticular person in a lineup. 20 7 The cues cannot be consciously con-
trolled .208
E. The Types of Scenting Dogs
Each scenting dog can be classified, based on the dog's orien-
tation toward ground scent, air scent, or a combination thereof, as
fitting into one of three types: the tracking dog, the trailing dog, or
the air scent or "point source" dog.
20 9
A tracking dog is oriented toward vegetative vapors.21 0 Although
such a dog often can and will discriminate among human raft odors,
that ability is short-lived and weak because of the dog's focus on
vegetation. 21l Tracking dogs will not vary from the tracklayer's foot-
steps. 212 Moreover, the vegetative vapor upon which the dogs rely is
often so similar to surrounding scents that the dog may be working
hard yet end up following the wrong trail. 213 Nevertheless, these dogs
are preferred for tracking competitions because the relatively longer
life of vegetative scent enables the dogs to follow fairly old tracks.
21
1
Trailing dogs have a stronger orientation to the rafts that have
fallen to the ground on or near the tracklayer's route. 215 Because of
wind and other conditions, the rafts may fall near, but not precisely
on, the tracklayer's path so that the trailing dog will vary somewhat
from the tracklayer's footsteps. 2 6 Moreover, because trailing dogs
205. See infra text accompanying notes 519-549 (surveying the unique psychological
factors present in dog scent lineups); see also Craig, The Dog as a Detective, ScI. MONTHLY
January 1924, at 45 (discussing psychological factors in both tracking and scent lineups).
206. F. BUYTENDUK, supra note 173, at 90 ("[A] well-trained dog very readily responds
to any signs unconsciously given by its master."); Craig, supra note 205, at 43-47 ("minimal
movements," such as subconscious jerks of a leash by a handler or fearful reactions by a
suspect).
207. Craig, supra note 205, at 44-47; see F. BUYTENDIJK, supra note 173, at 81, 86, 99.
208. F. BUYTENDIJK, supra note 173, at 81.
209. W. SYROTUCK, supra note 160, at 71-75.
210. Id. at 71, 75-76, 78.
211. Id. at 78.
212. G. JOHNSON, supra note 174, at 26; W. SYROTUCK, supra note 160, at 71-72.
213. W. SYROTUCK, supra note 160, at 76.
214. G. JOHNSON, supra note 174, at 21, 23, 26.
215. W. SYROTUCK, supra note 160, at 71.
216. G. JOHNSON, supra note 174, at 26-29; W. SYROTUCK, supra note 160, at 71, 73,
76-77.
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focus on both human and vegetative scents, such dogs sometimes
inadvertently focus on the often predominant vegetative scent.
21 7
Careful training by a highly skilled handler, however, often can pre-
vent this problem.218
Air-scenting dogs are oriented primarily to airborne rafts, often
ignoring ground scent entirely. 2 9 They may draw on the human raft
portion of ground scent if that portion is compatible with the air
scent.2 0 Air-scenting dogs follow increasing levels of human odor
intensity until reaching the source of the odor and, therefore, often
are called "point source" dogs.
221
Point source dogs can be used either for "detection" or "dis-
crimination."2 2 "Detection" merely requires a dog to react when a
particular substance is present but does not require the dog to dis-
tinguish that substance from other similar substances. 223 "Discrim-
ination" by contrast requires a dog to tell apart similar substances.
224
As applied to the tracking of human scent, a point source detector
dog is trained to react to the presence of any human2 5 An avalanche
victim locator dog is an example. 226 A point source discriminator dog,
on the other hand, is trained to react only to the scent of the par-
ticular human being tracked.
227
The difference is important because, for example, searching for
plane crash survivors requires a dog who will react to any person's
presence (a "point source detector dog"), but tracking humans flee-
ing from the scene of a crime requires a dog who only will react to
a scent matching one at the crime scene (a "point source discrimi-
nator dog"); a dog who reacts to the scent of humans not present
at the crime scene (a "detector") may incorrectly "identify" a person
as the wrongdoer.
228
"Detection" and "discrimination" also are important concepts
when dealing with dogs trained to locate substances instead of peo-
ple. For example, narcotics detector dogs often are trained to react
to a broad range of illegal substances but not to distinguish between
217. W. SyROTucK, supra note 160, at 76.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 75-77.
220. Id. at 76.
221. Id. at 79-81.
222. Id.
223. See id. at 81-82.
224. See id. at 80-82.
225. See id.
226. Id. at 80.
227. Id.
228. See id. at 81-83.
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marijuana and morphine. 229 This training for "detection" instead of
discrimination is critical because police generally seek a dog who will
react to all illegal substances, not one who finds heroin but ignores
crack.
230
These distinctions among the types of dogs are important be-
cause using a dog trained for one purpose to accomplish another may
lead to misidentification. 23'
F. Recognizing the Science Behind Scent Lineups: A Tool for Crafting
Fair Lineup Procedures
This brief review of the science of scenting permits certain ten-
tative distinctions to be drawn among tracking, narcotics detection,
and scent lineups. These distinctions in turn suggest certain minimal
requirements for a fair scent lineup.
First, scent lineups require discrimination, not merely detection.
The discrimination must be among scents within the particular class
of human body odors. Consequently, dogs trained only in detection
will not offer trustworthy identifications in lineups. 2 2 Furthermore,
dogs trained to discriminate among non-human scents also may not
be reliable for lineups. Accordingly, the worst type of dog to use in
a lineup would be an animal trained to detect non-human scents, the
most obvious example being the narcotics detector dog. Similarly,
tracking dogs, because of their focus on non-human scents, should
not be used in lineups. Trailing dogs, while somewhat better than
trackers, are also unreliable because they may mistakenly follow the
vegetative rather than the human scent. Human discriminating point
source dogs offer the most reliable results, although for reasons noted
below even point source dogs are not ideal for lineup identifications.
Second, lineups often take place after a much greater lapse in
time between the crime and the scenting than is the case with a track-
229. Id. at 81.
230. Id. at 81-82. It also is useful to remember that the distinctions among "tracking,"
"trailing," and "air scenting" dogs are not relevant in narcotics detection because neither
vegetative scent nor human scent is being sought but rather only the scent of the illegal
substance. See id. at 79-83. Because narcotics detector dogs are trained to locate narcotics
odor and to follow increasing levels of that odor's intensity until reaching the source of the
odor, however, such dogs often are called "single element" point source dogs. See id. at
79-80. The phrase "single element" apparently is intended to emphasize that the dogs are
trained to detect only narcotics (not necessarily only one type of narcotic) but not other
substances, such as natural gas or explosives. Id.
231. See id. at 82 ("The dog must distinguish between the criminal and non-criminal
.... This must be treated with caution as vegetative vapour trained dogs may point out
the wrong person.").
232. See supra text accompanying notes 229-231; infra text accompanying note 540.
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ing. 33 Special care, therefore, must be taken only to conduct lineups
within the time limits that controlled experiments have indicated a
particular scenting dog can still successfully differentiate the wrong-
doer's scent from those of others.
3 4
Third, a dog's ability to track someone despite "crossed lines"
should not be taken as proof that the dog can select matching scents
in a lineup. "Crossed lines" result when numerous persons walk across
'the tracklayer's earlier laid path. 235 The dog's ability to select the
correct path after a significant lapse in time, such as three hours,
shows only that he can distinguish among differing intensities of
scents, not that he can distinguish accurately among different human
scents of similar intensity.3
6
Fourth, even a tracking or trailing dog who has demonstrated
an apparent ability, at least under certain conditions, to distinguish
among human scents of the same intensity cannot necessarily be
trusted to perform accurately in a lineup. Because dogs generally
react to odor groups rather than individual odors, elimination of key
odors from a scent group creates a whole new challenge for the dog.?
7
Thus a dog who has proven his ability to distinguish among different
combinations of ground and human scent will not necessarily be ac-
curate in distinguishing among human scent groups alone. Use of air
scenting dogs, therefore, is preferable because they focus on human
scent only. Ultimately, however, dogs are most trustworthy when
they are trained for a single specific scenting task.23 18 This is partic-
ularly true in the case of dogs used in scent lineups because unique
scenting problems face a dog employed in a lineup circumstance. 239
Consequently, the best candidate for performing lineups is a dog
233. Compare S. BRYSON, supra note 3, at 226-27 (suggesting, depending upon the
conditions, upper time limits for successful tracking from a few hours to 30 hours) with
United States v. Gates, 680 F.2d 1117 (6th Cir. 1982) (eight-month delay between crime and
scent lineup).
234. See infra text accompanying notes 383-390 for a discussion of the maximum
permissible time lag between the crime and the scent lineup.
235. B. LowE, supra note 43, at 67 ("crossed lines"); accord G. JoHNsoN, supra note
174, at 44-49 ("crosstracks").
236. See G. JomsoN, supra note 174, at 39-48.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 168-173.
238. See W. SYRoTucr, supra note 160, at 81-82 (emphasizing the importance of using
dogs with different types of training to perform different scenting tasks); Hepper, The
Discrimination of Human Odour by the Dog, 17 PERCEPTIoN 549, 550 (1988) (dogs were
specifically trained for the task that they were called upon to perform in an experiment);
Letter from Brigadier Jan de Bruin to Andrew E. Taslitz (June 26, 1989) [hereinafter Letter
II] (on file at the Hastings Law Journal office) (recommending the use in scent lineups of
only dogs specially trained for that task).
239. See infra text accompanying notes 514-544.
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specially trained for lineup identifications and shown to have a proven
track record of reliably identifying defendants in lineups. Although
a dog specially trained for lineups but also trained in other scenting
tasks is not nearly as ideal as an exclusive lineup specialist, such a
dog is by far preferable to a dog trained for tracking or trailing but
not for lineups.
Fifth, lineups must be "blind," that is, conducted by a handler
who not only has no idea whom the police suspect, but also has in-
sufficient information regarding the case to form his own opinion
as to who is the probable wrongdoer. Without such "blindness,"
even a highly skilled and unquestionably honest handler will convey
"minimal cues" that will reduce the likelihood of an accurate iden-
tification. 24
0
Sixth, lineup participants themselves may convey "minimal cues"
that may affect the dog's performance. 24' Consequently, either object
lineups should be used or human lineups must be designed to block
the dog from seeing lineup participants.
Finally, unique psychological factors-which will be discussed
in a later section of this- Article-may affect a dog's performance in
a lineup. 242 Special controls therefore must be designed to minimize
or eliminate the effects of these factors.
243
111. Evidentiary Objections to Dog Scent Lineups
The answers to two questions guide much of the law of evidence,
particularly the law governing scientific evidence. First, what impact
will this evidence have on the jury? Second, how trustworthy is this
evidence? 2" The first question requires the court to consider such
240. See supra notes 206-208 and accompanying text.
241. Craig, supra note 205, at 46.
242. See infra text accompanying notes 514-544.
243. Several of these seven suggestions already have been adopted in the Netherlands.
See infra text accompanying notes 522-548.
244. See, e.g., Doyle, Applying Lawyers' Expertise to Scientific Experts: Some Thoughts
About Trial Court Analysis of the Prejudicial Effects of Admitting and Excluding Expert
Scientific Testimony, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 619, 620-22 (1984) (noting that the fears of
jury misuse of science, particularly "bad science," guide the law of scientific evidence);
Graham, Expert Witness Testimony and the Federal Rules of Evidence: Insuring Adequate
Assurance of Trustworthiness, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 43, 44 (1986) ("Trustworthiness of
expert witness opinion testimony today is a critical question in much if not most litigation
.... "); Imwinkelried, The Standard for Admitting Scientific Evidence: A Critique from
the Perspective of Jury Psychology, 28 VILL. L. REV. 554, 564 (1983) [hereinafter lmwin-
kelried, Critique] ("The combined effect of these criticisms-the level of error in forensic
analysis and the jury's suppossed inability to critically evaluate the evidence-is a powerful
argument for caution in the admission of scientific proof.").
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matters as whether the evidence will inflame the jurors' passions so
that they will decide the case based on their emotions, not based on
reason; whether jurors can and will give the evidence its appropriate
weight; and whether, if given appropriate instructions, they can and
will use the evidence only for its proper purposes. 245 The second ques-
tion is related to the first, in the sense that courts are less afraid that
juries will misuse evidence when that evidence is known fo be highly
trustworthy.26
This Article began by examining the myth of canine infallibility
because that myth offers guidance in determining what impact scent
lineup evidence will have on juries. The Article next examined the
scientific understanding of what it is that dogs scent and how they
do so because science sheds light on the trustworthiness of scent line-
ups. The question of trustworthiness-and ways to improve trust-
worthiness-is addressed in greater detail below, detail that cannot
be understood without the scientific background summarized in Part
II of this Article.
Myth and science thus provide a framework for examining the
host of potential evidentiary and constitutional objections to scent
lineups that are addressed below.
A. The Frye Rule
(1) Are Scent Lineups "Scientific" Evidence?
The classic test for the admissibility of scientific evidence was
articulated in Frye v. United States:247
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.
Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle
must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting
expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle
or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the par-
ticular field in which it belongs.2 s
245. E.g., M. GRAHAM, EVIDENCE: TEXT, RULEs, ILLUSTRATIONS AND PROBLEMS: THE
COMMENTARY METHOD 20, 22 (1983) (noting concerns that a jury may decide based on
"sympathy, hatred, contempt, retribution, or horror" or may overvalue the probative worth
of particular evidence); infra notes 675-684 and accompanying text (discussing using jury
instructions to control the weight jurors give evidence).
246. See infra notes 247-283, 409-450 and accompanying text.
247. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
248. Id. at 1014.
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Recently, there has been much dispute over whether the Frye test
makes sense. 249 The test has been attacked as too vague and difficult
to apply, as too conservative, and as too liberal. 2 0 Whatever the mer-
its of the test, it remains an obstacle to admissibility of evidence in
many jurisdictions, 251 and in many other jurisdictions the Frye gen-
eral acceptance requirement is still a factor that guides the court's
admissibility decision.
252
Frye only applies, however, to "scientific" evidence.2 53 The
courts' failure to address adequately or, for that matter, to address
at all the threshold question of what constitutes scientific evidence
has led the courts to apply Frye in some cases but not in others,
without a reasoned basis for distinguishing among them.2 4 The courts
have found it particularly difficult to address the application of Frye
to two types of dog scenting evidence: tracking and lineups.
a. The Tracking Analogy
In People v. Craig,25" the court at least implicitly confronted the
threshold question of whether tracking is "scientific" evidence within
the meaning of Frye. Defendant Craig appealed his robbery con-
viction on the ground that dog tracking evidence was improperly ad-
mitted at trial, in violation of the Frye standard. The court of appeals
rejected Craig's challenge and concluded that Frye governs inanimate
scientific techniques but not the ability of a properly trained animal
to utilize a "subjective, innate capability.' '256 The court reasoned that,
with inanimate scientific techniques, one piece of testing apparatus
is essentially the same as another. Since each dog has different abil-
ities, however, those special abilities must be demonstrated on an
individual basis.257 The court found such a showing based on the
testimony of Robert Outman, a dog trainer who had trained both
249. See, e.g., Rules for Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 115 F.R.D. 79 (1986)
[hereinafter Rules for Admissibility]; Symposium on Science and Rules of Evidence, 99
F.R.D. 187 (1983).
250. E.g., Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1197, 1208-28 (1980) (summarizing
criticisms of Frye).
251. Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595, 601
(1988) (noting that Frye still is followed in most jurisdictions).
252. E.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985).
253. Giannelli, supra note 250, at 1219; McCord, supra note 30, at 1181, 1189.
254. See, e.g., McCord, supra note 30, at 1181-89.
255. 86 Cal. App. 3d 905, 150 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1978).
256. Id. at 916, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 682.
257. Id. at 915, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 682.
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Bobby, the dog involved in the case, and Bobby's handler. Because
Outman testified that Bobby had a one hundred percent accuracy
record in training and in four actual cases, the court held that there
was ample proof of reliability to justify admitting the results of Bob-
by's tracking.
258
The Craig court's conclusion that the Frye test does not apply
to expert testimony when the testimony's value depends in part on
the proper training of a subjective, innate ability directly contradicts
earlier California case law. Thus, for example, the California courts
have applied Frye to testimony by voice identification experts, who
often partly base their opinion that two voices are identical on an
aural comparison; each expert listens to two voices and concludes,
with his trained ear, that the voices sound alike.259 Obviously, the
value of the expert's opinion turns both on his subjective, innate
ability to distinguish among similar voices and on the proper training
of that ability. There is no conceptual difference between the voice
identification and tracking cases, even though one depends upon the
training of a human ability and the other upon that of a canine.
Examining the purposes behind the Frye standard makes this
point clearer. Frye is designed to screen out expert evidence that the
jury cannot properly evaluate. The jury's inability to evaluate certain
evidence usually is a result of its tendency to be "overawed" by cer-
tain types of experts. 2 0 Such evidence will be admitted under Frye
258. Id. at 916-17, 150 Cal. Rptr. 682-83.
259. People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 29, 549 P.2d 1240, 1243, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 147
(1976); accord R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE: TEXT,
PROBLEMS, TRANSCRIPTS AND CASES 969 (2d ed. 1983). A voice identification expert also
bases his opinion on a visual examination of a "spectrogram," which is a graphic represen-
tation of each human voice plotted by time, frequency, and intensity. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d at
29, 549 P.2d at 1243, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 147. Although the expert's opinion thus turns in
part on purportedly objective data (the spectrogram), he offers his opinion to a specified
level of certainty because of the combination of this data with his subjective belief that, to
his "trained ear," the two voices sound alike. Consequently, if his trained ear is not effective
in matching voices, the expressed level of certainty of his opinion is subject to attack, and
indeed, if the spectrogram itself is inconclusive, the exercise of his trained ear may be the
factor that raises his opinion from uncertainty whether two voices match to a clear declaration
that they are from the same person. Additionally, the spectrogram is not as "objective" as
it may first appear because no scale governs the examiner's determination that the graphic
representations of the voices look alike. See Lewis, The Element of Subjectivity in Inter-
pretation of Test Results, in SCIENTIFC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE 429 (E. Imwinkelried 2d ed.
1981) ("The nadir of unstructured subjectivity may be the recently developed technology
popularly known as voiceprint .... The interpretation [of the voiceprint] is an individual
reaction on the examiner's part, which borders on the intuitive and is not susceptible to
objective verification.")
260. See Ex Parte Hinton, 548 So. 2d 562, 569 (Ala. 1989) (polygraph results inadmissible
because of danger that jury will be "overawed"), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 419 (1989); State
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only if there is an independent guarantee of trustworthiness. Frye
provides that guarantee by ensuring review of the evidence's accuracy
by a "minimal reserve" of unbiased experts.2 61 The need for such
a review exists whenever the jury is likely to be overawed by the ex-
pert and does not depend on whether the expert's opinion relates to
the use of inanimate instruments that are substantially identical in
every case or animate instruments such as dogs, the reliability of
which may vary with the particular instrument being used.
A hypothetical situation illustrates this point. If, as was the case
in Craig, jurors with preconceived notions of canine infallibility lis-
ten to a dog trainer testify that his particular dog is one hundred
percent accurate, the jury likely will give that testimony tremendous
weight. This result, however, is only acceptable if the testimony is
supported by scientific research showing that at least some dogs are
capable of nearly perfect discrimination among human scents. If sci-
entific experimentation in fact reveals that dogs are inaccurate at
scent discrimination, and some researchers indeed have made this
claim,2 62 a jury verdict based largely on the dog trainer's testimony
would be based on misleading evidence. Applying Frye in such cir-
cumstances would minimize this danger because the trainer's testi-
mony would be admitted only after proof that a substantial segment
of the scientific community accepts the reliability of the dog's ability
to discriminate among human scents.
Looked at from yet another perspective, Craig makes a different
logical error in concluding that the fact that the law requires each
dog's abilities to be demonstrated on an individual basis renders dog-
scenting evidence "non-scientific." To the contrary, this individu-
alized inquiry into whether a scientific instrument is in proper work-
ing order is common to, and an essential part of, the legal concepts
governing admissibility of "scientific" evidence. The accuracy of any
scientific test depends on the validity of both the underlying scientific
principles and the instrument applying those principles, as well as on
the calibration and testing of the instrument to ensure that it is in
proper working order. 263 Thus, the accuracy of dog scent discrimi-
v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989) (whether jury will be "overawed" was critical
factor in determining whether to admit expert testimony regarding child abuse); see also
Starrs, Frye v. United States Restructured and Revitalized: A Proposal to Amend Federal
Evidence Rule 702, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 249, 250 (1986) (noting that "juries give overweening
deference to scientific evidence, regardless of its validity within the scientific community.").
261. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Giannelli, supra
note 250, at 1208, 1215-16 (noting that an impartiality requirement better serves Frye's
purposes).
262. See infra text accompanying notes 363-372, 382 and accompanying text.
263. See infra text accompanying notes 451-456.
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nation depends upon the accuracy of the underlying scientific prin-
ciple that human scents are unique.2 64 Moreover, dogs, as the
instruments, must be shown to be capable of discriminating among
these scents. In each case the particular dog must be proven to be
properly trained, that is, "calibrated," and his individual ability to
discriminate accurately among human scents must have been tested
on the occasion in question.2 65 A "calibration" requirement, there-
fore, helps to ensure that application of a scientific technique on a
particular occasion is accurate. It does not, however, alter the es-
sential nature of that technique as scientific or remove the necessity
for an initial inquiry into whether the technique and the principles
on which it is based are valid.
b. The Lineup Cases
Craig's logic-that Frye does not govern techniques that rely on
the subjective, innate capabilities of animals-would, if accepted, bar
Frye's application to all dog scenting feats, including dog scent line-
ups. Indeed, some lineup cases have rejected Frye's application al-
though they have done so based on a very different theory than that
articulated in Craig.
State v. Roscoe266 is one such case. In Roscoe, the appellate court
affirmed the trial court's admission of scent lineup evidence over the
defendant's objection that the evidence was not generally accepted
among members of the scientific community.2 67 Surprisingly, the ap-
pellate court reasoned that, since it did not consider scent lineup ev-
idence to be scientifically based, proof of its acceptance by the
scientific community was not necessary in order for the evidence to
be admitted. The court noted that "it was not the theories of New-
ton, Einstein or Freud which gave the evidence weight ' 268 because
no -one knows how or why the dog did what it did. The court con-
cluded that the jury's verdict need not be based on scientific prin-
ciples, but instead could be based on the credentials and integrity of
the dog's handler, John Preston, and the "simple idea" that, when
264. See infra text accorfipanying notes 328-338.
265. See infra text accompanying notes 451-456.
266. 145 Ariz. 212, 700 P.2d 1312 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1094 (1985).
267. More specifically, the defendant argued that two claims were not generally accepted:
(1) the claim that trained dogs can perform scent identification lineups in addition to
tracking; and (2) the claim that such dogs can either track or identify after a long hiatus
between the time the scent is laid down on 'the scene and the time at which the dog is put
on the scent. Id. at 218-19, 700 P.2d at 1318-19.
268. Id. at 220, 700 P.2d at 1320.
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properly trained and handled, dogs can discriminate among human
odors. 269 Moreover, the court suggested that because the handler's
credentials and integrity were effectively probed and tested, his tes-
timony did not so overawe the jurors as to render them incapable
of evaluating the testimony effectively from their own knowledge.
270
The Roscoe court's conclusion that the jury's verdict was not
based on what commonly are understood as scientific principles is
plainly wrong. Even if the scientific basis was not explicitly artic-
ulated in the testimony, without the unspoken scientific assumption
that the biology of his dog's nose somehow enabled it to discriminate
among human scents, the dog handler's testimony would be com-
pletely irrelevant. 271 This assumption was given an air of pseudo-sci-
entific validity when Preston claimed that his own observations in
hundreds of cases demonstrated his dog's reliability. Further, the
implication of scientific infallibility crept in when Preston was al-
lowed to explain to the jury the need for "blind lineups." Because
the phrase "blind lineups" sounds scientific, it was likely to lead the
jury to perceive Preston as not simply a dog handler but rather an
individual versed in the science of devising carefully planned, ac-
curate, and fair lineups. His testimony about his observations in other
cases thus may have seemed to the jury to be a description of the
results of hundreds of carefully designed individual experiments. In
effect Preston's testimony derived its weight from science, thereby
creating an unquestionable need for the application of Frye.
The Roscoe court also incorrectly concluded that dog scenting
evidence does not derive its weight from "scientific" theory and that
Frye therefore does not apply because "no one knows exactly how
or why some dogs are able to track or scent, or the degree to which
they are able to do so. ' '272 The court failed to recognize that ig-
269. Id.
270. See id. at 219-20, 700 P.2d at 1319-20.
271. Indeed, the Roscoe court acknowledged that the scent lineup evidence was offered
at trial on the theory that it is "common knowledge that some dogs, when properly trained
and handled, can discriminate between human odors." Roscoe, 145 Ariz. at 219-20, 700
P.2d at 1319-20. The court concluded that there was "some support for this in the scientific
literature." Id. at 220 n.2, 700 P.2d at 1320 n.2. Curiously, however, the court viewed the
existence or non-existence of scientific support for this "common knowledge" as irrelevant
because the scientific data was not the basis for the presentation of the evidence to the
jury. Id. Even more curiously, the court, in the context of a collateral attack by Roscoe on
his conviction, recently has reaffirmed its general approach to scent lineup evidence as "non-
scientific," see State v. Roscoe, No. CR-89-0160-PC, slip op. at 5 (Ariz. Oct. 19, 1989),
but, in doing so, has conceded that "there was and is not demonstrable scientific acceptance
in the relevant scientific community for Preston's techniques." Id.
272. Id. at 219, 700 P.2d at 1319.
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norance of scientific principles and lack of sufficient scientific and
experimental proof is precisely what Frye seeks to guard against. In
fact, as two well-known commentators on the law of evidence have
noted, this particular concern of Frye is especially important in crim-
inal cases. According to Andre A. Moenssens and Fred E. Inbau:
In criminal cases, where an individual's freedom is at stake, courts
certainly ought to be very cautious in admitting evidence based upon
insufficiently tested or verified premises, especially when the evi-
dence seeks to establish the ultimate issue in the case-the iden-
tification of the accused as the perpetrator of the offense. It would
appear that when this is the issue, there may be occasions when the
more exacting general acceptance test of Frye, despite its deficien-
cies, should be followed. 273
This comment is directly relevant to scent lineups, which often are
the only direct evidence of the perpetrator's identity. The courts
therefore must be "very cautious" in admitting such evidence, a cau-
tion well served by the application of Frye.
c. Juror Inability to Evaluate Lineup Evidence Fairly
Even if it is conceded that scent lineups are not based on any
scientific theory as that term is commonly understood, Frye should
apply whenever jurors are likely to be in awe of expert evidence.
It is highly likely that jurors will be overawed by dog scenting
evidence. Psychology, however, offers little to support or refute this
conclusion, since the existing psychological studies regarding the ef-
fect of expert testimony on juries are scant, confusing, and con-
flicting.274 Nor should the court's own sense of what will overawe
the 'jury be the guidepost, since such a measure would be subjective
and offer little in the way of reasoned guidance to the analysis. Re-
sort to mythology, however, provides an objective standard for re-
solving the problem of jury overawe.
As discussed throughout this Article, there is no question that
the myth of the dog's infallible scenting abilities exists and survives
across generations, despite repeated, reasoned attacks. The Roscoe
273. A. MOENSSENS, F. INBAU & J. STARRS, SCrENTI-Ic EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 12
(3d ed. 1986).
274. E.g., R. HAsTIE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, INSIDE TlE JuRY 8 (noting that
judicial reluctance to use social science research results regarding juries "derives from the
lack of extensive empirical research on some of the legally significant aspects of jury
performance"). Compare Massaro, supra note 27, at 444 (noting lack of empirical evidence
that jurors are overawed by mental health experts) with Imwinkelried, Critique, supra note
244, at 570 (conceding that there is "meager data" regarding the ability of juries to evaluate
expert testimony but summarizing several studies which suggest that sometimes juries can
indeed evaluate such evidence properly).
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court itself, while rejecting application of the Frye standard, nev-
ertheless recognized the existence of the myth and even noted that
some states prohibit dog scenting evidence because of a fear that
jurors will be misled by "folklore superstitions that attach to blood-
hounds and their ability to track. '275 The Roscoe court further con-
ceded that there is "some likelihood that jurors may give such evidence
considerable weight. ' 276 Indeed, to counteract this possibility, the
court suggested that demonstrations in the courtroom or on film
would be advisable. 277 The court further declared that it "would have
been better if the trial court had required some independent veri-
fication of the dog's abilities. ' 278 Nevertheless, despite the absence
of both verification and the recommended demonstrations, the court
upheld the admissibility of the lineups in the case before it. It refused
to reach the logical conclusion that its own analysis suggested: jurors
will view scent lineups as possessing precisely the kind of mythic in-
fallibility that calls for the application of Frye.
Furthermore, factors other than the probability that the jury will
be overawed suggest that juries are incapable of fairly evaluating dog
scent evidence and, consequently, that Frye should apply.
279
First, only minimal literature currently is available for defense
lawyers to use in developing effective cross-examinations. Second,
few qualified scientific experts are available to testify on dog scenting
and to assist in trial preparation.
2 1
0
Third, the dog's scenting record often is offered as being perfect
or nearly so (for example, the "100%0 accuracy" rate attributed to
the dog in Craig)281 while the jury has little information available to
challenge that image. Such descriptions reinforce the myth that al-
ready has taken hold in the jurors' minds. Fourth, although dog
scenting evidence has been used for centuries, 2 2 experimental re-
search, particularly with regard to the accuracy of dog scent line-
ups, 283 still is in its infancy. It therefore may be advisable to keep
275. 145 Ariz. at 220, 700 P.2d at 1320.
276. Id. at 221, 700 P.2d at 1321.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. The four factors considered below are based on analyses of Frye-related questions
suggested by Professors Saltzburg and McCord. See McCord, supra note 30, at 1188.
280. Professor I. Lehr Brisbin, Jr., a well-known specialist in dog-scenting and research
professor at the University of Georgia, has suggested that only a handful of truly qualified
experts are available. Professor Brisbin also has bemoaned the dearth of scientific literature
and the need for further research. Telephone interview with I. Lehr Brisbin, Jr. (June 1,
1989).
281. People v. Craig, 86 Cal. App. 3d 905, 917, 150 Cal. Rptr. 676, 683 (1978).
282. See supra text accompanying notes 34-64.
283. See supra note 280; infra text accompanying notes 328-356.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42
DOG SCENT LINEUPS
this incomplete and inconclusive scientific picture from the jury.
In short, reliable jury decision-making can be served best, in
those jurisdictions still using the Frye test, by Frye's application to
scent lineup evidence.
d. The Novelty Question
Once it is understood that dog scent evidence is or should at least
be treated as "scientific" evidence, one potential question regarding
Frye's application still remains: is such evidence generally, and lineup
evidence in particular, sufficiently "novel" that Frye should apply?
28
The simple answer is that "novelty" should be irrelevant. The rule
that Frye governs the admissibility of "novel" scientific evidence
apparently has its roots in Professor Giannelli's comprehensive ar-
ticle on Frye.2 5 The novelty requirement is best understood, however,
as a simple statement that once a scientific technique is generally
accepted, the question is no longer "novel" and need not be reli-
tigated. Thus, if the question has never been litigated, the "novelty"
requirement should be no bar to raising Frye. Similarly, even where
general acceptance has been demonstrated once in litigation, the
"novelty" requirement should not bar relitigation if the scientific
community changes its mind when further research reveals that a
previously trusted technique no longer is valid.
Although dog scenting evidence has been used in one form or.
another for centuries, the general acceptance of such evidence rarely
284. Starrs, supra note 260, at 252-53 (noting Frye's "novelty" requirement).
285. Id. at 252-53 (attributing the novelty requirement to Professor Giannelli). Professor
Starrs' article provides an excellent critique of the "novelty" requirement. The requirement,
he notes, is ill-defined and often presents pointless and time-consuming foundational prob-
lems for trial courts. Id. He asks whether "novel" means historically "new" to the scientific
world. If so, will historically "old" techniques not be subject to Frye even where scientific
research has resulted in rejection of those techniques by most of the scientific community?
Id. at 253. Clearly, it would be illogical to answer "yes" to this last question. Similarly,
what can guide a court in determining whether a new technique that offers but a "twist"
on an old principle is truly "novel"? Moreover, science might accept one use of an old
technique but not a new and "novel" use. Surely the courts should not approve an application
of the technique where that new application is not yet accepted by the scientific community.
Additionally, if Frye does not apply to old techniques, the courts will have to ignore
scientific developments revealing that a once valued technique is indeed not trustworthy. Id.
at 253. In short, the "novelty" requirement defeats the very purposes of Frye unless the
requirement is but a judicial time-saving device; that is, a kind of "judicial notice." Professor
Starrs cautions against even this role for the "novelty" rule, rejecting the rule altogether.
Accordingly, the only logical meaning for the novelty requirement is that assigned in the
text of this Article: to bar relitigation of scientific reliability questions unless new evidence
sheds a different light on the inquiry.
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has been tested. 2 6 Consequently, the "novelty" requirement does not
bar application of Frye. This conclusion is even stronger, however,
regarding scent lineups since such lineups apparently did not enter
widespread use until the 1980s. 287 Lineup evidence thus truly is
"novel" and therefore at a minimum must survive Frye before being
presented to the jury.
288
(2) Is the Frye Test Met?
Only three cases have addressed, even indirectly, whether scent
lineups pass the Frye test. In one such case, United States v.
McNiece,289 the defendant objected to the use of scent lineups be-
cause the relevant scientific community generally had not accepted
the principle that each person has a unique scent. 290 The court, how-
ever, applied a relevancy test in which the Frye general acceptance
rule was but one factor, and concluded that the lack of general ac-
ceptance was unimportant. 29' The court noted that the jury was likely
to perceive the actions of an animate, nonmechanical instrument such
as the dog as subject to error.292 Ignoring the implications of the
dog's mythic infallibility, the court concluded that evidence of an
object lineup conducted fully twenty-one months after the crime was
admissible.
293
In a second case, United States v. Gates,294 the court upheld the
admission of lineup evidence because the five-factor test for the ad-
missibility of tracking evidence had been passed. The majority never
considered Frye. Circuit Judge Kennedy, in a concurring opinion,
concluded that the lineup evidence should not have been admitted
because no foundation was laid to establish either that scent lineups
were reliable or that they were generally accepted as such in the rel-
evant scientific community. Nevertheless, Judge Kennedy concurred
in the result, finding that the error was harmless "in light of the
overwhelming evidence of appellant's guilt.
'295
Ramos v. State,296 is the only case involving a scent lineup in
which a conviction was reversed by an appellate court and remanded
286. See supra text accompanying notes 255-272.
287. See supra notes 141-144 and accompanying text.
288. See infra text accompanying notes 289-353.
289. 558 F. Supp. 612 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
290. Id. at 615.
291. Id. at 615-16.
292. Id. at 615.
293. Id. at 617.
294. 680 F.2d 1117 (6th Cir. 1982).
295. Id. at 1120 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
296. 496 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 1986).
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for a new trial because of the prosection's failure to establish the
reliability of the lineup evidence. The Ramos court rejected the pro-
secution's argument that testimony of a police officer and of the
dog's handler was sufficient to establish such reliability. 297 Although
the court acknowledged that the United States Supreme Court pre-
viously had approved the use of drug sniffer dogs, and that the Su-
preme Court of Florida itself previously had approved the use of
tracker dogs, 298 the court held that tracking and narcotics detection
were "not the same" as scent lineups. 299 The court found that the
issue of reliability of dog scent lineups was a question of first im-
pression, and therefore, absent adequate proof of the reliability of
scent lineups at trial, the defendant's conviction for first degree mur-
der and his subsequent death sentence could not stand.3°° The court,
however, did not frame its analysis in terms of the Frye general ac-
ceptance requirement, but instead focused on evidence of "reliabil-
ity.,'301
These cases illustrate that the case law offers little guidance in
determining Frye's application to scent lineups. Because analogy to
the facts of similar cases is unavailing, whether dog scent lineups
meet the Frye test can be determined only by examining the basic
definitions of the terms comprising the Frye rule, the methods for
proving "general acceptance," and the policies to be served by ap-
plying Frye.
First, the "relevant scientific field" must be defined. 0 2 Many
scientific techniques do not fall within any one academic discipline. 30 3
For example, voiceprint analysis, which seeks to match a known and
an unknown voice as coming from the same person "requires knowl-
edge of anatomy, physiology, physics, psychology, and linguis-
tics. ' ' 3°4 Similarly, scent lineup analysis requires knowledge of canine
and human anatomy, physiology, physics, psychology, chemistry,
and osphresiology.3 5 Defining what constitutes the relevant field of-
ten pre-determines whether Frye is met. Thus, if the field of voice-





302. Giannelli, supra note 250, at 1208-10. -
303. Id. at 1208.
304. People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 34, 549 P.2d 1240, 1246, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 150
(1976).
305. See, e.g., W. McCARTNEY, supra note 169, at 1-15. "Osphresiology," the study of
the sense of smell, is a word no longer found in the dictionary, but the use of which
McCartney, in his classic work on the subject, has revived. See id. at 10.
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print analysis is defined to consist of the technicians who administer
voice spectrograms, such technicians unquestionably will declare
voiceprint analysis "generally accepted." 3 6 On the other hand, if the
field is defined more broadly to include research scientists in many
of the fields noted above, the opposite declaration will result.
30 7
The best approach is to define the relevant field to include
scientists who either have conducted research regarding the relevant
principles and techniques or are familiar with and capable of cri-
tiquing such research.3 8 Testimony regarding general acceptance
among such scientists should be offered only by one of their number
who does not make his living from application of the technique in
question.30 9 This approach has several advantages. Frye's purpose
is to ensure some minimal guarantee that evidence is trustworthy.310
The general acceptance requirement achieves that purpose by as-
suring that "those most qualified to assess the general validity of
a scientific method will have the determinative voice." 31 Clearly,
scientists are most qualified to assess the validity of a scientific
method. This assertion is better understood when it is emphasized
that the Frye requirement only makes sense if "general acceptance"
refers to acceptance of the results of, and the inferences drawn from,
scientific experimentation. After all, it is experimentation that dem-
onstrates the value of a scientific technique.3 12 Only a scientist is
306. See Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d at 39-40, 549 P.2d at 1249-50, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 153-54.
307. See J. TARANTINO, STRATEGIC USE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 132-33, 135 (1988).
308. See People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d at 38, 549 P.2d at 1249, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 153;
Moenssens, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence-An Alternative to the Frye Rule, 25 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 545, 548-51 (1984).
309. Giannelli, supra note 250, at 1215-16; see Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d at 38, 549 P.2d at
1249, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 153.
310. Giannelli, supra note 250, at 1206-08.
311. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
312. Moenssens, supra note 308, at 556-57. Professor Moenssens points out that a
technique should pass through six stages before it may be admitted at trial:
Stage 1: A theory is postulated.
Stage 2: Experiments are designed to verify the validity of the theory.
Stage 3: If the theory's validity is not disproved after a searching inquiry and
empirical testing, it is "proven" valid and a court then appropriately may take
judicial notice of the theory. This result is unlikely to occur at this stage, however,
because no vehicle exists for translating the theory into relevant evidence in a law
suit.
Stage 4: A technique is devised, or an instrument is designed and built, that will
permit the theory to be applied practically in a forensic setting.
Stage 5: After devising a methodology, further tests must demonstrate a positive
correlation between the results and the underlying theory. This stage is necessary
to prove that the effects observed are not the result of some unidentified cause.
Stage 6: After the test has been shown to yield reliable results that are relevant
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likely to be familiar with the experimental data and their meaning. 313
Moreover, only a scientist will be familiar with the nature and
extent of dissenting views and their significance.3 1 4 Specifically, a sci-
entist will know whether experimentation is in such an early stage
that no clear conclusions can be drawn, particularly where there are
conflicting points of view. 315 Alternatively, the scientist will know
whether, despite some dissent, experimentation has advanced to the
point that there are indeed "generally accepted" conclusions .316 Fi-
nally, a scientist who does not make his living from application of
the technique will have no "axe to grind" and can be better trusted
to offer an unbiased opinion.3 1 7
This technique has been applied successfully to voiceprint anal-
ysis, the result being that the Frye test was failed when the only tes-
timony regarding general acceptance was that of a technician and law
enforcement officer. In People v. Kelly,318 the California Supreme
Court held that a voiceprint analysis was inadmissible since it failed
to meet the Frye test. The only testimony regarding general accep-
tance was that of a technician and law enforcement officer who had
been trained by the leading pioneer in voiceprint analysis, headed the
to disputed issues in a law suit, a court then may admit these results properly into
evidence, and a qualified expert may interpret the results before the jury.
Id. at 556 (footnote omitted). Professor Moenssens notes that the courts' failure to examine
these six stages of development of a scientific technique has led to the acceptance of some
techniques under Frye that have not reached the final stage of experimental verification.
This failure is one of many reasons that have led Professor Moenssens to argue for replacing
Frye with a more flexible alternative. Whether or not such a course is wise, Frye is much
more likely to achieve its purposes when courts apply the test with the six stages of scientific
development in mind.
313. As Professor Giannelli states:
Even if empirical validation is recognized, a technician's testimony should never
suffice to establish the validity of a novel technique: "[Tihe technician merely
follows prescribed routines, and is not expected to understand their underlying
fundamentals. He knows how, but not why." Because it is critical to know the
"why," or, as in the case of empirical validation, the implications of not knowing
the "why," the views of scientists are essential. Moreover, a technician would not
be qualified to testify about the general acceptability of a technique because
presumably only a scientist would be sufficiently conversant with the views held
by those in the relevant field.
Giannelli, supra note 250, at 1214-15 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Kirk, The Interrelationship
of Law and Science, 13 BurAorO L. REv. 393, 394 (1964)).
314. Id.
315. See supra notes 312-313.
316. See Giannelli, supra note 250, at 1210-11; Giannelli, GeneralAcceptance of Scientific
Tests-Frye and Beyond, in ScmNTIc AND EXPERT EVIDENCE, supra note 259, at 24.
317. See E. IMWINKELRIED, METHODS OF ATTACKING SCIENTmC EVIDENCE § 4-6(b), at
137-41 (1982) [hereinafter E. IMWINKELEIED, METHODS OF ATTACKING]; J. TARkNTINO, supra
note 307, at 12-14; Giannelli, supra note 250, at 1215-16.
318. 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976).
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Michigan State Police Voiceprint Identification Unit, frequently tes-
tified as a voiceprint expert, and, in short, had "virtually built his
career on the reliability of the [voiceprint] technique." 3 19 The court
declared that such a technician could not "assess fairly and impar-
tially the nature and extent of any opposing scientific views.
'3 20
Applying this approach to scent lineups results in defining the
"relevant scientific field" as consisting of those scientists, whether
biologists, anatomy specialists, or dog psychologists, who are fa-
miliar with the experimental data regarding the trustworthiness of
canine scent discrimination generally and scent lineups in particu-
lar.3 2' Furthermore, any witness testifying about general acceptance
must not make his living by using dogs for scent discrimination tasks.
It is this definition of the relevant field, and this restriction on the
persons whose opinions are being considered, that leads to the con-
clusions stated below.
Second, both validity and reliability must be shown.3 22 "Valid-
ity" addresses whether a test is accurate and whether it measures
what it is supposed to measure. 23 "Reliability" refers to the con-
sistency with which repeated tests yield the same results. 324 The pur-
poses of Frye suggest that both validity and reliability are necessary
since a single test suggesting high accuracy is meaningless if later tests
reach contrary conclusions.323 Such later tests may reveal flaws in the
methods used in, or limits to the inferences that may be drawn from,
the early tests.
319. Id. at 38, 549 P.2d at 1249, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 153-54.
320. Id.
321. This definition of those who make up the relevant field does not mean that only
experiments conducted by scientists in that field are relevant in determining general accep-
tance. For example, a technician lacking the technical credentials of a research scientist but
who gains a strong familiarity with the scientific method might, in consultation with scientists,
conduct scent lineup experiments under controlled conditions. If research scientists review
the nature of the experiments and approve of the methods and the likely trustworthiness of
the results, and if the results are replicable in similar controlled experiments, then the
technician's work will be relevant in deciding the question of general acceptance. Indeed,
at least one "scientific technician," Brigadier Jan de Bruin of the Rotterdam Municipal
Police, has conducted controlled experiments concerning scent lineups, doing so in consul-
tation with Professor E.P. Koster, an olfaction expert at the University of Utrecht, Holland.
See infra text accompanying notes 379-381. However, whether this technician's experiments,
in conjunction with the work of others, establish general acceptance of the validity and
reliability of scent lineups is a question to be resolved by the views of research scientists,
not the "scientific technician."
322. Giannelli, supra note 250, at 1201 & n.20; Moenssens, supra note 308, at 548.
323. J. TARANTINO, supra note 307, at 3-4; Giannelli, supra note 250, at 1201 & n.20.
324. See supra note 323.
325. See McCord, supra note 30, at 1190.
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Third, the validity and reliability of both the underlying sci-
entific principles and the scientific technique must be shown.3 26 A
technique that appears consistent and accurate may not justify reach-
ing the conclusions that the'technique suggests if the underlying prin-
ciples are in error. For example, if a victim receives a threatening
phone call and records that call, numerous voiceprint experts might
agree that the recorded voice and the defendant's voice "match."
That match is meaningless, however, unless the underlying principle
that each person has a unique Voice is correct. Conversely, if the
underlying principle is correct but the voice spectrogram cannot be
trusted accurately to match one voice to another, the results of a
spectrographic comparison will be meaningless.
327
There are five relevant questions that the scientific community
must answer affirmatively if dog scent lineups are to pass the Frye
test:328 (1) Does each person have a unique scent? (2) If yes, is there
a "core scent" that stays the same over time, despite changes in in-
dividual mood, diet, clothes, cologne, and similar factors? (3) If yes,
are at least some dogs biologically capable of discriminating among
the unique human body scents? (4) If so, can those dogs be trained
to use their capability accurately whenever so commanded by their
handlers? (5) If those dogs can be so trained, how much time can
elapse between the application of scent to the object and the holding
of the lineup after which the dogs still can discriminate successfully
among scents? The first two questions are concerned with the validity
of the underlying scientific principles, and the latter three questions
inquire as to the validity and reliability of the technique.
To the first question many might answer "yes," each person
does indeed have a unique scent. Although both the principle of scent
uniqueness and its general acceptance often are articulated clearly,
329
the basis for such acceptance is less clear. Many widely varying ex-
periments have demonstrated that a dog can, under certain circum-
326. Giannelli, supra note 250, at 1211-14. The "validity" of a scientific principle, as
opposed to the technique applying that principle, might be better understood as meaning
that the theory reflects sound scientific reasoning, see Black, supra note 251, at 599-600,
and that it is supported by empirical verification, see Giannelli, supra note 250, at 1212-14.
327. See, e.g., A. MOEN sENS, F. INBAu, & J. STAums, supra note 273, at 663-64; Bessner,
The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Techniques in Criminal Trials: Voice Spectroscopy, 30
Cns. L.Q. 294, 297-99 (1988).
328. These questions are suggested by the research results summarized in W. McCRTNEY,
supra note 169, at 58-59, and by an analogy to the case law regarding the admissibility of
voice spectrograms. See supra note 327.
329. "It is generally accepted that humans have a scent and that it differs from one
individual to another." W. SYRoTucK, supra note 160, at xiii.
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stances, accurately distinguish among human odors (although the
dispute continues as to what these particular circumstances are).330
That fact, however, does not necessarily establish that human odors
are unique. A wide enough sample might show that dogs cannot dis-
tinguish among the scents of certain persons, thus suggesting that
these persons indeed have similar or identical scents.3 31 Moreover, a
dog's choosing among several persons might be the result of badly
designed experiments, not necessarily perceived differences in human
odors.33 2 Nevertheless, some authors at least implicitly accept the view
that research has proceeded far enough to justify the conclusion that
the uniqueness of each human's scent is "generally accepted." 333 This
uniqueness has been explained as follows. Heredity gives rise to in-
dividual DNA and its resulting individual characteristics. Thus, each
person's sweat should have a unique composition. 334 The action of
each individual set of skin bacteria on individual skin components
and secretions (such as sweat) further differentiates each person's
scent. 335 Varying combinations of clothing, shoes, toiletries, and diet,
among other factors, therefore should particularize each person's
scent.
336
Dissenters from the theory of scent uniqueness, however, now
have new evidence. Drs. I. Lehr Brisbin, Jr. and Steven N. Austad
have completed research that challenges the theory of scent unique-
ness. 337 Brisbin and Austad conducted numerous trials in which three
dogs were required to choose between two scented articles, one treated
with scent from a portion of the handler's body and one with scent
from a portion of a stranger's body. They concluded that dogs could
distinguish between handler and stranger scents both taken from hu-
man hands or both taken from human elbows but could not con-
sistently distinguish between handler and stranger scents taken from
different body parts; for example, from the handler's elbow but the
330. See the experiments summarized in W. MCCARTNEY, supra note 169, at 18-58; infra
text accompanying notes 337-390, 514-548.
331. Cf. infra notes 376-377 and accompanying text (summarizing experiment that
suggests that dogs cannot distinguish between identical twins living in the same environment).
332. See infra notes 522-548 and accompanying text (suggesting ways to design fair scent
lineup experiment).
333. See infra notes 334-336, 340-341 and accompanying text.
334. W. MCCARTNEY, supra note 169, at 28-29; W. SYROTUCK, supra note 160, at 21.
335. W. SYROTUCK, supra note 160, at 21-44. But see Telephone interview with Dr. L.J.
Myers, Director, Institute for Biological Detection Systems, Auburn University (Oct. 3,
1989) (challenging the notion that the bacterial action theory of human scent has been
experimentally proven correct).
336. W. SYROTUCK, supra note 160, at 21-44.
337. I. Brisbin, Jr. & S. Austad, supra note 198, at 13-15.
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stranger's hand. The authors suggested two possible conclusions from
their study. Individual odors may exist for specific human body parts,
but there is no unique individual odor characteristic of a particular
human and detectable by the dog regardless of the anatomical source
of the odor. Alternatively, there may be an individual unique human
body scent, but present training methods are inadequate to teach the
dog to make the necessary discrimination accurately. 338 Brisbin and
Austad's research is important because it draws into question the
theory of scent uniqueness, and if human scents are not unique, then
scent lineups unquestionably fail the Frye test. At the very least, Bris-
bin and Austad's work suggests the need for further research on
whether human scents are unique, and if so, on how dogs can better
be trained to discriminate among those scents.
The second question-whether there is a "core scent" that re-
mains the same despite changes in mood, diet, clothes, and the like-
is even harder to answer. Limited experimentation, discussed in Part
III(B)(1)(a) of this Article, suggests that properly trained dogs of
certain types can, at least under certain circumstances, discriminate
between the scents of identical twins based solely on differences in
the twins' diet or environment. 339 But whether a dog can match the
scent of an individual taken at one point in time to the scent of that
same individual at a later time when his diet, clothes, and environ-
ment have been varied in the interim has been little tested.
A suggested experiment would have a subject handle a porous
object, then eat a different diet, wear different clothes, live in an
environment where different odors were present, and finally, change
his cologne for one week. A non-suggestive, properly designed object
lineup would then be held at the end of that week. If the dog chose
the correct object in the lineup, and if other experimenters working
with other dogs reached similar results, that would strongly suggest
that there is indeed a "core" scent that remains constant over time.
To the author's knbwledge, as of the writing of this Article, no such
series of experiments has been conducted.
Nevertheless, respected authors in the field have concluded, with
some caution, that "[tihere is probably a basic odor which is typical
of each individual in good health and normal circumstances. This,
in turn, can likely be varied somewhat by emotions, toiletries, cloth-
ing, and diet.' ' 340 This "basic odor" is thought to "retain its char-
acteristic feature just as a human face does whether angry, or
338. Id. at 1, 3-4, 9-12, 14-15.
339. See infra text accompanying notes 373-377.
340. W. SYROTUCK, supra note 160, at 36.
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laughing, or weeping." ' 341 The basis of this conclusion is unclear, but
it is probably founded on the success of a significant number of dogs
in correctly discriminating among persons and objects after the pas-
sage of a fairly long period of time. Yet ultimately, the lack of con-
trolled experimentation specifically designed to test that conclusion
calls into question whether the conclusion should be considered "gen-
erally accepted" within the meaning of Frye. Moreover, the exper-
iments of Brisbin and Austad outlined above suggest that there may
be many "core" scents if indeed there are any "core" scents at all,
because there may be a different "core" for each part of the human
anatomy.
42
It is important to emphasize that even if the "basic odor" theory
were discarded, that only would call into question the trustworthiness
of lineups conducted after such time as to permit significant changes
in the subject's diet and environment. If the lineup is conducted within
hours of the crime, the individual's scent is less likely to have sig-
nificantly changed.
The third question should be answered "yes": numerous ex-
periments demonstrate that, at least under some conditions, properly
trained dogs are biologically capable of discriminating among human
odors .
34
The fourth question, however, should be answered "no": it is
not generally accepted that a dog can be trained to use his biological
capacity for scent discrimination accurately upon command. Factors
that raise the chances of correct canine scent discrimination include:
the dog's breed; careful selection of a highly motivated animal; close
bonding between dog and handler; lengthy, tedious, and precise
training for a single type of scent discrimination task; and the elim-
ination of suggestive circumstances. 344 When these factors are pres-
ent, it is unquestionably true that under certain circumstances some
dogs have been trained to discriminate correctly upon command.345
There has been too little experimentation, however, to determine pre-
cisely what training and which other circumstances are necessary to
ensure accuracy on any given occasion.
Indeed, Brisbin and Austad's recent research efforts suggest that
our present knowledge of dog training is insufficient to justify the
use of dog scent lineups. Thus these authors conclude:
341. W. MCCARTNFY, supra note 169, at 59.
342. See supra text accompanying notes 337-338.
343. See W. MCCARTNFY, supra note 169, at 73, and the numerous experiments sum-
marized throughout McCartney's text.
344. See id. at 17, 27-28, 57-58, 60-61, 74-75.
345. See id.; infra text accompanying notes 362-390.
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[I]dentification of individuals on the basis of information that the
dog obtains from scent articles is an important component of the
use of dogs in law enforcement .... Although it may indeed be
possible to train individual dogs to perform such [scent discrimi-
nation] tasks ... we feel that the results presented here make it
clearly incumbent upon the individual dog trainer or handler to
demonstrate with data collected under conditions of controlled sci-
entific observation, that the dog under consideration can indeed
perform the required scent identification tasks with an acceptable
degree of statistical reliability, before evidence based on the per-
formance of such a dog should be accepted in a court of law.
3 46
Dr. Brisbin also found much research on the training of dogs to per-
form scent lineups to be flawed, because the dogs were not asked
to perform "blank" lineups in which the true match to the scent did
not appear at all. Such tests are necessary in order to control against
the dog's choosing someone because it wants to please its master,
and not because it truly recognized the scent.
347
European research technician Jan de Bruin meanwhile insists
that he indeed has learned how to train dogs to avoid such false iden-
tifications and that he has performed controlled experiments con-
firming that dogs can be trained accurately to discriminate scents in
lineups upon command. 348 Although the results of his experiments
are available in English, de Bruin has yet to publish any explanation
of the number, manner, and circumstances of the experiments con-
ducted.3 49 Moreover, replication of his experiments has not yet been
attempted in the United States or elsewhere.
Finally, as to the fifth question, it is unclear how much time may
elapse between the laying of a scent and the holding of a lineup be-
fore the accuracy of a dog's discrimination is affected. Assuming that
there is a unique core scent that remains constant over time, over
how long a period can a dog still detect that scent? Some experiments
suggest an upper limit of between three to six weeks, 3 0 while others
346. I. Brisbin & S. Austad, supra note 198, at 14-15; see also Telephone interview with
Dr. L. J. Myers, Director, Institute for Biological Detection Systems, Auburn University
(Oct. 3, 1989) (expressing the opinion that further experimental research is necessary to
determine whether scent lineups are reliable).
347. Telephone interview with I. Brisbin (June 1, 1989).
348. de Bruin, supra note 157, at 8-9, 11; see also Frawley, supra note 157, at 10-12.
As noted earlier, de Bruin is in charge of the Rotterdam, Holland, Police Canine Unit. He
has conducted all the experiments discussed in this Article himself, but he designed the
experiments (and his program for training dogs and handlers) by consulting with a scientist,
Dr. E.P. Koster of the University of Uirecht, Holland. See supra note 321; infra note 379
and text accompanying both notes; see also Letter from Dr. E.P. Koster to Andrew E.
Taslitz (June 16, 1989) (on file with the author of this Article).
349. de Bruin, however, is working on a book that will explain his experiments in detail.
See Letter I, supra note 9.
350. See infra text accompanying notes 383-386.
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suggest that, under the right circumstances, the limit may be as high
as six months. 3 1 Some European researchers claim an upper limit of
three years if certain standardized procedures are followed. 3 2 These
few limited experiments, only one of which dealt with a true scent
lineup, 353 are insufficient to establish the general acceptance of a time
limit within which scent lineup discrimination may still be considered
trustworthy.
Moreover, the European claim of accurate results after three
years is implausible. One of the critical components of human scent
is the vapor produced by bacterial action on human skin cells and
skin secretions. 3 4 It is difficult to imagine conditions under which
this bacterial action could be maintained for such a long period of
time. Moreover, it seems that a bacterial action lasting that long would
break down all the skin cells and skin secretions involved. If "food"
other than skin cells and skin secretions were given to the bacteria,
the nature of the vapor released by the bacteria and thus the scent
on the object likely would change. Absent rebuttal of these obser-
vations, it is impossible to understand the significance of the little
research done or to reconcile the apparently conflicting results.
Accordingly, scent lineups, whether conducted promptly or long
after a crime, do not pass the Frye test. This does not mean, however,
that such lineups should never be admissible in a Frye jurisdiction;
rather, it means that scent lineups should be inadmissible until and
unless research establishes their reliability.3"5
In the many jurisdictions that do not follow Frye at all or that
consider general acceptance as only one factor in a broader analysis
of relevancy and weight,356 the lack of general acceptance will not
automatically condemn scent lineups to exclusion at trial.
351. See infra text accompanying notes 387-388.
352. See Frawley, supra note 157, at 12.
353. See de Bruin, supra note 157, at 8-11.
354. See supra notes 182-185 and accompanying text.
355. Professor Samuel G. Chapman, a political scientist who has written extensively on
the use of police dogs, has reached a similar, if slightly more optimistic, conclusion (albeit
without reviewing for his readers the scientific research supporting that conclusion):
It will take many years of research and experimentation, but it is possible that
law enforcement will enter the age of scent identifications. This suggests that
trained dogs, under the supervision of handlers, could be used to conduct scent
lineups with the results eventually carrying the weight of a fingerprint identifica-
tion. Farfetched, perhaps, but efforts to rise above problems in this area could
lead to an impressive achievement.
S. CHAPMAN, supra note 39, at 220-21.
356. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985) (acceptance among
the scientific community as but one factor); Giannelli, supra note 250, at 1203, 1232-35
(alternatives to Frye).
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B. Relevancy
Those jurisdictions following a relevancy analysis in place of
Frye admit scientific evidence only if the probative value of the ev-
idence outweighs such countervailing considerations as its tendency
to mislead the jury.357 Scientific evidence thus, in theory, is treated
like all other evidence, 35 8 for all evidence must survive this weighing
process. 359 Countervailing factors, however, cannot be weighed against
probative value without first determining how probative the evidence
is or rather how good a predictor the scientific test in question is.360
This section thus begins by discussing the state of the experimental
research on the predictive power of dog scent lineups. Having es-
tablished what that predictive power is (what the "probative value"
is), the discussion then considers two potential counterweights: the
"indeterminacy" or lack of guidance for the jury in deciding what
the probative value of lineups is generally and in particular cases and
the highly subjective nature of the lineup expert's testimony. This
section finally examines the legal bases of the relevancy approach in
greater depth to understand how courts have applied that approach
to scent lineups and whether, when that approach is properly un-
derstood, the balance tips against admissibility.
357. Giannelli, supra note 250, at 1235-39.
358. But in practice, concluding that certain evidence is "scientific" results in special
treatment of that evidence, even under a relevancy analysis. First, a rational inquiry into
the probative value of scientific evidence necessarily requires a court to delve deeply into
scientific principles and processes, instead of relying on the judge's own logic and experience.
Compare 1 S. SALTZBURG & M. MARTIN, FEDERAL RutEs oF EVIDENCE MAUAL 125 (5th
ed. 1990) (generally only "logic and experience together ... supply the judge with skills in
determining whether a given piece of evidence tends to prove or disprove a disputed
proposition") with Giannelli, supra note 250, at 1235 ("The probative value of scientific
evidence, however, is connected inextricably to its reliability .... Because the judge in
most cases cannot resort to logic and experience to evaluate the probative value of a novel
technique, he must turn to science."). Second, as explained in Section III A(l) of this
Article, scientific evidence is very likely to overawe a jury and must therefore be treated with
some special caution. See supra note 260 and accompanying text. Third, some jurisdic-
tions following a relevancy analysis nevertheless consider Frye general acceptance as one
factor (although, unlike with the Frye approach not the sole factor) in determining admis-
sibility. See supra note 356; infra note 448 and accompanying text. Frye's application to
"scientific" evidence thus may retain importance in relevancy approach jurisdictions.
359. P. GIANNELLU & E. IMWINKELRE D, SCIENTIFIc EviDEN E 31 (1986) ("The principle
alternative to the Frye test is to treat scientific evidence in the same way as other evidence,
weighing its probative value against countervailing considerations." (emphasis added)).
360. See Giannelli, supra note 250, at 1235-39.
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(1) Validity and Reliability: An Exploration of the Scientific Data
As noted above,36' there is no consensus in the scientific com-
munity on the accuracy of dog scent lineups. Moreover, not only are
there numerous incomplete, poorly designed, and conflicting exper-
iments in dog scenting generally, but most concern dog tracking, not
scent lineups in particular.3 62 Some experiments, however, are worth
discussing. These can be divided into two broad categories: exper-
iments in which little time elapsed between the laying of the scent
and the time of the scent lineup; and experiments conducted in order
to determine how much time could elapse before significantly af-
fecting the dog's accuracy.
a. Where Time is Not a Factor
The scenting abilities of dogs, both in tracking and scent dis-
crimination, were tested in Berlin during 1913 and 1914 under the
auspices of several persons, including Professor Pfungst and then
Police Lieutenant Konrad Most.3 63 Konrad Most, although a police
lieutenant by trade, had a contemporary reputation as one of the
persons most seriously engaged in the scientific investigation of train-
ing police dogs. 64
In one of the Berlin experiments, ten objects belonging to ten
persons were laid in a row. Each object was placed in the row by
its owner, without the touch of any other human being. A dog, Flott,
was given the scent from test person number three when he held both
his hands around Flott's nose for twenty seconds. Flott then was told
to fetch the object belonging to number three. In seventeen trials,
Flott retrieved the correct object on only two occasions for an ac-
curacy rate of under twelve percent, or little better than chance.
3 65
In a second experiment, ten persons laid their gloves on the
ground, then went off some distance, and stood in a row with three
paces between each man and his neighbor. A dog was given the scent
from one of the pairs of gloves and told to find the gloves' owner.
The test subjects were not told which pair of gloves were sniffed by
the dog, in an attempt to control for minimal cues. During each of
361. See supra notes 289-356 and accompanying text.
362. See, e.g., W. MCCARTNEY, supra note 169, at 18-58.
363. Craig, supra note 205, at 38, 41; see also W. MCCARTNEY, supra note 169, at 43
(recounting Most's experiments).
364. Craig, supra note 205, at 38.
365. Id. at 40.
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the four trials, the dog failed to find the correct owner.3 66 The use
of police dogs for identification of criminals was abandoned in Berlin
because of these horrendous failures.3 67 The Berlin lineup experi-
ments were, however, few in number and involved few animals. The
failures may have been due to poor training, a possibility further
suggested by the superior results achieved in other experiments.
368
Perhaps the best known experiments in which contrary results
were reached were those conducted by the psychologist, Frederick
Jakobus Johannes Buytendijk. 369 Buytendijk arranged zinc pails, each
with a stirrup handle, into three retorts. Each retort contained a mix-
ture of different acids found in human perspiration. A dog, Albert,
sniffed a fourth mixture that was identical to one of the first three.
The dog was then led by a handler to the line of zinc pails. The han-
dler did not know which pail contained the matching mixture. When
the dog located a match, he retrieved the pail. The experiment was
repeated with the same dog twelve times, with an accuracy rate of
almost sixty-seven percent based on eight correct choices out of
twelve. 370 In a second series of experiments, the same dog achieved
an accuracy rate of eighty percent based on eight out of ten correct
choices a.37 From these experiments, Buytendijk concluded that Albert
could discriminate among the three odor compounds very well. Buy-
tendijk cautioned, however, that "at the same time, despite this dis-
criminating power, an incorrect choice did occur several times, and
we see accordingly how very cautious one has to be in using police
dogs in judicial investigations.
'372
More recent experiments illustrate the precision with which the
experimental analysis of scenting can be undertaken. These experi-
ments also suggest-although alone they do not prove-that properly
trained dogs may have extraordinary powers of discrimination.
One of the most interesting recent experiments was conducted
by Peter G. Hepper of the Department of Psychology at The Queen's
University of Belfast. 373 Dr. Hepper conducted a series of three ex-
periments designed to determine the dog's ability to distinguish var-
366. Id. at 40-41.
367. W. McCARTNEY, supra note 169, at 43.
368. Compare Craig, supra note 205 (in one test the dog fetched the right object only
twice out of 17 trials) with F. BuYTraNwux, supra note 173, at 89-96 (dog achieved success
rate as high as 80%) and infra text accompanying notes 369-382 (chronicling other experi-
ments yielding high success rates).
369. See F. BuYTE uK, supra note 173, at 89-96.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 96.
372. Id.
373. See Hepper, supra note 238.
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iations in scent based upon genetic, dietary, and environmental
differences among humans. These experiments were conducted after
each dog was given extensive training in a specific type of discrim-
inatory task. In each experiment odors were obtained by having sub-
jects wear T-shirts continuously for a twenty-four-hour period. Prior
to wearing the T-shirts, each subject was asked to wash and rinse
thoroughly using the same soap. The T-shirts also were washed in
the same washing powder. Experiments were held after no more than
a twenty-four-hour lapse between wearing the T-shirt and conducting
the experiment. Furthermore, the dog's owners were not informed
which T-shirt was the "correct" choice for the dog to make.
In the first type of experiment, male twins aged two to three
months were used and four dogs were tested. Each dog's perform-
ance was tested with a different subset of five twin pairs for a total
of fifty trials per dog. Environmental and dietary factors were con-
trolled because the twins lived in the same homes and were fed iden-
tical diets. The twins, however, were non-identical, thus differing in
genetic relatedness.174 The four dogs respectively demonstrated ac-
curacy rates of ninety-two, ninety-four, eighty-four, and eighty-six
percent (because only two T-shirts were involved in each trial, if the
dog randomly chose (i.e. without scenting) one T-shirt over the other,
the dog would have a fifty percent chance of being correct). Con-
sequently, each of the dogs was capable of discriminating between
individuals to a significant degree according to genetic differences.3 75
The same four dogs were involved in the second type of ex-
periment. In this type, ten sets of identical twins aged between thirty-
four and fifty years, eating different diets and living in different
homes, were examined, again with fifty trials per dog. The dogs had
greater difficulty distinguishing between the scents of genetically
identical persons differing only in diet and environment but still did
much better than chance. The respective accuracy rates of the four
dogs were eighty, eighty-two, eighty-four, and eighty-eight percent. 3
76
In the final type of experiment, both environmental and genetic
factors were the same. As in the first experiment, ten sets of twins
between the ages of two and three months were used, but this time
the twins were identical. The dogs did no better than, and sometimes
374. Identical or "monozygotic" twins come from the same fertilized egg, thus sharing
the same genetic material. See DORLAND'S POCKET MEDICAL DICTIONARY 687 (22nd ed.
1977). Non-identical twins come from two different eggs, thus they do not share identical
genetic material although they still are born at the same time. Id.
375. Id. at 550-51.
376. Id. at 551-52.
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worse than, pure chance-demonstrating respective accuracy rates of
fifty-four, forty-six, forty-six, and fifty percent.377
Dr. Hepper's experiments, while enlightening, were far too lim-
ited. First, because they involved only two choices per dog per trial,
they created the very high pure chance accuracy rate of fifty percent.
Second, too few dogs were tested to draw broad conclusions. Third,
the experiments did not include "blank lineups," (for example, scent-
ing the dog on an object handled by person "A" but then asking
the dog to choose between persons "B" and "C" where all three
individuals differ genetically but eat the same food, wear similar
clothes, and work in the same place). Of course under this scenario
the only "correct" answer is for the dog to choose no one at all. 378
In contrast, Brigadier Jan de Bruin, supervisor of the Rotter-
dam, Holland, Police Department Canine Unit, in consultation with
Dr. E.P. Koster, an olfaction expert at the University of Utrecht,
Holland, conducted a series of scent discrimination experiments that
included "blank" lineups.3 79 These experiments, described in greater
detail in Part III.E.(3) of this Article, involved "true" lineups; that
is, lineups in which the dog was required to choose-among numerous
human scents, not simply scents "A" and "B." de Bruin reports a
ninety-five percent accuracy rate, based upon his special training pro-
gram,380 but precise information as to the number and details of the
individual experiments has not yet been published. 31 To this author's
knowledge, no similar experiments have been reported elsewhere.
Not all recent experiments, however, have reached the fairly high
accuracy rates claimed by Jan de Bruin and reported by Dr. Hepper.
Drs. Brisbin and Austad found that, even in their simplest experi-
ments, which required three dogs to distinguish between the scent of
the handler's hand and a stranger's hand, the dogs were correct only
-75.7% of the time. 382
377. Id. at 550-52.
378. See supra note 347 and accompanying text.
379. See de Bruin, supra note 157, at 7-11; Frawley, supra note 157, at 10; infra notes
522-546 and accompanying text; see also Telephone interview with I. Brisbin, Research
Professor, University of Georgia (Oct. 6, 1989) (coining the term "blank lineups").
380. de Bruin has reported that he takes about one year to train each dog, a process
that involves daily exercise and testing of the animal. See Letter I, supra note 9. He has
described his training techniques as among the "newest," but he has not yet described in
any significant detail what those training methods are or how they differ from older methods.
He has promised to do so, however, in a book to be completed in the near future. Id.
381. Letter I, supra note 9.
382. I. Brisbin, Jr. & S. Austad, supra note 198, at 9. The dogs did much better in
distinguishing human scent from no scent at all, but, even then, the dogs were accurate
only about 93% of the time. Id. at 11.
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b. Where Time is a Factor
Very few experiments have studied the effect of time on a dog's
accuracy. In one of the few that did investigate this area, researchers
King, Becker, and Markee randomly placed slides in a five station
circle in such a way that a fingerprinted slide appeared at each station
five times in every twenty-five trials. 83 Five fresh slides (one fin-
gerprinted and four blank) were used in each trial, with a rotary fan
clearing the air between trials. The slides were aged indoors and
therefore not exposed to the elements. Two dogs were tested to see
whether they could still detect the human odor trace on the single
fingerprinted slide in each trial over successively longer periods of
time.
After three weeks, one of the dogs was correct ninety-four per-
cent of the time while the other dog was correct only sixty-eight per-
cent of the time (chance accuracy, of course, being one out of five
slides or twenty percent). At the end of six weeks, both dogs were
performing in the forty to fifty percent accuracy range. And by eight
weeks, their success rate had fallen to twenty percent accuracy or that
of chance performance.3 4 King, Becker, and Markee described these
results as demonstrating that the dogs had "high performance scores"
in choosing among the slides for "up to 6 weeks. ' 385
These experiments are of limited value, however, in determining
what period of delay is acceptable between the laying of the scent
and the conduct of the dog scent lineup. King, Becker and Markee's
dogs were only tested as to detection of human odors, not discrim-
ination, since only one slide in each trial had a human scent trace. 38 6
It presumably would be much harder for a dog to match an indi-
vidual's scent to a slide after three weeks if each slide contained the
scent of a different human. Yet such a circumstance would be much
closer to what happens in a dog scent lineup and, therefore, would
provide better guidance in making judgments regarding how quickly
scent lineups must be held if they are to be accurate.
The Menzels, who conducted various scenting experiments in the
1920s and early 1930s, maintained that a dog could recognize a hu-
man odor on an object for as long as six months if the odor was
suitably preserved in a glass container in a dry and cool place. 38 7 Nev-
383. King, Becker, & Markee, Studies on Olfactory Discrimination in Dogs: Ability to
Detect Human Odour Trace, 12 ANIMAL BEHAv. 311, 312 (1964).
384. Id. at 312-13.
385. Id. at 314.
386. See id. at 312.
387. W. MCCARTNEY, supra note 169, at 59.
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ertheless, they recommended that a control object also be taken from
a person known to be innocent at the same time as the tested object
and from the same body part as that from which the tested object
was taken. The Menzels further recommended that a control test with
this object be made a day or two before the actual criminal inves-
tigation.388 The use of a control in the procedure acts as a check on
the accuracy of the dog's scenting. It is unclear what would explain
the superior results reported by the Menzels compared to the results
achieved by King, Becker, and Markee, although the Menzels' special
effort to store the scent in glass containers in a dry, cool place may
offer a partial explanation.389 In any event, their isolated efforts are
of little value without similar results being achieved by an adequate
number of other researchers.
Finally, as discussed above, Brigadier de Bruin's experiments
suggest a high accuracy rate after a lapse of. time as long as three
years. 390 It is difficult to formulate a theory that would explain ac-
curacy after such a long passage of time.
(2) Relevancy and Indeterminacy
This review of the experimental data on scent discrimination
demonstrates that widely varying results have been achieved regard-
ing dog's accuracy and that too little experimentation has been done
to justify broad conclusions as to how good dogs are at scent dis-
crimination. Without a measure of how effective they are at that
task, however, there is no way to determine whether evidence of scent
discrimination at lineups is "relevant."
The Federal Rules of Evidence define "relevant evidence" as
"evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that
388. Id.
389. Compare id. at 59 (scent stored in glass container) with King, Becker, & Markee,
supra note 383, at 312 (slides stored in cabinets protected by fine gauze screening where the
slides "could become dusty but not completely begrimed"). In his classic work on dog-
scenting, McCartney offers an English language summary of the Menzels' work, which they
had originally reported in German. Unfortunately, McCartney summarizes their conclusions,
not the details of their individual experiments, so it is difficult to critique their methodology.
McCartney, supra note 169, at 59.
390. Frawley, supra note 157, at 12 ("In Brigadier de Bruin's experiments, he has stored
the scent of police officers from his department in the glass bottles for three years. The
dogs are still identifying the correct individual."); cf. J. TARANMNo, supra note 307, at 12-
15 (discussing the need for general acceptance in the relevant scientific community that the
technique of electrophoresis of evidentiary blood stains can result in an accurate reading of
genetic markers after the lapse of a specified period of time); Moenssens, supra note 308,
at 567 (emphasizing that a technique must be reliable for the precise purpose for which it
is being used).
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is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence." 39 The ac-
curacy of a particular kind of scientific evidence determines in part
whether that evidence is logically relevant.3 92 For example, if a mur-
der is committed with only four people present, there is automatically
a twenty-five percent chance that any one of them committed the
crime. If the murder weapon was found, a dog scent lineup could
be conducted to determine which of the four had handled the weapon.
If the dog used had an accuracy rate of only twenty-five percent,
assuming that only one of the four had handled the weapon, the
dog's selection of any individual in the lineup would not make it any
more probable that that individual was guilty than would have been
true without the lineup. Consequently, the lineup results would not
be "logically relevant."
An approximate measure of accuracy is also necessary when an-
alyzing what two well-known commentators have called "pragmatic
relevance." An inquiry as to the pragmatic relevance of evidence asks
whether the probative value of that evidence outweighs counter-
vailing considerations such as its tendency to confuse a jury. 93 Thus,
while a ninety-nine percent accuracy rate in the example above might
justify admitting scent lineup evidence despite a tendency to mislead,
a twenty-six percent accuracy rate would not.
When the accuracy rate of a type of evidence is unknown or is
subject to dispute, logical relevancy is indeterminate.3 94 If only a range
391. FED. R. EVID. 401.
392. The term "logically relevant" means relevance as defined in Rule 401 and is used
to delineate such relevance from "pragmatic relevance," defined below. See R. LEMPERT &
S. SALTZBURG, supra note 259, at 153 (defining "logical relevance" and comparing it to
other concepts of relevancy); see also infra note 393 (defining "pragmatic relevance").
393. See C. MUELLER & L. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES: TEXT, CASES,
AND PROBLEmS 79 (1988) (coining the term "pragmatic relevance"). "Probative value" refers
to the tendency of evidence to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove; the
requirement that there be at least some such tendency is part of Federal Rule of Evidence
401's definition of relevant evidence. See C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185,
at 541-42 (1984) [hereinafter MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE]. The additional requirement that
probative value be outweighed by countervailing considerations-what Mueller and Kirk-
patrick call "pragmatic relevance"-is set forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 403. "Pragmatic
relevance" has also been called "legal relevance," id. at 548 & n.43, but the phrase
"pragmatic relevance" is clearer because both commentators and courts have used "legal
relevance" to mean many different things. See id.
The need for an inquiry into scientific accuracy to resolve both logical and pragmatic
relevancy questions is discussed in Giannelli, supra note 250, at 1235-39, although he uses
slightly different terminology.
394. Professors Lempert and Saltzburg identify this indeterminacy as one example of an
"estimation problem," or a problem in estimating true probative value. R. LEMPERT & S.
SALTZBURG, supra note 259, at 160. They note that "[i]n these circumstances courts often
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of likely accuracy rates is known (as opposed to literally no estimate
of accuracy being available), the lower end of the range might be high
enough to justify a fiiding of logical relevancy. For example, a forty
to sixty percent probability of scenting accuracy in the four person
murder lineup posited above would increase a suspect's probability
of guilt above pure chance. Nevertheless, without a more precise de-
termination of accuracy, a court may be hard pressed to determine
whether probative value outweighs countervailing considerations. Be-
cause of the scant research on scent lineups the court in a lineup case
is always faced with this very problem of uncertainty: without a
measure of probative value, that value cannot be weighed against
other concerns.
3 95
A second problem of indeterminacy arises regarding the diffi-
culty in determining whether certain persons, objects, or phenomena
fit within a specified class. 39 For example, a test for the presence
of barium and antimony may reveal levels of those elements on a
person's hands that are well in excess of the amounts found in the
general population. The usual explanation for the presence of these
elevated concentrations is that the defendant recently fired a gun.
397
Assuming that this is the correct explanation in eighty percent of the
cases, however, there is arguably still no way of knowing whether
in any particular case the elevated levels were due to firing a gun or
some other unknown cause. Some courts, therefore, exclude statis-
tical evidence of the explanation for scientific phenomend as logically
irrelevant because "[e]ven if statistical evidence of the general re-
liability ... were valid, such evidence would not warrant a finding
of reliability in a particular case. "398
Of course as a matter of pure logic this approach to logical rel-
evancy is wrong, as is again demonstrated by the barium-antimony
example above, because there the statistical evidence unquestionably
exclude evidence as irrelevant rather than let the jurors speculate on its import. Since such
evidence might well relate to the probability of guilt or innocence if its true implications
were known, a more precise justification for exclusion is 'relevance unknown."' Id. at 160.
395. See United States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp. 510, 514 (D. Md. 1973) (indeterminacy
regarding the accuracy of the polygraph examination was one factor leading the court to
declare polygraph results inadmissible in a criminal trial).
396. George, Statistical Problems Relating to Scientific Evidence, in SCIENTIFIC AND
EXPERT EVDENC.E, supra note 259, at 105, 127-33. This problem is more pronounced where -
the classification of phenomena has a substantial subjective element, as is true with dog
scent lineups. See id. at 122.
397. McCord, supra note 30, at 1194.
398. E.g., Commonwealth v. Foley, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 608, 611, 389 N.E.2d 762, 765
(1979) (emphasis added) (error to allow an expert to testify that the statistical probability
of polygraph accuracy was 85% or better).
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made it "more probable" than not that the defendant had fired a
gun. It is therefore more sensible to admit that the barium-antimony
evidence is logically relevant, but to note the danger of the jury's
being misled by the evidence, thus assuming that the defendant is
guilty based only or in large part on the statistics. The jury's proper
role should be to determine to which group the defendant belongs,
the eighty percent for whom shooting a gun is the correct explanation
or the twenty percent for whom the explanation is unknown.3 9
Alternatively, assume that besides the gun firing explanation the
only other known cause of elevated levels of barium and antimony
is exposure to those elements in the course of certain professions.4
Under these circumstances, the solution to the problem is easy. An
expert could explain the two possible causes to the jury, and the pros-
ecutor could offer evidence that the defendant was not working in
the relevant professions at the time of the crime. If the defense of-
fered evidence to contradict the prosecution's assertion, the jury could
then decide for itself which alternative it believes is the true source
of the elevated elements.
With scent lineups, however, research has not progressed this
far and no one understands why even well-trained dogs occasionally
make mistakes. Thus, if there is an eighty-five percent accuracy rate,
why is the dog wrong fifteen percent of the time? What factors lead
to error? Are such factors present here? Only when such questions
have been answered can the jury decide in any particular case whether
the fact that a dog identified a particular defendant falls within the
fifteen percent group of inaccurate identifications or the eighty-five
percent group of accurate ones.
(3) Subjectivity: Cues and Miscues
The greater the element of subjectivity in a scientific test, the
greater the risk of error and the greater the danger of misleading the
399. Some commentators oppose allowing the jury ever to hear statistical evidence of
this nature because they fear that the statistics will mislead the jury. E.g., George, supra
note 396, at 136. But see MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 393, at 656-57 (favoring
admissibility of such probability evidence to aid the jury under certain circumstances).
Whether or not jurors are given precise statistics, however, it is arguably appropriate to
advise them that a particular technique is imperfect without ever mentioning the numbers
that purport to measure how imperfect. Such an approach eliminates the major danger
created by statistical evidence: that seemingly impressive numbers may mislead or overwhelm
the jury. Id. at 652; see also Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal
Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971). But see Saks & Kidd, Human Information Processing
and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristic, 15 LAW & Soc'Y 123 (1980-81) (arguing that the
danger of jury confusion is overstated). The approach, however, does not eliminate the
problem that jurors may still lack guidance in determining whether the technique was or
was not correct in the specific case before them.
400. See P. GIANNELLI & E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 359, at 333-36 (1986).
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jury °1 "Subjectivity" refers to effects on test outcomes or on the
interpretation of test results that cannot be measured, or, if meas-
urable, cannot be catalogued in a systematic manner. 402 As the po-
tential for subjectivity increases so does the risk of unnoticed error
and the likelihood that the accuracy of the results will depend heavily
on the examiner's skill in reducing subjectivity and in accurately in-
terpreting test results.43
As is discussed previously, 404 scent lineups involve tremendous
subjectivity in both their design and administration. The behavior
of both the examiner and the subjects can affect the lineup outcome,
yet that effect cannot be measured or catalogued and may, therefore,
not even be noticed. Not only is the examiner's skill critical in train-
ing his dog and in designing a fair, non-suggestive lineup,'40 but so
is his skill critical in interpreting the behavior of his dog.4°6 This sub-
jectivity is exacerbated by the lack of uniform industry guidelines to
which the examiner may refer when he interprets canine behavior or
designs a fair lineup. 40 Nor are there uniform guidelines regarding
who qualifies as a scent lineup examiner.4°s As a consequence, it is
401. See United States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp. 510, 512-14 (D. Md. 1973) (attacking
the subjectivity involved in polygraphy); Lewis, The Element of Subjectivity in Interpreting
Instrumental Test Results, in SCszNTIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE,'supra note 259, at 409
(cataloguing the sources and dangers of subjectivity).
402. See Lewis, supra note 401, at 412-14; Comment, The Evidentiary Uses of Neutron
Activation Analysis, 59 CAIjF. L. R . 997, 1020-23 (1971) (authored by Dennis S. Karjala).
403. This is so for two reasons: first, sources of error can be introduced but undetected
in the creation of the data, Lewis, supra note 401, at 413-14; and second, adequate criteria
do not exist for the experts to articulate the precise foundations for their conclusions, often
resulting in differing experts reaching contrary opinions regarding the meaning of the same
data. Comment, supra note 402, at 1020-24.
404. See supra notes 240-242, 259, 344-345, 396 and accompanying text.
405. See infra notes 514-548 (emphasizing that creating fair scent lineups, if possible at
all, requires a knowledge of underlying scientific principles and great care in applying them);
Letter I, supra note 9 (dog trainers must "have ability and patience in order to be able to
handle and control the dogs [sic] conduct and reactions, they must have authority and be
resolute, they must have the capability to use their special abilities in criminal investigations,"
and they must, when paired with their dogs, "reach a 95% positive score" in practice before
they may be considered as "operative units.").
406. Cf. State v. Frazier, 162 W. Va. 602, 617, 252 S.E.2d 39, 48 (1979) (excluding
polygraph results because so "much depends upon the subjective analysis of the results by
its operator. We know of no scientific test conventionally admitted by the courts which
carries such a high degree of interpretative subjectivity.") (emphasis added).
407. See United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978) (existence and main-
tenance of interpretive standards critical in judging the reliability of spectrogram), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979); Imwinkelried, Instrumental Techniques Yielding Nonnumerical
Test Results, in SCmNTFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE, supra note 259, at 405-06 (noting the
lack of uniform standards in forensic odontology and firearms identification).
408. Telephone interview with Dr. L.J. Myers, Director, Institute for Biological Detection
Systems, Auburn University (Oct. 3, 1989); telephone interview with Phil Hoelcher, a dog
training expert (June 2, 1989); cf. Abbell, Polygraph Evidence: The Case Against Admis-
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difficult to screen the quality of the examiners or objectively identify
whether, in any particular case, subjective distortions in the admin-
istration or interpretation of the test are unduly affecting the ex-
aminer's opinion. Such subjectivity, when combined with the
numerous other concerns surrounding the conduct of dog scent line-
ups-particularly the incipient stage of experimental research and the
problem of indeterminacy-suggests that, as a class of evidence, scent
lineups should not be admitted at trial.
(4) Is the Relevancy Test Met?
The primary alternative to the Frye test for admissibility of sci-
entific evidence is the "relevancy approach" that is associated with
Professor McCormick. 409 Variations on this approach abound. 410 The
common thread among these variations is that they all balance the
probative value of admitting novel scientific evidence against coun-
tervailing considerations. 41 Two of the Federal Rules of Evidence are
the primary sources for the McCormick approach.
Under Rule 702, an expert may testify only if "scientific, tech-
nical, or other specialized knowledge will a.rsist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. ' 41 2 Evidence
cannot assist the jury, however, unless the soundness and reliability
of that evidence outweigh its tendency to overwhelm, confuse, or
mislead .411
sibility in Federal Criminal Trials, in SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE, supra note 259, at
849-51 (noting importance of strict standards for the professional training of polygraphers).
409. Giannelli, supra note 250, at 1233 (crediting Professor Charles Tilford McCormick
with founding the relevancy approach); McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New
Approach to Admissibility, 67 IOWA L. REV. 879 (1982) (in his article, Professor Mark
McCormick elaborates on the relevancy approach first suggested by Professor Charles Tilford
McCormick).
410. See, e.g., Symposium on Proposed Rules for Admission of Scientific Evidence, in
Rules for Admissibility, supra note 249, at 108-45 [hereinafter Symposium] (surveying
approaches and proposing alternatives to the McCormick relevancy approach); see also
sources cited infra note 414 (summarizing two of the best-known variations of McCormick's
approach).
411. See Symposium, supra note 410; see also United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224,
1237-41 (3d Cir. 1985) (Before admitting scientific evidence, the court should consider the
soundness and reliability of the technique used in generating the evidence, the possibility of
jury confusion, and the proffered connection between the evidence and the disputed factual
issue.).
412. FED. R. EVID. 702 (emphasis added).
413. E.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1235, 1237-41 (3d Cir. 1985). Of
course, evidence also cannot aid the jury unless it is first determined that the evidence is
what it purports to be. See FED. R. EVID. 901. Consequently, counsel should be alert,
before engaging in more esoteric analyses, to circumstances suggesting that the source scent
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Furthermore, Rule 403 offers alternative or supplementary sup-
port for the McCormick approach: "Although relevant, evidence may
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
'414
The relevancy analysis has been applied to scent lineups in only
the most indirect and cursory fashion. In Ramos v. State,4 5 the Su-
preme Court of Florida reversed a defendant's murder conviction
that the lower court based on two dog scent-discrimination lineups.
The court, recognizing that the scent lineup was a new method of
proof, held that the lineup evidence was improperly admitted partly
because the state had not first established that "this type of lineup
evidence" was reliable. 41 6 The court, however, .did not address how
reliable lineups must be in order for them to pass the relevancy test
or what countervailing considerations, if- any, should be weighed
against lineup reliability.
In United States v. MNiee,4 1 7 the court applied a relevancy
approach and upheld the admission of scent lineup evidence. The
court conceded that the chance of two individuals having similar or
"Identical scents had not yet been established in the scientific com-
munity.418 The court concluded, however, that jurors would be skep-
tical of the "human-like" lineup evidence and that a combination
of adequate jury instructions, a heavy burden of proof, and a cor-
roboration requirement would prevent the jury's being unduly prej-
udiced or misled. 4 9 Although it voiced the belief that jurors would
be duly skeptical of scenting evidence, the court itself expressed no
such skepticism, noting that dogs
have either a very heightened or sophisticated sense of smell, or
even what we might well term to be an extra sensory perception that
on which the dog is placed is either not the wrongdoer's scent or is so contaminated by
other scents that there is no way to know whether or not the scent is the wrongdoer's. See
Epperly v. Booker, 235 Va. 35, 366 S.E. 2d 62 (1988) (In Epperly, the court considered a
similar claim to that described but the court concluded that, as a factual matter, there was
no evidence that either the object scented or the trail followed had been contaminated by
other scents.).
414. FED. R. Evm. 403; see also McCormick, supra note 409, at 911-12 (advocating an
11-factor test for determining the Rule 403 balance); accord 3 J. WEn sTEIN & M. BERGER,
WErNsmnE's EVmENCE 702 [03], at 702-41 to 702-43 (1988) (advocating a seven-factor
test).
415. 496 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 1986).
416. Id. at 123.
417. 558 F. Supp. 612 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
418. Id. at 615.
419. Id. at 615-16.
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provides them with the ability to sense or perceive unique char-
acteristics or special odors that exist in all humans, thus enabling
dogs to distinguish among humans.
420
The McNiece court, however, never examined the scientific lit-
erature relevant to evaluating the accuracy of lineups. The court failed
to achieve a thorough and rational balancing of probative value
against countervailing concerns because it ignored this literature. By
failing to confront the mythic infallibility of the dog, the court itself
fell victim to that very myth.
The McNiece court purported to apply the relevancy analysis
articulated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in United States v. Williams.42' Had the McNiece court care-
fully followed the Williams approach, however, the decision in
McNiece would have been very different.
In Williams, the court concluded that a spectrographic voice
analysis was properly admitted at the defendant's narcotics trial. The
court held that the probative value of the spectrogram outweighed
any tendency to mislead, prejudice, or confuse the jury.422 The court
found that the probative value was high for five reasons: (1) the false
identification rate ranged between 2.4 and 6.3 percent, depending on
how the rate was measured; 423 (2) inaccuracies in the spectrogram or
its failures to reflect accurately the voice of the accused were more
likely to result in false negatives than false positives; 424 (3) the In-
ternational Association of Voice Identification maintained standards
to guide examiners in declaring matches; 425 (4) the technique histor-
ically has been applied with care and concern-particularly by the
examiner involved in the case before the court-instead of the tech-
nique's lending itself to abuse; 426 and (5) the technique was analogous
to other types of accepted scientific techniques, such as handwriting
comparison and analysis of gun barrel striations, which require an
examiner to compare known and unknown specimens to determine
whether there are sufficient points of similarity to justify declaring
a "match.'' 427
420. Id. at 614 n.2 (emphasis added).
421. 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979).
422. Id. at 1198-1200.
423. Id. at 1198. Other scientists have suggested much lower accuracy rates. See, e.g.,
Hazen, Effects of Differing Phonetic Contexts on Spectrographic Speaker Identification, 54
J. ACOUSTICAL Soc'Y AM. 650 (1973).
424. Williams, 583 F.2d at 1199.
425. Id. at 1198.
426. Id. at 1199.
427. Id. at 1198-99.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42
On the other hand, the court found four reasons why the tech-
nique's tendency to mislead the jury was low. First, the jury can
easily understand and evaluate the "simple step of visual pattern-
matching. ' 42 Second, the jury can visually examine and compare on
its own the written graphs and aurally examine and compare the taped
voices. 429 Third, effective cross-examination can reveal weaknesses in
the reliability of both the technique and the equipment, as well as
the qualifications of the expert. 40 And finally, the jury can be in-
structed that the expert's opinion is solely for its assistance to be
completely rejected if considered unreliable.
431
None of the factors suggesting a high probative value in Wil-
liams are present with dog scent lineups. The false identification rate
of such lineups is indeterminate, and, in any event, the few available
studies suggest error rates of at least ten percent, not 2.4 to 6.3 per-
cent. 432 Moreover, unidentified lineup suggestiveness or other flaws
in the technique are more likely to lead to false positives (identifying
an innocent person) than false negatives (freeing a guilty person) .43
Furthermore, there is no association of scent lineup examiners that
has formulated standards to guide the conduct of specific lineups.
Additionally, there is at least some reason to suspect that, instead
of the scent lineup technique being applied with care and concern,
it has been subject to abuse by careless or even unscrupulous ex-
aminers. 434 Nor is the technique analogous to other accepted tech-
niques. Indeed, as will be discussed below, 435 the dog scent lineup is
most analogous to those techniques that largely have been found to
be inadmissible by most American courts. The known probative value
of the scent lineup therefore is much less than is that of the spec-
trogram, which was the method at issue in Williams.
The scent lineup also has a much greater tendency to mislead
the jury than the spectrogram. With evidence of a scent lineup, unlike
that of a spectrogram, there are neither visual patterns for jurors to
compare nor the opportunity for jurors to perform their own com-
parison of scents. Moreover, effective cross-examination is difficult
428. Id. at 1199.
429. Id.
430. Id. at 1200.
431. Id.
432. See supra text accompanying notes 363-382. Only de Bruin claims fairly high
accuracy rates, yet even he reports an error rate of five percent. See supra text accompanying
notes 379-381.
433. See infra text accompanying notes 518-548.
434. See supra text accompanying notes 152-155 (detailing the allegations of fraud by
John Preston).
435. See infra text accompanying notes 442-444.
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because jurors cannot know why the dog has made his choice in a
particular case, and experimental research is at too early a stage for
weaknesses in the technique to be revealed clearly. Even cross-ex-
amination regarding the limited nature of the scientific research is
unlikely to be effective given the dog's aura of infallibility. 4 6 For
these same reasons, jury instructions are likely to be an ineffective
method of control.
In fact, the court's analysis in Williams was flawed in many re-
spects. For example, the court underemphasized the subjective ele-
ments of voice identification, including both the examiner's use of
aural comparison as a supplement to the spectrogram and the ex-
aminer's interpretation of the spectrographic charts. 4"1 As noted ear-
lier, techniques relying upon subjective judgments raise a significant
possibility of confusing or misleading the jury. 43 8 Furthermore, the
court rejected the claim that insufficient tests had been conducted
to establish that spectrograms of the same voice do not differ more
than spectrograms of different voices, and concluded that courts
"must decide admissibility issues in the light of the current state of
the art. ' 43 9 This approach ignored the basic rule of the scientific
method that there must be adequate and consistent experimental ver-
ification of a theory before the theory may be considered sound.
440
Voice identification based upon spectrographic analysis thus is not
nearly as reliable as the Williams court maintained, as other courts
since have concluded. 441 Because the proven experimental reliability
of the scent lineup is subject to even greater doubt than the ques-
tionable voice spectrogram, under a relevancy analysis scent lineups
should be viewed with caution.
Support for this conclusion is even clearer when it is noted that
scent lineups are more analogous to the polygraph than to the voice
spectrogram. Both the polygraph and scent lineup are techniques in
which "unusual responsibility" is placed on the examiner.4 2 The ex-
aminer is a potential source of conscious or unconscious improper
436. Cf. United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1019 (1975) (suggesting that cross-examination and refutation are inadequate means of
attack when "an exaggerated popular opinion of the accuracy of a particular technique
makes its use prejudicial or likely to mislead the jury.") (emphasis added).
437. See Thomas, Voiceprint: Myth or Miracle, in SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE,
supra note 259, at 1015, 1029-30 n.28.
438. See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1239 (3d Cir. 1985); see also supra
text accompanying notes 401-408.
439. United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1197 n.4 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1117 (1979).
440. See supra text accompanying notes 261-320.
441. E.g., Windmere, Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 105 N.J. 373, 522 A.2d 405 (1987).
442. United States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp. 510, 512 (D. Md. 1973).
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suggestion and in both techniques his interpretation of results is highly
subjective. 443 This subjectivity suggests a lack of consistency among
examiners. Moreover, because the two techniques involve grave con-
cerns over false positives, they both involve a significant chance of
convicting the innocent. 44 Both techniques involve limited verified
experimental data and significant scientific dispute regarding the ac-
curacy of the techniques, thus raising the problem of indeterminacy
discussed above. 445 Furthermore, an aura of mythic infallibility sur-
rounds both techniques. 446 Although some psychologists have ex-
pressed doubt regarding the existence of the myth of the infallible
polygraph, 447 no psychologist has doubted-for none has yet inves-
tigated-the myth of the dog. Finally, although the Frye notion of
general acceptance was of little importance to either the McNiece or
Williams courts, when many courts apply a relevancy analysis, they
recognize general acceptance as one factor to be considered in weigh-
ing probative value against countervailing concerns. 44 The lack of
such general acceptance clearly is significant for both techniques,
although it is particularly important for the scent lineup.
Of course, the polygraph has its defenders, since in the view of
some the technique has made great strides in the many years since
its developnient. 449 The same cannot be said of scent lineups. The
present stage of scientific development of the scent lineup is closer
not to today's polygraph test but rather to the 1923 polygraph test
that was rejected by the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia
in Frye.450 Accordingly, scent lineups should be excluded from ev-
idence at trial, both in jurisdictions applying Frye and in those ap-
plying a variant of the McCormick relevancy analysis.
C. Calibrating the Dog
In addition to demonstrating the validity and reliability of a sci-
entific technique and the theory underlying the technique, the in-
443. See id. at 512-13; supra text accompanying notes 401-408.
444. See J. TARANTINO, supra note 307, at 221 (cautioning about the false positives
danger with the polygraph).
445. See United States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp. at 514 (noting indeterminacy and incipient
stage of polygraph research).
446. Skolnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific Evidence: An Analysis of Lie-Detection,
70 YALE L.J. 694, 704-05 (1961).
447. Imwinkelried, Critique, supra note 244 at 567-68.
448. E.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985).
449. See generally Rapp, The Comparative Reliability of the Polygraph, 4 THE REvIaw
OF LITIGATION 151 (1985) (comparing reliability of polygraph evidence with that of other
forms of admissible evidence.
450. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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strument used must be shown to be in proper working order at the
time of the test. 451 With animate instruments such as dogs, this
"calibration ' 45 2 requirement is equally important because the canine
sense of smell can be weakened by many factors, including disease
and re-training by an inadequately skilled handler. 453 To ensure that
dogs used in law enforcement are properly "calibrated," some scien-
tists have suggested that there should be at least a periodic certifi-
cation process by which the animals' olfactory performance will be
451. Imwinkelried, Evidence Law and Tactics for the Proponents of Scientific Evidence,
in SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE, supra note 259, at 33, 52-53. This requirement is often
stated but its rationale rarely explained. See id. at 52; P. GIANNELLI & E. IMWINKELRIED,
supra note 359, at 40. In some jurisdictions the proper working order requirement is imposed
by statute, while in other jurisdictions the requirement is rooted in case law. Id. at 41.
Some courts, however, view whether an instrument was in proper working order as affecting
the weight accorded to the evidence, not the admissibility of the evidence. Id. at 40; see
Imwinkelried, supra, at 52 (noting majority of jurisdictions consider proper working con-
dition a prerequisite to admissibility). The better view would seem to be that proper working
order should go to admissibility, because the factfinder may easily be misled by a result
from a machine not in proper condition. For example, if a radar speedometer is misadjusted
so that it always reads cars as moving 60 miles per hour (m.p.h.) no matter how fast they
really are traveling, a reading that a car was traveling 60 m.p.h. in a 55 m.p.h. zone misleads
the factfinder as to the value of the evidence (such evidence might be offered in a wrongful
death suit against the speeding driver). Indeed, arguably the reading of such a radar machine
is not even logically relevant, for the result makes it no more likely than would otherwise
be true that the defendant was speeding (alternatively, if the radar is sometimes accurate
and sometimes not, the proper objection in a particular case might be "relevancy unknown,"
thus creating a grave danger that the radar reading will mislead the jury). Indeed those
jurisdictions treating "proper working condition" as an admissibility question are clearly
concerned greatly about the danger of jury confusion. They generally treat the question as
one to be resolved by the court under Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a), with the burden on
the proponent to establish proper working condition by a preponderance of the evidence.
See P. GIANELLI & E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 359, at 43. But see People v. Pompilio,
137 Misc. 2d 997, 999, 522 N.Y.S.2d 761, 763 (1987) (trial court must consider whether
there is "sufficient evidence from which the trier of facts could reasonably conclude that
the breathalyzer instrument was in proper working order," a standard equivalent to that in
Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b) for questions of conditional relevancy).
452. To "calibrate" means "to standardize (as a measuring instrument) by determining
the deviation from a standard so as to ascertain the proper correction factors ... [to] adjust
tune." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 197 (Merriam-Webster Inc. 1988).
"Calibration" is "the act or process of calibrating." Id. Rephrased, "calibration" is the
act of adjusting or tuning an instrument to a standard, that is, the act of placing an
instrument in proper working order.
453. E.g., Myers, Nusbaum, Swango, Hanrahan & Sartin, Dysfunction of Sense of Smell
Caused by Canine Parainfluenza Virus Infection in Dogs, 49 AM. J. VETERINARY RES. No.
2 188 (1988); Myers, Hanrahan, Swango, & Nusbaum Anosmia Associated with Canine
Distemper, 49 AM. J. VETERINARY RES. No. 8 1295 (1988); Simpson & Myers, Dyosmia
Caused by Encephalitis in a Dog, 191 J. AM. VETERINARY MED. Ass'N 1593 (1987); see
Letter from Dr. L. J. Myers, Director, Institute for Biological Detection Systems, to Andrew
E. Taslitz (Mar. 7, 1990) [hereinafter Letter from Dr. L. J. Myers] (discussing need for
canine calibration procedure).
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evaluated based on scientific methods. 454 Such a calibration proce-
dure will consider the sensory function of the dog, which can be tested
by electro-encephalographic olfactometry or behavioral olfactome-
try,455 his temperament, his motor function and history of treatment
by veterinarians, and the continuing training of his handler. 4 6 Such
an approach is essential if the courts are to have any confidence in
the use of dogs in scent lineups.
D. Who Is Qualified as an Expert on Dog Scent Lineups?
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, only a witness "qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, training, or education" may testify
concerning scientific, technical, or specialized matters. 457 Moreover,
testimony on scientific and technical matters is admissible only if it
will "assist the trier of fact." 458 Again, only a properly qualified ex-
pert will assist the jury.45 9 Indeed, the testimony of an insufficiently
qudlified "expert" is likely to confuse and mislead the factfinder,
thus requiring exclusion of the testimony under Federal Rule of Ev-
idence 403.
410
With scientific evidence, each of three types of experts must be
shown to be qualified to testify regarding three distinct aspects of
scientific evidence: an educating witness (the educator) who teaches
the jury about the validity and reliability of the underlying scientific
principle and the scientific instrument or technique; a reporting wit-
ness (the reporter) who verifies that the particular instrument used
was in proper working order at the time of the test, that proper test-
ing procedures were followed, and that the test yielded a certain re-
sult; and an interpreting witness (the interpreter) who interprets the
test result and explains the reasoning underlying his interpretation. 46'
Sometimes an educating witness is unnecessary, for example when
454. Letter from Dr. L. J. Myers, supra note 453.
455. See Myers & Pugh, Thresholds of the Dog for Detection of Inhaled Eugenol and
Benzalde-hyde Determined by Electroencephalographic and Behavioral Olfactometry, 46 AM.
J. VETERINARY REs. No. 11 2409 (1985); see also Myers, Nash & Elledge, Electro-olfactog-
raphy: A Technique with Potential for Diagnosis of Anosmia in the Dog, 45 AM. J.
VETERiNARY REs. No. 11 2296 (1984).
456. Letter from Dr. L.J. Myers, supra note 453.
457. FED. R. Evro. 702 (emphasis added).
458. Id.
459. Graham, supra note 244, at 73 ("Anyone with scientific, technical, or specialized
knowledge, including knowledge gained through experience, which will assist the trier of
fact, is an expert.") (emphasis added); see also R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBtRG, supra note
259, at 859-60.
460. See R. LEmPERT & S. SArTz uG, supra note 259, at 864.
461. Imwinkelried, supra note 451, at 39-40.
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the court may judicially notice the validity of the theory and the re-
liability of the instrument. 462 Other times an interpreting witness may
be unnecessary because, for example, certain test results may be self-
explanatory. 463 For jurisdictions facing the novel question of the ad-
missibility of dog scent lineups, however, all three types of witnesses
will be necessary since the validity of the technique and the theory
are not subject to judicial notice464 and the test results are not self-
explanatory.
Unfortunately, the courts largely have not made any inquiry into
whether lineup "experts" have the qualifications necessary to testify
in all of the three mentioned capacities. Instead, the courts generally
rely solely on the testimony of the dog's handler, who discusses his
training in handling dogs, his experience regarding the accuracy of
his own dogs, and his involvement in the particular lineup in ques-
tion. 46 15 The handler, while properly qualified as a reporting witness,
lacks the theoretical training necessary to verify the validity of the
theory and the instrument.4 6 Moreover, he is not necessarily equipped
to interpret the results because proper interpretation requires both
theoretical knowledge and practical experience, which he may be
lacking. 467 If the requirement that an expert be sufficiently qualified
462. Id. at 39; see, e.g., State v. Wilcox, 40 Ohio App. 2d 380, 381-83, 319 N.E.2d
615, 617-18 (1974) (judicial notice taken of theory of the Doppler principle underlying the
radar speedometer's general reliability as a scientific instrument.).
463. Imwinkelried, supra note 451, at 39-40.
464. At least one court has in effect "judicially noticed" the validity of the theory
underlying scent lineups and the reliability of the dog as a discriminating biological instru-
ment. Roberts v. State, 298 Md. 261, 273 & n.5, 469 A.2d 442, 447 & n.5 (1983). The
Roberts court, based upon its own cursory review of the tracking literature, concluded that
a trained tracking dog can focus on one scent. From this premise, the court leaped to the
conclusion that such a dog can ignore suggestive influences in scent lineups. Id. at 273, 469
A.2d at 447. Of course, the court's use of "judicial notice" was inappropriate, for only
adjudicative facts "not subject to reasonable dispute," FED. R. EVID. 201(b), may be
judicially noticed, a test clearly failed. See also Neal v. Fisher, 312 Md. 685, 696, 541 A.2d
1314, 1320 (1988) (following "not subject to reasonable dispute" test for judicial notice);
accord OHIO R. EvID. 201(b); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2202 (1980); N.C.R. EVID. 201(b).
Moreover, the court's sole reliance on tracking literature, ignoring the differences between
scent lineups and tracking, emphasizes the dangers of courts' making improper use of the
doctrine of judicial notice.
465. See, e.g., United States v. McNiece, 558 F. Supp. 612, 616 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); State
v. Roscoe, 145 Ariz. 212, 221, 700 P.2d 1312, 1321 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1094
(1985); Epperly v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 214, 233, 294 S.E.2d 882, 893 (1982), habeas
corpus proceeding sub nom., Epperly v. Booker, 235 Va. 35, 366 S.E.2d 62 (1988).
466. See Imwinkelried, supra note 451, at 39-50 (offers the example of a chemist, who
is the educating witness, and a laboratory technician, who is the reporting witness); E.
IMWINKELRIED, METHODS OF ATTACKING, supra note 317, at 196 ("The teaching witness'
primary credential is theoretical knowledge, obtained through formal education.").
467. E. IMWINKELRIED, METHODS OF ATTACKING, supra note 317, at 196-214.
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to "assist the trier of fact" in making a particular inquiry468 is to
have any meaning, courts must pay closer attention to whether a
particular witness is qualified to serve all three functions, and if not,
must limit that witness' testimony to the scope of his qualifications.
In practical terms, this generally will mean that there must be at least
one expert in addition to the handler who has a theoretical back-
ground regarding the research on the accuracy of dog scent lineups.
Such experts may have practical experience that makes them useful
as interpreter as well as educator experts.
E. Suggestiveness and the Role of Counsel
The Article thus far has considered how the common law and
rule-based evidentiary objections that are common to all cases in-
volving scientific evidence should be applied to dog scent lineups. But
the law of evidence in criminal cases in many ways has been "con-
stitutionalized" by the United States Supreme Court. The Court has,
in particular, recognized two constitutional protections that come
into play only in lineups or similar pretrial confrontations: the sixth
amendment right to counsel at pre-trial identification procedures and
the due process prohibition against such procedures being conducted
in an unnecessarily suggestive manner. If either of these protections
is violated, evidence of the pre-trial identification (here, the lineup)
may be suppressed at trial." 9 It is these two constitutionally-based
objections to which this Article next turns. 470
(1) General Principles
Due process requires the irial court to suppress all identification
evidence derived from unnecessarily suggestive pretrial confronta-
468. FED. R. EvD. 702.
469. See infra notes 475-513 and accompanying text.
470. This Article addresses another constitutional protection-the right of an accused to
confront the witnesses against him-in section III F(2). See infra notes 577-628 and accom-
panying text. Because of its close logical connection to the confrontation clause question,
another common law/rule-based issue-hearsay-is discussed imihediately before the con-
frontation clause. The due process, right to counsel, hearsay, and confrontation clause
analyses are all necessary to understand yet another set of common law and rule-based
issues: those surrounding the unique evidentiary tests used by the courts in tracking and
scent lineup cases. See infra text accompanying notes 629-643. These evidentiary issues differ
from those in sections III A-D above (covering grounds for objection comion to all types
of scientific evidence) because these special issues involve tests unique to dog-scenting. See
infra text accompanying notes 629-643. The discussion of those special issues in turn sets
the stage for understanding questions that may arise on appeal, thus completing the analysis
of potential objections to lineups. See infra text accompanying notes 644-651. The penulti-
mate section of the Article then considers methods for correcting the problems with scent
lineup evidence other than by complete exclusion. See infra text accompanying notes 652-
684.
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tions that have created a very substantial likelihood of misidentifi-
cation. 47' Whether a substantial likelihood of misidentification exists
is determined by examining the totality of the circumstances. 472 Even
unnecessarily suggestive pretrial confrontations are admissible, how-
ever, if the court is convinced that the witness had a reliable in-
dependent basis for the out-of-court identification.4 73 Thus a witness
who observed a robber in bright light for twenty minutes and who
gave an excellent detailed description of the robber to the police
probably had a reliable independent basis for selecting the defendant
from a visual lineup that was conducted one day after the crime, even
though there was some unnecessary suggestion that he do so. 474 A
similar test governs admissibility of in-court identifications by the
same witness: if the suggestive pretrial confrontation created a very
substantial likelihood of "irreparable" misidentification in court, the
witness may not identify the defendant at trial.475 Again, reliability
is the "linchpin" of the analysis.
476
The few cases that have considered the applicability of these due
process tests to dog scent lineups have failed to examine closely the
reliability question or to consider whether scent lineups may, because
of their unique characteristics, require a modified or wholly different
due process test.
In Roberts v. State,477 a defendant appealed a rape conviction
that resulted from a dog's identifying as the defendant's a ski cap
worn by the rapist. The identification was made in two dog scent
lineups, each of which involved the defendant and four police of-
ficers. The court affirmed the defendant's conviction and concluded
that the lineups were not unduly suggestive even though the dog knew
the four police officers involved but did not know the defendant,
meaning that the defendant was the only stranger in each lineup. The
471. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972) (where there is unnecessary suggestiveness,
a subsequent in-court identification is inadmissible only if there is " 'a very substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification,' " and "with the deletion of 'irreparable,' [that
test] . . . serves equally well as a standard for the admissibility of testimony concerning the
out-of-court identification itself") (quoting in part Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377,
384 (1968)); accord Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 107, 109-14 (1977) (rejecting a per
se rule and reaffirming the Biggers analysis).
472. Manson, 432 U.S. at 104.
473. Id. at 114.
474. For cases similar to this hypothetical, see State v. Brown, 549 A.2d 1373 (R.I.
1988); Commonwealth v. Wright, 240 Pa. Super. 4, 367 A.2d 1096 (1976).
475. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 198.
476. Manson, 432 U.S. at 114 (using "linchpin" language in discussing suppression of
an unnecessarily suggestive pretrial confrontation).
477. 298 Md. 261, 469 A.2d 442 (1983).
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court based this conclusion on its own survey, "to some extent," of
the general literature on tracking dogs. In this survey, the court found
"no indication that a trained and reliable tracking dog will signal
a find because the person found is the only one unfamiliar to the
dog from among a group of persons. ' 478 Indeed, the court noted
that, "so far as we can determine from the literature, the purpose
of training a tracking dog is to keep it focused on the given scent
and not distracted by other scents." 479
The court's analysis in Roberts ignored both fundamental prin-
ciples of due process and the science behind scent lineups. First, the
court ignored the principle that lineup participants should be sub-
stantially similar in appearance or, at minimum, that the defendant
should not have an obvious distinguishing characteristic. 40 In United
States v. Wade,481 the Supreme Court illustrated the importance of
this principle when it recounted several horror stories of suggestive
lineups in which the defendant was the only Oriental, the only person
with black hair, the only tall suspect, or the only young suspect.
482
Indeed, it is inconceivable that a visual lineup involving a human
witness would be upheld if it consisted of four friends of the witness
and a single stranger, the defendant.
Despite the Court's discussion in Wade and its acknowledgment
of the danger of suggestiveness inherent in the conduct of a visual
lineup, the Roberts court, in effect, imbued the dog with magical
powers to ignore such suggestions and to make a reliable identifi-
cation. The court found these magical powers by engaging in an ad-
mittedly limited review of the relevant literature. From the mere
absence of -literature addressing the precise suggestive circumstances
before the court and from the fact that the goal of tracking training
is to keep a dog focused on a single scent, 483 the court concluded that
a dog can indeed generally focus solely on that scent. This is a tre-
mendous leap in logic. A tracking dog may focus on a particular
scent simply because the vegetative portion of that scent is of a dif-
ferent age than competing vegetative track scents, not because the
dog has a proven ability to ignore suggestive influences in discrim-
478. Id. at 273, 469 A.2d at 447.
479. Id.
480. The prevention of lineups where the defendant has an obvious distinguishing
characteristic was one of the reasons the Supreme Court gave for extending the right to
counsel to post-indictment lineups. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 232-33, 236-37
(1967).
481. Id.
482. Id. at 232 (quoting P. WALL, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 53).
483. Roberts, 298 Md. at 273, 469 A.2d at 447.
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inating among human scents. 48 4 Furthermore, the scent lineup offers
additional potential suggestion, in the form of subconscious minimal
cues, 485 that are not present in tracking when the dog cannot see its
human quarry.
Second, the court reached its sweeping conclusion that a lineup
involving the defendant as the sole stranger can never be suggestive
without looking to the totality of the circumstances. Had the court
looked to all the circumstances and given the parties the opportunity
to supplement its own research, the court might have noted, for ex-
ample, that in one of the two lineups the defendant was placed at
the end of the line-a circumstance that by itself would prompt some
researchers to find that the lineup was suggestive. 48 6 This circum-
stance, when combined with the defendant's being the only stranger
in the lineup and with the failure to protect against minimal cues,
easily could have supported a conclusion that the lineup was un-
necessarily suggestive.
Third, the court ignored the practical problem of determining
whether a dog's identification of a man results from suggestion or
from a clear, accurate, independent recollection of events. After all,
a dog cannot be cross-examined.
Finally, the court failed even to consider whether the prosecution
bore the burden of proving reliability. If the burden was on the pros-
ecution, it is difficult to imagine how so suggestive a lineup as this
could have been upheld. 7
In the only other case considering an attack on the fairness of
a scent lineup, Ramos v. State,488 the court held that lineup evidence
should have been excluded partly because of the suggestive nature
of the procedure. 48 9 Two lineups were held, the first involving a line
of five blue shirts, four of which belonged to the husband of the
secretary to the police chief. The fifth shirt, the victim's and the one
identified by the dog as having a scent matching the defendant's, was
the only shirt that had been worn by a female and the only shirt with
blood on it. The second lineup involved five knives, only one of
484. See supra text accompanying notes 195-204.
485. See supra notes 241-243, 404-407 and infra notes 514-544 and accompanying text.
486. F. BUYTENDIJK, supra note 173, at 92.
487. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 462 (2d ed. 1985) (reviewing the
conflicting arguments regarding allocation of the burdens of production and persuasion as
to the suggestiveness of lineups).
488. 496 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 1986); see also Epperly v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 214, 227,
294 S.E.2d 882, 889-90 (1982) (apparently only one blood-stained towel in two object lineups,
yet court did not address suggestiveness), habeas corpus proceeding sub nom., Epperly v.
Booker, 235 Va. 35, 366 S.E.2d 62 (1988).
489. Ramos, 496 So. 2d at 123.
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which-the knife found in the victim and later matched by the dog
to the defendant-had blood on it. Both lineups involved one ob-
viously unique item, and the court accordingly found the conduct
of both lineups to be unfair.
490
Although the court reached the correct conclusion, it did so
without considering whether scent lineups should be held to the same
due process standard as either visual or voice lineups. Nor did the
court consider upon whom the burden of proving reliability should
fall or under what circumstances, if any, an unnecessarily suggestive
scent lineup can be considered reliable.
A careful analysis of dog scent lineups suggests that they are
fundamentally different from either human visual lineups or human
voice identification lineups. First, while it is easy to guard against
obvious kinds of suggestion-like those in Roberts and Ramos-it
is harder to guard against more subtle but no less pernicious forms
of suggestion. For example, a visual lineup can attempt to include
persons of similar height, weight, race, and skin and hair color. A
voice lineup, although with more difficulty, can attempt to include
voices of similar timbre and pitch. 49' But how can it be determined
whether a scent lineup includes similar scents, particularly when the
dog's sense of smell is not only so different from our own but also
so poorly understood?
The answer to the problem may lie partly in the meaning of the
word "unnecessary" as it is used in the due process test. 492 Although
the Court never has clearly defined "necessity," most cases have
treated the concept as similar to "urgency," permitting, for example,
a one-person showup where the hospitalized victim is near death. 493.
On the other hand, the Court has a flexible notion of urgency, as
demonstrated by Simmons v. United States,494 in which the Court
concluded that using photo arrays, instead of some other less sug-
gestive identification procedure, one day after a gunpoint robbery
was not "unnecessarily suggestive." The Court reasoned that
A serious felony had been committed. The perpetrators were still
at large. The inconclusive clues which law enforcement officials
possessed led to Andrews and Simmons. It was essential for the FBI
agents swiftly to determine whether they were on the right track,
490. Id.
491. See, e.g., A MODEL CODE OF PREARRAIONMENT PROCEDURE § 160.2(3) (1975)
(requiring that voice identifications be "made from a selection of several voices, a reasonable
number of which shall be similar to that of the person to be identified").
492. See supra text accompanying note 471.
493. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
494. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
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so that they could properly deploy their forces in Chicago and, if
necessary, alert officials in other cities.4 95
The scope of the Simmons notion that suggestion may be nec-
essary to determine whether they are "on the right track" is un-
certain. 496 It is important to note, however, that the Court's discussion
of necessity was directed to whether it was necessary to use the par-
ticular type of identification procedure-a photo array instead of a
lineup.4 97 But the Court emphasized that each photo array, while not
perfect, 498 involved at least six photographs, with each witness being
alone while viewing the photographs, and with no evidence that the
FBI suggested which persons shown were under suspicion. 499 The
pressing need to conduct identifications by photo arrays did not,
therefore, make it "necessary" that those photo arrays be conducted
in a suggestive manner. Thus, if the police had been sloppy or care-
less in the manner in which they conducted the arrays, for example
using only one or two photographs or declaring that "the perpetra-
tors are probably in these photos," the Court probably would not
have held that suggestiveness necessary. °° Indeed, since Simmons,
the Court has made it clear that the police are expected to make rea-
sonable efforts to render lineups fair and that the technical difficulty
of organizing fair lineups does not make the resulting suggestion
"necessary." 50' Consequently, police ignorance of the scientific prin-
495. Id. at 384.
496. See W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 487, at 338 (Simmons has most often been
applied by lower courts to justify identification procedures conducted within several hours
of the crime, and these cases suggest, without clearly articulating the point, that the stronger
the need for conducting a particular procedure, the higher the risk of error that will be
tolerated as "necessary").
497. 390 U.S. at 383-86 & n.6 (noting dangers of photographic identifications and
emphasizing that "a corporeal identification . . . is normally more accurate"). Five photos-
preads were conducted. Id. at 385. The court spoke generally at one point about the need
to use spreads at all, id. at 384-85, but at another point noted that if one spread resulted
in an identification, the remaining confrontations could have been done in the form of
lineups. Id. at 386 n.6.
498. Id. at 386 n.6 ("[I]t probably would have been preferable for the witnesses to have
been shown more than six snapshots, for those snapshots to have pictured a greater number
of individuals, and for there to have been proportionally fewer pictures of Simmons.").
The six photographs used were primarily group photographs, and Simmons appeared several
times in the series. Id. at 385.
499. Id. at 385.
500. See id. at 383 (the danger of suggestion in photospreads is increased if the police
display only a single picture of an individual who generally resembles the wrongdoer or if
the police indicate to the witness that they have other evidence that one of the persons
pictured committed the crime).
501. See, e.g., Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972) (showup was unnecessarily suggestive,
despite the police finding no one at either the city jail or the juvenile home on the date of
the identification procedure who fit a physical description comparable to the defendant's).
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ciples underlying fair scent lineups or the failure to exercise common
sense-as in Ramos and Roberts when the police created obviously
suggestive scent lineups-arguably should not excuse the police from
obtaining the necessary knowledge or exercising appropriate common
sense. This does not mean that every officer must become an expert
on the subject, but only that police must either retain a properly
qualified expert or have one on the staff. Still, when science has not
accounted for all the factors that may lead to suggestion or when
designing an entirely suggestion-free lineup (such as one in which all
participants eat similar food, use similar soap, work in similar lo-
cations, and use similar colognes) is extremely expensive and time-
consuming, the burden on the police of minimizing suggestion may
be so intolerable that some potential suggestion ought to be permitted
as "necessary."
Second, it is much more difficult than with a visual lineup under
the Manson due process test to determine whether a suggestive dog
scent lineup is so reliable as to outweigh the effect of suggestion
50 2
thus making the lineup and later in-court identification admissible
under the due process test despite the unnecessary suggestion.503 In
Manson v. Braithwaite, the Court noted that five factors must be
considered in making this reliability determination: (1) the witness'
opportunity to view the accused during the perpetration of the crime;
(2) the witness' degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness'
description; (4) the witness' degree of certainty; and (5) the time be-
tween the crime and the confrontation.5 ° These factors, in turn, are
weighed against the corrupting effect of the suggestiveness of the
identification.5 0 S
The court cited with approval the district court's opinion on this point: " 'In this case it
appears to the Court that a lineup, which both sides admit is generally more reliable than
a show-up, could have been arranged. The fact that this was not done tended needlessly to
decrease the fairness of the identification process to which petitioner was subjected.' " Id.
at 199 n.6 (quoting lower court's opinion). See also W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note
487, at 462 (rejecting notion that "accidental" suggestion by the police renders the suggestion
"necessary"); cf. Alpert and Smith, Law Enforcement Defensibility of Law Enforcement
Training, 26 Came. L. BULL. 452 (October 1990) (generally discussing the many ways in
which the complexities of constitutionally-mandated procedures, even if an expert must be
retained to train the officers).
502. See Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).
503. As noted previously, the admissibility ,of both unnecessarily suggestive pretrial
identifications and subsequent in-court identifications under the due process clause turns on
substantially similar totality of the circumstances tests that weigh the effect of the suggestion
against independent indications that the identifications are reliable. See supra notes 471-476,
503.
504. 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).
505. Id. These same five factors apply in determining the reliability of the suggestive
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With a scent lineup the first consideration is not at issue. Be-
cause the dog can sniff the persons and objects involved for as long
as necessary, its ability to observe and accurately remember a scent
to which the dog earlier was exposed is not in question and its op-
portunity "to view" is not important. Of course, it may be important
to know whether a dog sniffing a new scent for the first time can,
upon leaving the scent to approach a line of persons or objects, re-
member the scent long enough to complete sniffing the line (if the
dog forgets what it is he smelled, how can he possibly know that a
later scent matches the one previously smelled but now forgotten?).
That problem, however, does not turn on the dog's "opportunity"
to sniff on an earlier occasion (for example, during the crime itself)
but rather on whether the dog has the mental capacity to retain the
memory of an object that he sniffs on this particular occasion for
the few seconds (or minutes) that it takes thereafter to sniff those
persons in the lineup.
Unfortunately, the effect of the additional three factors on the
dog's reliability cannot be determined. The degree of attention a dog
pays to his scenting task may be clear to a trained observer, °6 but
beyond this gross determination there is no way to know or test pre-
cisely the intensity of the dog's concentration. The dog cannot de-
scribe the two scents and, even if the dog could do so, we have no
way of testing whether the description of the scent taken and the
"matching" scent are the same. Nor can the dog convey his level of
certainty about a match.
The last factor-the time between the crime and the confron-
tation-is relevant not because memories may fade, the concern in
visual and voice lineups, but rather because scents may fade. The
longer the time lapse, the greater the likelihood that the dog will not
accurately detect any single scent or discriminate one scent from
among many. 07 While science can shed some light on how much time
can elapse before a dog's scenting ability is impaired, the research
is at such an early stage that, under many circumstances it is im-
out-of-court identification itself and the reliability of any later in-court identification.
Compare Manson, 432 U.S. at 114 (reaffirming and explaining the significance of the Biggers
totality of the circumstances approach) with Neal v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972)
(declaring that, with the deletion of the word "irreparable," the same due process test
applies to both suggestive out-of-court identifications and subsequent in-court identifica-
tions).
506. See Tracking the Tracker, supra note 42, in which Phil Hoelcher, a tracking expert,
upon viewing a videotape of one of John Preston's dogs at work, concluded, "This dog
does not look like he is even remotely trying to find scent. There is just a total lack of
enthusiasm, intensity, about the dog's entire performance."
507. See supra text accompanying notes 383-390.
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possible to draw a conclusion regarding the significance of this fac-
tor.
The difficulties in applying the Manson factors to a dog scent
lineup demonstrate that using the factors in this circumstance de-
prives the court and jury of guidance in weighing the corrupting ef-
fect of suggestion against indications that the dog can identify
accurately despite such suggestion. The Manson Court was willing
to tolerate admission of identification testimony with "some ques-
tionable feature" because the Court could "rely on the good sense
and judgment of American juries, for evidence with some element
of untrustworthiness is customary grist for the jury mill. ' 508 But an
inability to cross-examine the dog, the limited state of scientific
knowledge, and the juror's belief in the canine's mythic infallibility
undermine the assumption that in the case of dog scent lineups, the
jury can be trusted to weigh questionable identification procedure,
features against reliable ones. Merely exposing the fact that scientific
evidence regarding the reliability of dog scent lineups is scant by cross-
examining prosecution witnesses, is, for the reasons noted in the dis-
cussion of relevancy 509 unlikely to make the jury sufficiently skep-
tical of the dog scent identification.
The unique features of the dog scent lineup and the illustrated
unsuitability of the Manson test suggest two possible approaches to
evaluating alleged denials of due process in the scent lineup scenario.
One possible approach would be to exclude all unnecessarily sug-
gestive dog scent lineup evidence per se, without inquiring whether
the resulting identifications are reliable despite this suggestiveness.
5 10
Alternatively, the burden of proving reliability could be placed on
the prosecution.5 1' This approach is followed in some jurisdictions
508. 432 U.S. at 116.
509. See supra notes 391-400, 434-436 and accompanying text.
510. This would be similar to the approach that the Court has followed concerning
constitutional violations in other areas. Thus confessions may be suppressed because of the
failure to give Miranda warnings even if the defendant knew all his rights without those
warnings. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Similarly, pretrial identification evidence
is excluded from trial where there has been a violation of the defendant's sixth amendment
right to counsel at the identification procedure, even if the procedure was otherwise fair
and non-suggestive. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 273 (1967) ("Only a per se
exclusionary rule as to such testimony can be an effective sanction to assure that law
enforcement authorities will respect the accused's constitutional right to the presence of his
counsel at the critical lineup.")
511. Compare Corn v. Zant, 708 F.2d 549, 566-67 (11th Cir. 1983) (once a defendant
establishes that a suggestive pretrial confrontation has created a very substantial likelihood
of irreparable misidentification, the burden shifts to-the government to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the in-court identification is derived from an independent source
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and seems to make particularly good sense with dog scent lineups
because, on the one hand, the defendant is not handicapped by the
minimal information available regarding scent lineup reliability, since
the burden is the prosecutor's, but, on the other hand, the govern-
ment still has a chance to get scent lineups into evidence despite un-
necessary suggestion if it can nevertheless come up with the necessary
scientific proof. Moreover, this approach is more consistent with
United States Supreme Court case law discussed above in that iden-
tification evidence is not automatically excluded; rather, the pros-
ecution has the opportunity to establish reliability via expert testimony
on the particular question being considered, leaving the court to weigh
that reliability against the corrupting effect of the unnecessary sug-
gestion. For example, if a defendant's shirt was the only shirt in a
lineup that had been exposed to a flower bed, the prosecution might
argue that the unnecessary suggestiveness did not undermine the re-
liability of the identification because flowers do not emit a scent that
is "biologically significant" to dogs.512 The success of such an ar-
gument would depend in part upon the details of the expert testi-
mony, but the important point is that the availability of the argument
protects the legitimate concerns of both the defense and the pros-
ecution, unlike the one-sided, defense-skewed approach of a per se
rule.513
In any event, under either approach, the government is best ad-
vised to do all that it can to minimize the suggestiveness in any par-
ticular scent lineup. Only science can shed light on how to accomplish
that task.
(2) Science Enlightens the Inquiry
Frederick Buytendijk has noted several canine behaviors, dis-
played even by well-trained police dogs, that must be kept in mind
in designing a fair dog scent lineup. These behaviors include, among
others: (1) a dog is more likely to select an object at the end of a
row; 14 (2) a dog will stop sniffing objects in a line-he will sniff no
or is otherwise reliable), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1023 (1984) with W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL,
supra note 487, at 462 (suggesting that the defense should have the burden of proving
suggestiveness and unreliability, but the prosecution should have the burden of proving that
any suggestion was necessary) and United States ex rel. Hudson v. Brierton, 699 F.2d 917,
923-25 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 833 (1983).
512. F. BUYTENDUK, supra note 173, at 79-80.
513. See supra notes 471-476 and accompanying text (explaining the Manson and Biggers
approaches to the exclusion of unnecessarily suggestive pretrial confrontations).
514. Id. at 92.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42
further-once he reaches an object that, to him, has a "special"
smell;51 5 (3) a dog often will select an object with a "similar" but
not identical smell to the object upon which the dog was scented-
for example, odors from the same group, such as all tar smells, will
be "matched"; 51 6 (4) a dog often chooses an object because of visible
characteristics instead of scent;517 and (5) a dog may choose the object
that the trainer wants the dog to select, a desire that Buytendijk sug-
gested might be conveyed to the dog by slight differences in the trai-
ner's tone of voice but which, of course, also can be conveyed by
other minimal cues.51 8 Although Buytendijk described his own ex-
periments as yielding "very satisfactory results, "519 he cautioned that
the combination of these five (and other) behavioral tendencies es-
tablishes that lineup results "can never attain the degree of certainty
that is necessary before condemning a human being.
' 520
Buytendijk recounts the following experiment to demonstrate the
dangers inherent in dog scent lineups:
In the police station there was a suspect. The officials wanted to
find out whether a coat (a) which had been found somewhere be-
longed to this man, and the experiment was carried out in the fol-
lowing way. Six coats were placed in the passage, the coat (a) and
five belonging to the office clerks. The dog was allowed to sniff
at the suspected man, and it brought back coat (a). Such a test proves
nothing. In any case that particular coat would have a different
smell-complex from those of the five clerks. Let us imagine that
smells are visible-then the dog, for example, would see five grey
coats and one bright red one before it. The chances that the one
that looked so prominent would be chosen are very great. Only when
all the objects belong to the same odour-group and are also alike
to the eye as far as size and shape are concerned, can there be a
chance of trustworthy results.
It is still more dangerous to let a dog choose a person out of a row
of people on the score of the odour of an object offered to the dog.
Even if the trainer knows nothing about the test, and has himself
no suspicion of anybody, there still remains the possibility, by no
means a slight one, that the dog may respond to the faintest move-
ment of one of these persons.5 21
Since Buytendijk wrote these words, there has been little re-
search to challenge his conclusions on the dangers of dog scent line-
ups. What has been challenged, however, is whether those dangers
515. Id.
516. Id. at 93.
517. Id.
518. Id. at 81, 90, 92-93.
519. Id. at 93-94.
520. Id. at 99.
521. Id. at 99-100.
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can, indeed, be controlled so that a fair dog scent lineup is possible.
(3) Designing a Fair Scent Lineup
de Bruin and Koster have designed techniques for conducting
scent lineups that appear to address many of the concerns Buytendijk
expressed. 2 2 They suggest three different lineup methods, which are
discussed seriatim below.
The first is a variation on the classic person lineup. All the per-
sons participating in the lineup must stand behind a screen of hor-
izontal slats so that the dog cannot see the lineup participants. This
approach controls for minimal cues from those in the line. Fans are
sometimes placed behind the screen to ensure that the scent reaches
the dog's nostrils. All participants must come from the same envi-
ronment and must not wear "strong smelling clothes." If the par-
ticipants are not all from the same environment, they all wear similar
clean overalls for two hours before the lineup.
5 23
Neither the dog nor the handler is present when the persons are
placed in the line. Indeed, although the handler gives the dog the
scent, the dog enters the lineup room without the handler, again elim-
inating minimal cues.5 24 If the dog finds a matching scent, the dog
sits down at that lineup participant. 25 The procedure is repeated twice,
with the participants changing positions each time.1
26
In de Bruin's tests, the suspect's position is selected either by the
suspect or by lot;5 27 the better practice might be to increase the size
of the line and never place the suspect at either end because of the
dog's tendency to select items at the end of a line.128 Of course, if the
screen keeps the dog from seeing where the line ends, this concern may
be unwarranted.
An alternative procedure proposed by de Bruin involves the use
of eighteen glass jars, each containing stainless steel tubes. The six
participants wash their hands with the same odorless soap, then dry
their hands with a clean piece of paper towel so that smells additional
to human scent are equal for all. The participants hold three tubes
in their hands for five minutes, and these tubes then are returned to
522. de Bruin, supra note 157.
523. Id. at 6-7.
524. Id. at 7.
525. Id.
526. Id. at 6-7.
527. Id. at 7.
528. See supra note 514 and accompanying text.
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the jars.529 Next, a person other than the dog handler then puts the
tubes on the floor of a special room, taking care not to touch them.
Again, neither the dog nor the handler is present during this proce-
dure. The handler gives the order "search," and the dog then sniffs
the tubes and selects the one, if any, that matches a scent given to
the dog earlier. 530 The test is repeated twice with previously unused
tubes used in each new experiment. A positive match is declared only
if the dog makes a positive identification of the suspect's tube on each
of the three tries.5 3' The handler is not present in the special room at
the time that the lineup is actually performed.53 2 The position of the
suspect is determined as with the person lineup described above,533 but
since the dog can see the tubes, it might be wiser for the procedure
to be modified by not placing the suspect's tube at the end of the line,
perhaps compensating for the reduced variation by increasing the num-
ber of participants in the lineup.
This procedure has an advantage over the in-person lineup be-
cause the only scent on the tube is human body scent. 534 The scents
of clothing, shoes, and other sources are not present.
A variation on the tube method involves the use of cloths. A spe-
cial sterilized cloth may be used to wipe an object found at a crime
scene such as a gun.5 35 The cloth is placed in a glass jar for storage.
Instead of holding tubes in their hands, lineup participants hold sim-
ilar cloths; otherwise the tube lineup procedures are followed.536 The
advantage of this method over the tube method is that the gun can
be wiped of scent, the scent stored, and the gun then sent to a forensics
laboratory.5 3
7
In each of the above-described methods, the dogs used in the line-
ups were specially trained in dog scent lineups for at least eighteen
months.5 38 A trainer-handler team is approved for work on actual cases
only if the team has a success rate with known matches of ninety-five
percent.5 39 In their training, the dogs used also must have proven that
they are capable of "negative identification," that is, of not selecting
529. de Bruin, supra note 157, at 7.
530. Id.
531. Id. at 7-8.
532. Frawley, supra note 157, at 10-12.
533. de Bruin, supra note 157, at 8.
534. See id. at 7.
535. Frawley, supra note 157, at 10, 12.
536. Id. at 11.
537. Id. at 8.
538. Id. at 11-12. Actually, de Bruin's manual says at least a year and Frawley's description
of de Bruin's work claims 18 months.
539. Letter I, supra note 9.
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anyone if there is no scent match in the lineup. 54° As a consequence,
the dogs are trained only to signal a match if an identical, and not
merely a similar, scent is found within the line.
In addition, if at any time during the three lineups that include
the suspect's scent the dog's identification appears to be "hesitant, '5 4'
de Bruin's technique calls for a series of five lineups that includes two
negative identification tests (or two lineups in which the suspect does
not participate). A match is declared only if the dog identifies the
suspect in each lineup in which the suspect's scent is present and iden-
tifies no one in each lineup in which the suspect's scent is absent.1
42
This procedure increases the likelihood that matches are derived from
identical and not merely similar scents. A further improvement, how-
ever, would be to require the use of the five-lineup negative identi-
fication procedure in all cases, rather than allowing the decision to
conduct negative identification lineups to depend on the handler's sub-
jective judgment that the dog has made a "hesitant" identification.
Some variation on de Bruin's procedures seems well-suited to cre-
ating a fair dog scent lineup. Although he is working on a book that
will address these matters, de Bruin has not yet published the details
of his research and training methods.5 43 It is therefore impossible to
know precisely how he trains his dogs or whether his research results
are reliable. Once the results are available, however, their replication
and the confirmation of their reliability by researchers in the United
States may well suggest that fair lineup procedures are possible.
Although de Bruin's suggestions may go far towards creating a
fairer scent lineup procedure, his suggestions are not perfect. Thus,
he apparently does not account for and control variations in scent
resulting from the accused's diet.544 It may, of course, turn out that
dietary differences are unimportant but this must be experimentally
verified. For example, if everyone but person "A" in a lineup eats
the same garlic-free food while "A" eats garlic, yet in repeated lineups
the dog always chooses non-garlic-eater "B" (who is the correct match)
and in several negative identification trials that exclude "B" but in-
clude "A" the dog does not react at all, that should be strong evidence
that the garlic does not affect the dog's reliability. Yet de Bruin reports
no such experiments.
540. De Bruin, supra note 157, at 8.
541. Id. at 9. de Bruin does not define precisely what he means by "hesitant" or how this
determination is to be made. See id.
542. Id.
543. See Letter I, supra note 9.
544. See de Bruin, supra note 157, at 4, 6-11 (recognizing that diet affects human scent,
but not including dietary controls among the preparatory procedures for a dog scent lineup).
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One other aspect of de Bruin's experiments requires particularly
close examination. He maintains that his experiments have proven ef-
fective with scent stored for as long as three years . 45 Indeed, he has
begun a scent bank in which scent is taken from suspects arrested and
stored or kept "on file." 546 If a new crime is committed, a scent lineup
can be done using the stored scents. The concept is very similar to
fingerprinting all persons arrested and later using those prints in fin-
gerprint comparisons.
If, as previously noted, human scent consists of vapors released
from bacterial action,5 47 it is difficult to understand how a scent can
be stored for so long without the bacteria dying. Brigadier de Bruin
apparently theorizes that his special cloth, when stored in a glass con-
tainer, can retain scent for very long periods and that his experiments
prove this.54 If he is right, the bacterial action theory of human scent
may need to be reexamined. Without further research, however, it is
impossible to know whether he is right and thus whether, and under
what circumstances, fair lineups are possible.
(4) The Role of Counsel
Apart from, and yet related to, the due process requirement of
a fair lineup is the sixth amendment right of a suspect to counsel at
a post-indictment visual lineup.5 49 The sixth amendment provides that,
"in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." 510 The Court has held
that this right begins only with the initiation of adversary judicial pro-
ceedings against the defendant 5 51 and even then, applies only at "crit-
ical stages" of the prosecution. 52 Although the Court has also held
that not every pretrial identification procedure constitutes a "critical
stage, ' 553 a post-indictment visual person lineup is such a critical stage
because it is a "trial-like confrontation" in which counsel can act as
the accused's "spokesperson.. . or advisor." 554 What the Court means
by these terms is not entirely clear, although it has emphasized that
545. Frawley, supra note 157, at 11-12.
546. Letter II, supra note 238.
547. See supra text accompanying notes 181-191.
548. See supra sources cited at note 157.
549. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
550. U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI.
551. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972).
552. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970).
553. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 312 (1973).
554. Id.
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the defendant's physical presence at a lineup offers "opportunities for
prosecuting authorities to take advantage of the accused." '555 More-
over, counsel will be more sensitive to suggestive influences and can
help at the lineup to remove these "disabilities of the accused," thereby
"protect[ing] the defendant from errors that he might make if he ap-
peared . . . alone. 55 6 Presumably this means that the attorney can
seek to correct improper suggestiveness. Moreover, the Court has em-
phasized that because the attorney is present, he will be better able
to reconstruct the lineup at trial 5 7 With scent lineups of persons, these
same concerns-that a defendant needs protection against the police
taking unfair advantage and needs counseling on what he can do to
minimize suggestion-apply and, as with visual lineups, an attorney
who is present at such a lineup will be better equipped to represent
the defendant at trial.
It is less clear whether a suspect has a right to counsel at a scent
lineup, like de Bruin's tube and cloth lineups, involving only objects.
The United States Supreme Court held in United States v. Ash558 that
there is no sixth amendment right to counsel at a photographic array
identification because the accused is not present during the array; thus,
no spokesperson or advisor is needed. Arguably this is equally true
in a tube or cloth scent lineup, as the defendant is not then present.
The Ash court based its decision in part on the belief that the
adversary mechanism at trial would cure the ill effects of certain un-
represented pretrial confrontations.5 9 Thus, counsel need not be pres-
ent at the accused's fingerprinting, or at analysis of his blood samples,
clothing, and hair, since knowledge of science and technology re-
garding those techniques is sufficiently advanced and the variables in-
volved in the techniques are few enough that the accused still has an
opportunity for a meaningful confrontation of the government's wit-
nesses at trial. 60 The Court found this to be equally true with pho-
tographic displays because the photos can be brought to the trial and
the witnesses adequately cross-examined. 61
Scent lineups, however, are like neither photo displays nor fin-
gerprint comparisons. Scents cannot be reproduced for the jury, and
the combination of scientific ignorance and canine mythology make
effective cross-examination difficult. Arguably, then, the sixth amend-
555. Id.
556. Id. at 312-13.
557. See id.
558. 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
559. Id. at 315-16.
560. Id. at 315 (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1967)).
561. Id. at 317-21.
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meat right to counsel should extend to any post-indictment dog scent
lineup, whether or not the defendant is present.
562
Assuming that an accused is entitled to have counsel present at
a post-indictment scent lineup, there remains a dispute over what role
counsel should play at a lineup: passive observer or active partici-
pant.5 63 Whatever role the courts deem "proper," counsel should at
the very least attempt to persuade the police to accept his recom-
mendations regarding how to minimize suggestion at a scent lineup.
The discussion above of de Bruin's experiments offers a useful checkl-
562. Although there is no sixth amendment right to counsel at pre-indictment lineups, an
argument can be crafted that there is a due process right to such representation at a dog scent
lineup. Cf. Grano, Kirby, Biggers, and Ash: Do Any Constitutional Safeguards Remain Against
the Danger of Convicting the Innocent?, 72 MICH. L. REv. 717 (1974) [hereinafter Grano]
(arguing that at least in certain cases there is a due process right to counsel pre-indictment).
In Gagnon v. Scarpeli, 411 U.S. 778, 781-82 (1973), the Court held that due process required
the state to provide appointed counsel in certain parole and probation revocation hearings,
even though there was no sixth amendment right to counsel at such post-criminal prosecution
proceedings. Under precedent, the Court had held that due process afforded the parolee or
probationer substantial hearing rights. The Gagnon Court concluded that, under certain
circumstances, counsel would be needed to ensure the effectiveness of the hearing rights
guaranteed by due process. The Court refused, however, to create an absolute due process
right to counsel in all parole or probation revocation proceedings. Id. at 787. Instead, the
Court declared that the decision was one to be made on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 790.
Although the Court did not set precise guidelines kor making this decision, the Court did
declare that counsel "presumptively" should be provided where the parolee or probationer
requests counsel based upon a colorable claim that he has not committed the violation with
which he is charged or that there are substantial reasons that justified or mitigated the
violation, reasons that are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or present. Id.
Similarly, there is a due process right to fair procedures at lineups. The Court in Kirby v.
Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690-91 (1972), in holding that the sixth amendment did not extend the
right to counsel to pre-indictment identification procedures, noted that the defendant still was
protected from police abuse by this due process right to fair procedures. But it may be difficult
for defense counsel to recreate in court any suggestiveness in a scent lineup or to cross-examine
the government's witnesses on the scent lineup's fairness. This will hamstring counsel in a
suppression hearing as well as at trial. Counsel's best bet is to prevent suggestion in the first
place by taking an active role at the lineup. However, unlike in the probation and parole
revocation proceedings addressed in Gagnon, where a scent lineup is involved, the issue is
always whether the defendant committed the act with which he has been charged, one of the
two circumstances that the Gagnon Court labeled as "presumptively" creating a due process
right to counsel. Arguably, therefore, a case-by-case approach is unwarranted; a due process
right to counsel is necessary to protect the due process right to fair procedures at all dog scent
lineups. Cf. Grano, supra, at 742-55 (arguing that, even after Gagnon, there is a due process
right to counsel at all precharge station house confrontations).
563. See Read, Lawyers at Lineups: Constitutional Necessity or Avoidable Extravagance?,
17 UCLA L. REv. 339, 362-67 (1969); compare Glligan, Eyewitness Identification, 58 Mm.
L. REv. 183, 201 (1972) (the passive presence of a lawyer at a lineup does not preclude
subsequent attack of that lineup) with Panel Discussion, The Role of the Defense Lawyer at
a Line-up in Light of the Wade, Gilbert, and Stovall Decisions, 4 Ctms. L. BuLL. 273, 290
(1968) (lawyer's presence at lineup should result in automatic admissibility of identification
evidence).
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ist of safeguards that counsel can insist be followed at the lineup.
5 64
The danger that the jury may attach undue weight to an identification
by the dog, even an identification made under clearly suggestive cir-
cumstances, is too great for counsel to risk playing a passive role. As
the Court concluded in United States v. Wade, "[t]he trial which might
determine the accused's fate may well not be that in the courtroom
but that at the pretrial confrontation ... with little or no effective
appeal from the judgment there rendered by the witness-'that's the
man.' ''565
Counsel, therefore, must educate themselves in the literature re-
garding scent lineups and must argue strenuously for the use of pro-
cedures at least as protective of the defendant's rights as those de Bruin
designed. If the defendant nevertheless is identified, knowledgeable
counsel who has spotted each of the suggestive factors in the lineup
will be far better prepared to argue effectively that the lineup evidence
must be excluded as violative of due process. Of course, counsel also
must move vigorously to exclude the lineup on Frye, 66 relevancy,
67
and the other grounds discussed in this Article, for the suppression
motion may be far more important than the actual trial. If the motion
to suppress nevertheless is denied, counsel who at least attempted to
play an active role at the lineup and who was fully aware of the sci-
entific underpinnings of scent identification will be far better prepared
at trial to clarify for the jury those aspects of the identification pro-
cedure that render the procedure untrustworthy.
F. Hearsay-Related Objections
(1) Hearsay
A small minority of jurisdictions have concluded that dog scent
identification evidence is inadmissible hearsay.5 68 The rationale for this
564. See supra notes 522-548.
565. 388 U.S. at 235-36.
566. See supra notes 247-356 and accompanying text.
567. See supra notes 391-450 and accompanying text.
568. See the cases collected at Annotation, supra note 98, at 1228-29. Although neither
this Annotation's summary of the cases, nor the cases themselves, use the word "hearsay,"
the cases either explicitly or implicitly emphasize the inability to cross-examine the dog. See,
e.g., People v. Pfanschmidt, 262 Ill. 411, 462, 104 N.E. 804, 823 (1914) ("Neither court nor
jury can have any means of knowing why the dog does this thing or another ...."); State
v. Grba, 196 Iowa 241, 260, 194 N.W. 250, 258 (1923) (" 'If a person was testifying to having
tracked the defendant from or about the place, he could be cross-examined upon that
subject. ... Not so with the dog.' ") (emphasis added) (quoting with approval a dissent of a
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position is straightforward. Hearsay is an out-of-court statement of-
fered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 569 The dog's alerting
to a defendant's presence is the dog's way of saying, "That is the man;
his scent matches the scent on the source object." When used in court,
this statement is admitted to prove exactly what it 'asserts: the two
scents match. Since the source scent is that of the wrongdoer, the state-
ment logically supports the conclusion that it is the defendant who did
the crime. The dangers arising from the use of this kind of hearsay
were summarized in Brott v. State:
570
Undoubtedly, nice and delicate questions are time and again pre-
sented to [the bloodhound] for decision. But the considerations that
induce[d] him, in a particular case, to adopt one conclusion rather
than another can not go to the jury. The jury can not know whether
the reasons on which he acted were good or bad, whether they were
all on one side or evenly balanced, or whether his faith in the identity
of the scent which he followed was strong or weak. In attempting
to separate one smell from ten, twenty, fifty, or a hundred similar
smells with which it is intermixed and commingled, it is highly prob-
able, if not quite certain, that the bloodhound undertakes a task al-
together beyond his capacity.
57'
The flaws in this position are obvious. As two well-known com-
mentators on the law of evidence have declared:
The hearsay rule responds to the frailties of human declarations and
the degree to which these frailties can be better assessed if the de-
clarant testifies in person before the trier of fact subject to cross-ex-
amination. The rule does not apply to statements which emanate from
non-human sources, whose "testimony" cannot be tested by cross-
examination.
52
That the hearsay rule is thus primarily a rule of preference for the live
testimony of humans who can be cross-examined in court is further
underscored by the definition of a "statement" in Federal Rule of
Evidence 801. That definition includes the "nonverbal conduct of a
person, if it is intended by [the person] as an assertion."5 73
majority-view case, Pedigo v. Commonwealth, 103 Ky. 41, 57, 44 S.W. 143, 147 (1898) (Guffy,
J., dissenting)). The inability to cross-examine is the primary modern justification for the
hearsay rule. See McCoRmcK oN EvwmCElc, supra note 393, at 728. Consequently, majority-
view cases, in rejecting the minority view that dog-tracking evidence is never admissible, have
described the minority cases as expressing three related concerns: "The dog cannot be cross-
examined, his trainer's testimony is hearsay, and the accused is not confronted by his accuser,
the dog." Terrell v. State, 3 Md. App. 340, 355, 239 A.2d 128, 136 (1968) (emphasis added).
569. See e.g., FED. R. EvID. 801(c); OKT.A. STAT. tit. 12, § 2801 (1980); N.C.R. Evn.
801(c); OHio R. EvID. 801(C).
570. 70 Neb. 395, 97 N.W. 593 (1903).
571. Id. at 397-98, 97 N.W. at 594.
572. R. LEmPERT & S. SALTUrm, supra note 259, at 370.
573. FED. R. EviD. 801(a)(2) (emphasis added); OKRA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2801 (1980); N.C.R.
Evm. 801(a)(2); Omo R. Evm. 801(A)(2).
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Moreover, a dog's actions are meaningless without the testimony
of a handler or other expert to explain the dog's behavior. "[I]t is the
human testimony that makes the trailing done by the animal com-
petent, and [the dog's] actions are described by human testimony, just
as it would describe the operations of a piece of intricate machin-
ery. ' 57 4 This analogy to expert testimony regarding the responses of
machinery has led most courts to conclude that dog scent identification
evidence is not hearsay because the handler, not the dog, is the true
witness . 7
Although the majority of courts are correct in concluding that
dog scent identification evidence is not hearsay, in arriving at this con-
clusion the courts fail to respond adequately to the concerns of the
Brott court: that neither the trainer nor the dog himself can explain
the dog's actions adequately.
Two options are available for protecting against the danger of
erroneous convictions resulting from this lack of information. The
first option is to consider the likelihood that the trainer's ignorance
will so mislead the jury that the evidence must be excluded because
the dangers of using the evidence outweigh its probative value under
a test such as that in Federal Rule of Evidence 403. As discussed ear-
lier, there is a good chance that this first option will succeed in barring
scent lineup evidence from trials .176 The second option is to ask whether
the expert's minimal knowledge about the subject matter of his tes-
timony may be so inadequate as to deprive a defendant of his right
under the sixth amendment to confront the witnesses against him.
(2) The Confrontation Clause
The confrontation clause in the sixth amendment of the United
States Constitution provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right .. .to be confronted with the witnesses
against him.' '77 This right protects defendants in both state and fed-
eral criminal proceedings.5 7s A primary purpose of the right is to secure
for the defendant the opportunity for effective cross-examination of
the witnesses against him.5 79 Because dogs cannot be cross-examined,
574. State v. Dickerson, 77 Ohio St. 34, 69, 82 N.E. 969, 976 (1907).
575. See, e.g., Terrell v. State, 3 Md. App. 340, 355-56, 239 A.2d 128, 136-37 (1968);
Commonwealth v. Michaux, 360 Pa. Super. 452, 461, 520 A.2d 1177, 1181-82 (1987).
576. See supra notes 409-450 and accompanying text.
577. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
578. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
579. United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559 (1988); accord Kentucky v. Stincer, 482
U.S. 730, 738-39 n.9 (1987) ("a state rule that precludes a defendant from access to information
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defendants have argued-although generally without success-that ad-
mission of dog scent identification evidence violates confrontation
rights.580 The argument has failed for reasons similar to those that have
resulted in rejection of the hearsay challenges to such evidence: the
true witness is the handler, and the handler is subject to cross-ex-
amination.
5 81
Most courts improperly treat the conclusion that the handler is
the true witness as the end of the confrontation clause analysis .5 2 That
would be the case if the clause did not guarantee more than merely
the right to question a witness. The United States Supreme Court's
decisions suggest, however, that the clause guarantees something more;
specifically, the opportunity for effective cross-examination.5 83 This is
not a guarantee of actual effectiveness but rather of a realistic and
fair chance of calling the credibility of a witness' testimony into ques-
tion.5
4
With dog scent lineups, the dog's mythic infallibility makes it
difficult for a defendant to find effective weapons with which to attack
the dog's "testimony." This problem is compounded because the han-
dler or other expert also has little reliable basis for his opinion. The
state of scientific research regarding the meaning and accuracy of dog
scent lineups is too primitive to enable anyone to know with any degree
of certainty how accurate a dog is in any specific case.58 5 Moreover,
before trial may hinder that defendant's opportunity for effective cross-examination at trial")
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 965 (1988); Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (per curiam)
(confrontation clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination); Nelson v.
O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 629 (1971) (confrontation clause does not bar admission of out-of-court
statements where defendant has the benefit of "full and effective cross-examination"); Cali-
fornia v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 159 (1970) (admission of out-of-court statement does not violate
confrontation clause "as long as the defendant is assured of full and effective cross-examination
at the time of trial").
580. Commonwealth v. Michaux, 360 Pa. Super. 452, 461, 520 A.2d 1177, 1181-82
(combination tracking and scent showup); cf. State v. Streeper, 113 Idaho 662, 666-67, 747
P.2d 71, 75 (1987) (tracking case). In one amusing case, a defendant offered a slightly different
confrontation clause argument. In United States v. Carroll, 710 F.2d 164 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983), the defense sought to put the dog on the stand "to try to talk
to the dog," thus enabling the jury to judge the dog's "intelligence, training, and good
breeding." Id. at 168 n.l. The defendant challenged his conviction on appeal, arguing that
the trial court's denial of the opportunity to question the dog deprived the defendant of his
right to confrontation. The appellate court disagreed, concluding that the true witness was the
handler and that, given the handler's testimony regarding the dog's reliability, no purpose
would be served by bringing the dog in for the jury's observation. Id.
581. See Streeper, 113 Idaho at 666-67, 747 P.2d at 75; Michaux, 360 Pa. Super. at 461,
520 A.2d at 1181-82.
582. See cases cited supra note 580.
583. See United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988).
584. Id. at 558.
585. See supra notes 361-400 and accompanying text.
November 1990]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
the concerns of the court in Brott v. State remain: neither the handler
nor any other expert knows enough about canine behavior to be able
to determine what "nice and delicate" decisions the dog made, why
he made them, how certain he was of their accuracy, or how much
his choices were influenced by suggestive factors.116 Merely pointing
this out is unlikely to lead jurors to reconsider their preconceived no-
tions of canine infallibility.58 7 Thus, the presently immature state of
scientific research combines with juror preconceptions to make ef-
fective cross-examination of the handler or other expert impossible.
The starting point for analysis is Delaware v. Fensterer88 In Fen-
sterer, a government expert in a murder trial testified that, in his opin-
ion, a hair found on the murder weapon was forcibly removed from
the victim. The expert, however, could not remember which of three
possible methods he had used to arrive at his conclusion.8 9 A defense
expert suggested that the government expert has in fact relied on one
particular theory, a theory that the defense expert then vigorously
challenged.5 90 The United States Supreme Court rejected the defen-
dant's argument that the government expert's memory lapse deprived
the defendant of his confrontation rights because the defendant could
not expose and test the basis for the expert's opinion. 91 The Court
concluded that the "Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity
for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective
in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.''92
This minimal constitutional guarantee was met in the case before the
Court for two reasons: first, the government expert's failure to recall
the basis for his opinion "invite[d] the jury to find that his opinion
[was] as unreliable as his memory";593 and second, the defense was
able to demonstrate through its own expert that the prosecution relied
on a theory which the defense considered baseless. 94
The Court also rejected the Delaware Supreme Court's conclusion
that due process required the prosecutor, who knew in advance of the
trial of the witness' memory lapse, to refrain from calling the witness
to the stand. Treating the due process and confrontation clause anal-
yses as virtually identical, the Court concluded that because under the
586. See Brott v. State, 70 Neb. 395, 397-98, 97 N.W. 593, 594 (1903).
587. See supra note 436 and accompanying text.
588. 474 U.S. 15 (1985).
589. Id. at 17.
590. Id.
591. Id. at 18.
592. Id. at 20.
593. Id. at 19.
594. Id. at 20.
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confrontation clause the expert's memory lapse went solely to the
weight, not to the admissibility of the testimony, the prosecution had
no obligation to refrain from calling the witness.5 95 In reaching this
conclusion, however, the Court noted the following:
We need not decide whether the introduction of an expert opinion
with no basis could ever be so lacking in reliability, and so preju-
dicial, as to deny a defendant a fair trial. The testimony of Dr.
DeForest [the defense expert], suggesting the actual basis for Rob-
lard's [the prosecution expert's] opinion and vigorously disputing
its validity, utterly dispels any possibility of such a claim in this case.59
Although in the quoted language the Court posits a situation in
which an expert opinion literally has "no basis," logic suggests that
confrontation clause guarantees may be violated where there is a min-
imal basis but a great danger of prejudice. Indeed, if no basis what-
soever was the test, the Court would not have gone on to talk of
opinions "so lacking in reliability," instead of opinions with "no re-
liability," as to deny a defendant a fair trial. The constitutional rule
that the Court suggests may thus be restated as follows: If expert tes-
timony is extremely unreliable, that is, if the testimony is based on
unsound or insufficiently tested scientific principles, and if the jury
nevertheless is likely to give that testimony great weight, confrontation
rights are violated if the defense is unable to elicit, by even the most
probing questions, sufficient information to offer the defense a re-
alistic chance of calling the credibility of the expert's opinion into
question . 97 Since Fensterer was decided, no court has directly con-
595. The only case cited by the Court in reaching this conclusion was United States v.
Bastanipour, 697 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1091 (1983). In Bastanipour,
a government chemist testified that he based his opinion that a certain substance was heroin
on laboratory tests and on information obtained from a computer. The defendant claimed
that he was denied meaningful cross-examination because the expert "knew nothing" about
the computer program upon which he based his opinion, and therefore the government should,
at the very least, have made the program available to defense counsel prior to trial. The
Seventh Circuit rejected defendant's claim because there was no appreciable risk that prejudice
resulted. Defense counsel had rejected the proffer of a sample for testing, and the white
powdery substance analyzed had been found hidden under the false bottoms of caviar tins.
Under these circumstances, the court found it "wholly unrealistic" to believe that the substance
analyzed was not contraband. Id. at 177. The Bastanipour court did not find that mere
questioning of the expert was sufficient to protect defendant's confrontation rights. Rather it
found that under the circumstances defendant had been offered an adequate "opportunity"
for "effective" cross-examination.
596. Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 22-23.
597. This concern with giving the jury sufficient information to enable it fairly to evaluate
the evidence and thus to promote the accuracy of the truth-finding function, has been expressed
repeatedly in the Court's confrontation clause jurisprudence. See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig,
110 S. Ct. 3157, 3163 (1990) ("The central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure
the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing
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sidered whether the rule suggested by the Court's dicta is indeed the
rule that the Court will follow.
In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 98 however, a plurality of the Court
suggested that the confrontation clause guarantees no more than an
opportunity to pose questions, thus rejecting any inquiry into the like-
lihood that such questions may have a significant impact on the jury's
assessment of credibility. Ritchie involved a child protective services
agency's refusal to comply with a defendant's subpoena for the med-
ical records of his daughter, whom the defendant had been charged
with raping.59 The trial court denied the defendant's motion to require
the agency to disclose the subpoenaed records. On appeal the Court
remanded the case with instructions that the trial judge review the
records in camera to determine whether they contained information
that may have affected the outcome of the trial. 6°
The plurality based its decision on the prosecution's due process
obligation to turn over information that is both favorable to the ac-
cused and material to his guilt. 601 Justice Powell, in an opinion in which
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and O'Connor joined, re-
jected the argument that the confrontation clause created a pretrial
right to access to those records necessary to ensure an adequate op-
portunity for cross-examination at trial. 602 Justice Powell stated simply
that, "Normally the right to confront one's accusers is satisfied if de-
fense counsel receives wide latitude at trial to question witnesses. ' ' 01
Because withholding of the records requested did not prevent trial
counsel from questioning the witnesses fully, the plurality found no
confrontation clause violation.
Justice Blackmun strongly disagreed in a separate concurring
opinion. 65 In his view, simple questioning often may be insufficient
in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact."); Kentucky v. Stincer, 482
U.S. 730, 737 (1987) (the right to cross-examination "is essentially a 'functional right' designed
to promote reliability in the truth-finding functions of a criminal trial"); Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56, 73 (1980) (confrontation clause not violated by the introduction of prior testimony
where the declarant was unavailabfe at trial because previous cross-examination has "afforded
'the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement' " (citations
omitted)); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970) (suggesting the touchstone of effectiveness
is whether cross-examination affords " 'the trier of fact . . . a satisfactory basis for evaluating
the truth of the prior statement' ") (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970)).
598. 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
599. Id. at 43.
600. Id. at 45.
601. Id. at 57.
602. Id. at 52-53.
603. Id. at 53.
604. Id. at 54.
605. Id. at 61-66 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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to serve the purposes of cross-examination.60 Although the confron-
tation clause does not ensure a defendant the most effective available
means of cross-examination, Justice Blackmun concluded that the
clause does guarantee a method sufficient to call a witness' credibility
into question.10 When a defendant is denied pre-trial access to in-
formation that would make possible effective cross-examination of a
crucial prosecution witness, the defense may be denied the minimally
sufficient cross-examination at trial that the confrontation clause pro-
tects. 608 Nevertheless, Justice Blackmun concurred in the result because
he considered the Court's remand order sufficient to protect con-
frontation rights.09
The theory of the plurality in Ritchie, that mere questioning is
sufficient to protect confrontation rights, has not been followed by
a majority of the Court in later opinions. Indeed, while the Court has
found it very easy to establish that a defendant has been offered an
opportunity for "effective" cross-examination, the Court has not re-
treated from its inquiry into whether, under the specific facts before
it, the defendant has indeed been offered such an opportunity.
The Court's most significant recent inquiry into this question was
undertaken in United States v. Owens. 610 Owens involved an assault
victim who had been hospitalized because of a skull fracture suffered
in an attack. While in the hospital, the victim identified the defendant
in a photo array.,"' At trial, however, the victim could not remember
that he had been his assailant. 612 Moreover, although the victim re-
membered identifying the defendant in the photo array, the victim
could not recall whether any of his hospital visitors had suggested,
before the array, that the defendant was the assailant. 613
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia in which all four mem-
bers of the Ritchie plurality as well as Justices Stevens and Blackmun
606, Id. at 63.
607. Id. at 62-65.
608, Id.
609. Justice Brennan, dissenting in an opinion in which Justice Marshall joined, agreed
with Justice Blackmun that the denial of pretrial discovery can, in certain circumstances,
deprive a defendant of the opportunity for effective cross-examination, thus violating the
confrontation clause. Id. at 66-72 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Ritchie, Justice Brennan concluded,
involved such a violation because denial of access to prior statements that may be inconsistent
with a witness' trial testimony "strikes at the heart of cross-examination." Id. at 71. Justice
Stevens also filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Scalia joined,
concluding that the orders challenged should not have been reviewed because of their lack of
finality. Id. at 72-78.
610. 484 U.S. 554 (1988).




joined, considered whether despite the victim's memory lapse the de-
fendant has an adequate opportunity for effective cross-examination
of the victim.
61 4
The Court found that the defendant had an opportunity for ef-
fective cross-examination because he had "realistic weapons" for cross-
examination. 615 This was demonstrated by defense counsel's summa-
tion, which emphasized the witness' memory loss and argued that the
witness had identified the defendant solely because of the suggestions
of visitors to the hospital.61 6 The Court rejected the argument that,
given the grave dangers of identification testimony, the out-of-court
identification was so inherently unreliable that the tools used by de-
fense counsel were inadequate means of impugning the victim's tes-
timony.617 The Court emphasized, however, that it based this final
conclusion on the absence of any argument that the photo array was
conducted in a suggestive manner. 6 8 The Court thus left open the pos-
sibility that much more powerful weapons may be required to meet
minimum constitutional requirements when there is evidence of a po-
tentially suggestive identification.
Despite affirming the defendant's conviction in the case before
it, the Owens Court upheld the theory that a defendant must have a
realistic opportunity for effective cross-examination. 61 9 This interpre-
tation of Owens is consistent with the Court's repeated emphasis in
its other confrontation clause cases that the purpose of the clause is
"to augment accuracy in the factfinding process by ensuring the de-
fendant an effective means to test adverse evidence.' '620 The prospect
remains that, in an appropriate case, the Court will overturn a con-
viction in which no true opportunity has been offered for effective
cross-examination, despite the fact that a defendant may have been
afforded an unrestricted scope to pose appropriate questions. This
614. Id. at 555-56.
615. Id. at 560.
616. Id.
617. Id. at 559-60.
618. Id. at 561.
619. Id. at 559. Justice Brennan, in his dissent, characterized the majority opinion very
differently: "[W]e have never before held that the Confrontation Clause protects nothing more
than a defendant's right to question live witnesses, no matter how futile that questioning might
be." Id. at 567. Although the result reached by the Owens majority might reflect an
unarticulated belief that the mere opportunity for questioning is all that the clause requires-
the precise view advocated by the Ritchie plurality-the Owens majority nevertheless adhered
at least in form to the notion that the confrontation clause guarantees an opportunity for
effective cross-examination, not mere questioning. Justice Brennan's characterization of the
majority's reasoning is, therefore, unfair.
620. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980).
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Article argues that dog scent lineups offer just such an "appropriate
case."
This interpretation is also consistent with the Court's emphasis
in right to counsel cases on the need to provide the defense with ef-
fective tools, not simple questioning, to preserve fundamental con-
frontation values. Thus, in United States v. Wade,62' the Court declared
that the sixth amendment right to counsel extended to post-indictment
lineups because the "inability effectively to reconstruct at trial any
unfairness that occurred at the lineup may deprive [the defendant] of
his only opportunity meaningfully to attack the credibility of the wit-
ness' courtroom identification." ' 62 The Court continued:
Insofar as the accused's conviction may rest on a courtroom iden-
tification in fact the fruit of a suspect pretrial identification which
the accused is helpless to subject to effective scrutiny at trial, the
accused is deprived of that right of cross-examination which is an
essential safeguard to his right to confront the witnesses against him. 
6
The Wade Court found that a right to counsel was necessary at
a lineup because of the mere possibility that, without counsel, it would
be impossible effectively to disclose at trial whether the lineup was
"suspect," that is, conducted in a suggestive manner. 62 The Owens
Court, on the other hand, apparently demanded evidence that a pre-
trial confrontation was in fact suggestive before requiring some special
means to ensure effective cross-examination at trial concerning the
reliability of the pretrial identification procedure. 625 When Wade and
Owens are considered together, therefore, it seems likely that the Court
will pay particularly close scrutiny to the ability to cross-examine ef-
fectively when there is evidence that a lineup was suggestive.
The results of cases like Delaware v. Fensterer626 and Owens dem-
onstrate that the Court is extremely reluctant to conclude that a par-
ticular cross-examination did not offer a defendant an opportunity for
effective cross-examination when the trial court did not significantly
restrict the scope of that examination. On the other hand, the Court
consistently has inquired into whether such an opportunity has been
621. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
622. Id. at 232.
623. Id. at 235 (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400) (emphasis added); see also Penn-
sylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 69-72 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that both Wade's due
process analysis of the reliability of lineups and the numerous confrontation clause decisions
of the Court reflect a common concern with protecting the opportunity for an effective cross-
examination at trial, that is, cross-examination that augments the accuracy of the factfinding
process).
624. Wade, 388 U.S. at 235.
625. 484 U.S. 554, 561 (1988).
626. 474 U.S. 15 (1985).
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offered and repeatedly has suggested that there may be cases in which
the evidence is so prejudicial and the opportunity for effective cross-
examination so weak that the confrontation clause will have been vi-
olated. 627 While the Court undoubtedly will find such a violation only
in very special cases, dog scent lineups, which not only are viewed as
powerful evidence of a defendant's guilt but also offer little infor-
mation to enable jurors to evaluate that evidence fairly, would seem
to be one such special case. Moreover, as suggested in Owens,628 this
argument may be particularly appealing when there is evidence that
a particular scent lineup was suggestive, for the dangers of an erro-
neous conviction are then great while the tools for exposing those dan-
gers are minimal.
G. The Traditional Foundation Requirements for Tracking Evidence
The review of the common law, rule-based, and constitutional
objections to scent lineups emphasized the difficulties in designing fair
and accurate scent lineups and in offering defense counsel as adequate
opportunity to reveal lineup weaknesses at trial. That review sets the
stage for understanding the flaws in the unique common law rules
crafted by the courts for tracking evidence and the absurdity of ap-
plying those rules to scent lineups.
Several courts have admitted scent lineup evidence when some
variation on the traditional majority foundational requirements for
tracking evidence has been met. 629 Those traditional requirements, as
adapted to scent lineups, require that the particular dog: (1) be of pure
blood and of a stock characterized by acuteness of scent and the power
to discriminate among individual human beings; (2) be accustomed
and trained to discriminate among individual human beings; (3) be
found by experience in actual cases to be reliable in such discrimi-
nation; (4) be placed on the scent of an article where the scent of the
alleged criminal participant is present; and (5) be placed on such scent
and for such identification purposes within the period of his effi-
ciency. 6
30
These requirements are easily criticized. While olfactory acuity
may vary among breeds, such acuity also varies with the individual
dog's hereditary traits and health; in addition, motivation and training
627. See supra notes 591-597, 610-620 and accompanying text.
628. 484 U.S. at 561.
629. United States v. McNiece, 558 F. Supp. 612, 616-17 & n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); see
United States v. Gates, 680 F.2d 1117, 1119 (6th Cir. 1982); State v. Roscoe, 145 Ariz. 212,
220-21, 700 P.2d 1312, 1320-21 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1094 (1985).
630. McNiece, 558 F. Supp. at 616 n.5; accord Gates, 680 F.2d at 1119.
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alter the accuracy of identification and discrimination. 6 1 It is, there-
fore, difficult to understand why, if a particular dog is deemed suf-
ficiently reliable based upon "experience in actual cases," the dog's
breed should be an absolute prerequisite to admissibility.
63 2
Moreover, the requirement that the dog involved be trained to
discriminate among individual human beings is also of little value as
it usually is applied. This requirement generally is met by the testimony
of the dog's handler regarding the proper training of dogs for scent
lineup discrimination. 63 3 But without scientific testimony establishing
that dogs can indeed be so trained, the court or the jury cannot de-
termine whether'a dog's training was adequate. 63 The requirement that
the dog be found reliable by experience in actual cases in practice also
has been met by the handler's testimony that he repeatedly has found
his dog to be correct. 635 Again, without scientific testimony, it cannot
be known whether prior accurate results reflect the dog's olfactory
talents or just the poor design of suggestive tests.
Finally, the requirement that the dog be asked to perform within
the "period of his efficiency" has proven meaningless in practice. Thus,
in United States v. McNiece,636 while purporting to follow the five-part
test outlined above, the court concluded that a delay of twenty-one
months between a robbery and a lineup "might, arguably" reduce the
probative value of the lineup, but that possibility went solely to the
weight, not the admissibility, of the evidence. 637 This result is partic-
ularly shocking because even the few researchers who would consider
an accurate lineup possible after such a delay would discount the lineup
in McNiece because no special precautions to preserve the scent were
taken.638
The traditional approach, therefore, has not worked. A better-
reasoned approach is to treat dog scent evidence the same as other
631. W. McCARTNEY, supra note 169, at 17-18. "Acuity" refers solely to sensory ability,
not to the dog's behavior in using that ability. Comments of Dr. L.J. Myers in reviewing an
early draft of this Article (on file with the author of this Article).
632. See M. PEARSALL & H. VERBRUGGEN, supra note 3, at 12 ("A dog's ability to track
is an individual trait, which is not tied to a particular breed.").
633. E.g., Gates, 680 F.2d at 1119 (dog's handler testified); Roberts v. State, 53 Md. App.
257, 266-67, 452 A.2d 1271, 1276 (1982) (testimony of handler and of his teacher, the official
bloodhound handler for a sheriff's department), aff'd, 298 Md. 261, 469 A.2d 442 (1983).
634. Cf. State v. Loucks, 98 Wash. 2d 563, 567, 656 P.2d 480, 482 (1983) ("While a dog's
trainer may be available for cross examination, he obviously will be unable to answer many
questions bearing on the reliability of the dog's conclusions.").
635. See cases cited supra note 629.
636. 558 F. Supp. 612 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
637. Id. at 617 n.6.
638. See Letter I, supra note 9 (special cloths and airtight container used for scent storage).
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scientific evidence, thus focusing attention more clearly on the un-
derlying reliability problems that fairness suggests should be the courts'
primary concern.
H. The Corroboration Requirement
Some courts acknowledge the weaknesses of scent lineup evidence
but admit the evidence subject to the requirement that the defendant
may be convicted only if there is other, corroborating evidence of
guilt. 63 9 Corroborating evidence has been defined as "evidence sup-
plementary to that already given and tending to strengthen or confirm
it."640 Thus, evidence that meets the minimal requirements of logical
relevancy, or that makes it ever so slightly more likely than would
otherwise be true that the defendant is the wrongdoer,64' meets the
coorboration test. Such a test provides little assurance that the only
direct evidence of identity, the dog's lineup alert, is reliable.
One court has sought to compensate for the weaknesses of the
vague, unguided corroboration rule by instructing the jury that it may
consider the lineup only if the jury is first convinced of the defendant's
guilt by clear and convincing corroborating evidence. 642 This approach
is also inadequate. 643 If the scent lineup is the only evidence that raises
639. See, e.g., United States v. McNiece, 558 F. Supp. 612, 616-17 (E.D.N.Y. 1983)
(lineup); cf. Commonwealth v. Michaux, 360 Pa. Super. 452, 459-61, 520 A.2d 1177, 1180-81
(1987) (tracking/showup), appeal denied, 517 Pa. 605, 536 A.2d 1329 (1987); State v. Loucks,
98 Wash. 2d 563, 567-69, 656 P.2d 480, 482-83 (1983) (tracking).
640. State v. Ellis, 48 Wash. App. 333, 335, 738 P.2d 1085, 1087 (1987) (tracking case)
(quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 414 (4th rev. ed. 1968)); see also State v. Nicholas, 34
Wash. App. 775, 779, 663 P.2d 1356, 1358-59 (1983) (tracking case rejecting the argument
that corroborating evidence must, in itself, provide substantial evidence of identity; all that is
necessary is that the combination of tracking and other evidence be sufficient to permit a
rational jury to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt).
641. " 'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. Evm. 401; OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §
2401 (1980); N.C.R. EVID. 401; OHIO R. Evm. 401.
642. United States v. McNiece, 558 F. Supp. 612, 616-17 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). The McNiece
court combined the traditional five-part test for the admissibility of tracking evidence with the
requirement that there be clear and convincing corroborating evidence of the defendant's
identity. Id. at 616 & n.5, 617. Neither the tracking test nor the corroboration requirement
provides significant assurance that the scent evidence is reliable, and accordingly, the combi-
nation does little to address the fundamental problem facing the courts.
643. Cf S. ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 43-44 (1987) (noting the inability of the judiciary to use
the corroboration requirement with either consistency or clarity in rape cases); V. HAts & N.
VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 207 (1986) ("there is some evidence that the corroboration
instructions don't work the way they ought to"; thus a jury simulation study conducted by
one of the authors in a rape case revealed that, "contrary to expectations, when jurors were
given corroboration instructions, they were no more likely to scrutinize the victim's credibility
or the potentially corroborative evidence").
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the level of the jury's belief in the defendant's guilt from clear and
convincing to beyond a reasonable doubt, and if the lineup is of ques-
tionable value, the conviction may stand on sand.
Perhaps the greatest failing of the corroboration requirement is
that it serves as a substitute for the court's examination of the strengths
and weaknesses of the lineup itself as a scientific technique. If those
strengths and weaknesses are properly examined, however, and if a
court is convinced that the technique is valid and will not unduly mis-
lead the jury, there seems little reason to impose a vague and confusing
corroboration requirement. On the other hand, if the court has serious
doubts about the technique's validity, the lineup should never reach
the jury.
I. The Standard of Proof and Harmless Error
Two procedural matters-the standard of proof for admitting ev-
idence and the standard of review on appeal-must be considered if
the review of potential objections to dog scent lineups is to be fully
understood.
As to the first of these matters, Professor Giannelli, 6 4 relying
upon an analysis first suggested by Professor Saltzburg, 64s has rec-
ommended admitting novel scientific evidence only if the court is first
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the underlying scientific
technique is valid. The justification for the recommendation is that
novel scientific evidence poses significant reliable problems and runs
the risk of causing extreme jury prejudice. Therefore, errors regarding
the validity of a scientific technique are very likely to result in er-
roneous verdicts.6 This danger is particularly geat when, as with dog
644. Giannelli, supra note 250, at 1245-50.
645. Saltzburg, Standards of Proof and Preliminary Questions of Fact, 27 STAN. L. REV.
271 (1975).
646. Giannelli, supra note 250, at 1247-48. Professor McCord has argued that a heightened
standard of proof is unnecessary to guard against erroneous verdicts where a trial court has
otherwise properly done its job in determining the reliability of scientific evidence and its
likely impact on the jury. McCord, Profiles, Syndromes and Other Mental Exotica: A New
Approach to the Admissibility of Nontraditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases,
66 OR. L. REv. 19, 106 (1987). Professor McCord, like so many other academics, including
the author of this Article, has proposed his own set of guidelines to assist the courts. What
Professor McCord misses, however, is that courts faced with the complexity of scientific
evidentiary questions have repeatedly ignored exhortations to more careful analysis, and
attorneys, perhaps because they have known that they too could "get away with" truncated
analyses, have done little to help the courts. A heightened standard of proof provides a strong
incentive for the proponents of scientific evidence to do their homework, and, in addition,
impresses upon the courts the need for more than a casual examination of scientific evidence
before such evidence is presented to a jury.
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scent lineups, a finding of the preliminary fact ("validity") is likely
to be dispositive of guilt. 647 Professor Giannelli's approach properly
focuses judicial attention on whether the lineup is a sound scientific
technique while assuring, as the corroboration requirements does not,
a high degree of confidence in the outcome of the trial. 648
Whether the admission of scent lineup evidence is "harmless er-
ror" is, of course, a determination that only can be made on a case-
by-case basis. 649 It is important to emphasize, however, that because
of the jury's potential misuse of the evidence, the government bears
a heavy burden in seeking to persuade a court beyond a reasonable
doubt (for constitutional errors) or by a high probability (for non-con-
647. This preliminary fact is to be decided solely by the judge, pursuant to Federal Rule
of Evidence 104(a), and the proponent will have the burdens of both production and persuasion
as to the existence of the preliminary fact of "validity." Giannelli, supra note 250, at 1247 &
n.372. "Since the purpose of imposing a special burden on the admissibility of novel scientific
evidence is to insulate the jury from unreliable evidence, treating the issue as one of conditional
relevancy under Fed. R. Evid. 104(b) would undermine that purpose." Id.
648. At first blush, Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987), seems to call into
question whether heightening the standard of proof is an option still available to federal courts
in resolving questions concerning the admissibility of scientific evidence. In Bourjaily, the
Court suggested that preliminary fact-finding under Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) is subject
to the preponderance of the evidence standard only. Although Bourjaily involved the very
narrow question of the standard of proof to be applied in determining whether a conspiracy
existed for purposes of the co-conspirators exception to the hearsay rule, commentators have
concluded that, under Bourjaily, "it is highly likely that the preponderance standard will be
used in virtually all preliminary factfinding governed by Rule 104(a)." 1 S. SALTZBURG & M.
MARTIN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 42-43 (5th ed. 1990).
The Bourjaily Court, however, rested its holding primarily on two conclusions: first, that
the preponderance standard has been used successfully in other areas, notably determining the
admissibility of confessions and evidence seized pursuant to searches conducted under fourth
amendment standards; and second, that based on this experience, there was " 'nothing to
suggest that admissibility rulings have been unreliable or otherwise wanting in quality because
not based on some higher standard.' " 483 U.S. at 175-76 (quoting Lego v. Twomey, 404
U.S. 477, 488 (1972)).
But both Professor Giannelli's article, which proposes a heightened standard of proof, and
this Article challenge the applicability of the Bourjaily Court's second conclusion to decisions
involving the admissibility of scientific evidence. See supra notes 244-643 and accompanying
text; Giannelli, supra note 250, at 1247-48. To the contrary, such decisions often have been
"wanting in quality," as has been demonstrated in numerous examples discussed throughout
this Article. Accordingly, Bourjaily's holding should not bar federal courts from adopting a
heightened standard of proof in screening dog scent lineups.
649. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, reh'g denied 386 U.S. 987 (1967). Chapman
established that most evidentiary errors of constitutional dimension will result in reversal in
criminal cases if the court is not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the errors are
harmless. For non-constitutional evidentiary errors, a lesser standard applies: whether it was
"highly probable" that the error was harmless. Dowling v. United States, 46 Cr. L. Rptr.
2057, 2058, 2060 (1990). "High probability" requires that the Court have a "sure conviction"
that the error did not prejudice the defendant, although it is not necessary that every reasonable
possibilitly of prejudice be disproved. United States v. Dowling, 855 F.2d 114, 123 (3d Cir.
1988).
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stitutional errors) that the error did not contribute to the verdict.
60
This will be so particularly when the lineup is the only direct evidence
of the perpetrator's identity or when other direct evidence of identity
is equivocal. 6-5
IV. The Full Disclosure Alternative
The studies regarding the impact of expert evidence on a jury are
sparse and conflicting. 652 Several commentators have suggested that,
650. Cf. Dedge v. State, 442 So. 2d 429 (Ma. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). In Dedge, the court
held that it was not harmless error to bar the testimony of a defense expert on scent
discrimination where the defendant's conviction was based on a combination of a scent lineup
held more than three months after the crime, an inconclusive analysis of a hair sample, and
the equivocal identification testimony of the victim. The court also held that the admission of
hearsay supporting the reliability of the dog was not harmless error because the dog's "abilities
were the key to Dedge's identification." Id. at 431. See also State v. Roscoe, No. CR-89-
0160-PC, slip op. at 5-6 (Ariz. Oct 19, 1989) (given the absence of scientific support for scent
lineups and the circumstantial nature of the case in question, newly-discovered evidence of
fraud by the prosecution's scent lineup expert might-depending upon its nature and specificity,
as demonstrated at a hearing-justify a new trial). But see United States v. Gates, 680 F.2d
1117 (6th Cir. 1982) (finding no error in the admission of dog scent lineup evidence but
concluding that, even if there was error, the error was harmless).
651. This discussion of harmless error raises another question to be addressed on appeal:
what standard of review should be applied to a trial court's determination that the canine
nose is imbued with a mythic infallibility?
The easy answer is that the question is not a relevant one, for a determination that proffered
evidence is or is not imbued with "mythic" qualities is merely a tool that aids the court in
finding preliminary facts or deciding questions of admissibility. For example, under a relevancy
approach to scientific evidence, a determination of "mythic infallibility" aids the court in
finding the preliminary facts whether the evidence is prejudicial and, if so, to what degree.
See supra notes 244-246, 409-550 and accompanying text; 22 R. WIGHT & C. GRAHAM,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5224, at 320 (1990) (the existence of Rule 403 counter-
vailing factors is a preliminary fact to be determined by the trial judge). Once these and other
preliminary facts are found, they are weighed against probative value to determine Rule 403
admissibility. That final decision is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g.,
United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1239-41 (3d Cir. 1985) (apparently treating the
determination of "mythic infallibility" as but one step in the court's exercise of its discretion
under a relevancy approach to scientific evidence; no consideration of the possibility that the
conclusion that evidence is "mythic" might be subjected to a separate and different standard
of review).
But this approach ignores two factors: first, as a practical matter, characterizing evidence
as "mythic" or choosing not to do so may in some cases be the most important reason for
a court's excluding or admitting evidence; and, second, under the approach suggested herein,
see supra note 33, the appellate court is as competent as the trial court to determine whether
a myth exists, for both can examine the same sources, and generally neither must make
credibility judgments. Consequently, a more realistic and more effective approach-and one
that creates a powerful incentive for both attorneys and trial judges to examine evidence of
myth carefully-is to review decisions concerning th& existence or non-existence of myth de
novo. Cf. Monahan & Walker, supra note 33, at 514 (recommending de novo review of social
science research findings relied upon by trial courts in crafting new rules of law).
652. Compare M. Myers, Rule Departures and Making Law: Juries and Their Verdicts, in
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at the very least, juries may be overawed by some experts but not
others. 613 A separate analysis must be made of each class of expert
evidence to determine whether the jury is likely to abuse evidence in
that class. 654 An analysis of expert testimony regarding dog scent line-
ups is in part what this Article has sought to achieve. That analysis
is incomplete, however, if exclusion of the potentially misleading ev-
idence is treated as a court's only option. 651 Other options, specifically
the availability of techniques for controlling the weight that the jury
may give the testimony, must be considered. These options seek to
alter the effect of expert testimony by providing full disclosure to the
jury of all information necessary for it to evaluate the evidence fairly.
Full disclosure might include instructing the jury that it should not
give the evidence undue weight; that certain factors make the accuracy
of the evidence in the particular case questionable and that scientific
bases exist for challening the accuracy of the entire class of evidence.
This Part addresses four major full disclosure techniques, in-
cluding discovery, adversary attack, demonstrations and independent
testing, and jury instructions.
A. Discovery
A successful challenge to scientific evidence may require extensive
research in preparation for cross-examination, the retention of an op-
posing expert, and the opportunity for independent investigation and
testing. A detailed and thoughtful examination of the nature of the
tests performed, the procedures employed, and the qualifications of
IN THE JURY Box: CONTROVERSIES IN THE COURTROOM 105-06 (1987) (jury verdicts do not
depend significantly upon expert testimony) and Massaro, supra note 27 at 444 (noting the
dearth of empirical evidence on the question but arguing that jurors can fairly evaluate expert
testimony) and R. SIMON, THE JURY: ITS ROLE IN AMRICAN SOCIETY 57-69 (1980) (jurors are
skeptical of expert medical testimony on the insanity defense) with C. FREDERICK, THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF THE AMERICAN JURY 159 (1987) (greater expertise means greater persuasion)
and Sheehan, Some Psychological Aspects Relevant to the Jury, in THE JURY: PROCEEDINGS
OF SEMINAR ON riTE JURY 114 (Australian Institute of Criminology ed. May 1986) (expert
psychological testimony reduces the impact of eyewitness testimony) and M. NrETzEL, PSYCHO-
LOGICAL CONSULTATION IN THE COURTROOM 141 (1986) (perceived expertise significantly affects
jury verdicts). See generally H. KALVEN, JR. & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
653. Doyle, Applying Lawyer's Expertise to Scientific Experts: Some Thoughts About Trial
Court Analysis of the Prejudicial Effects of Admitting and Excluding Expert Scientific
Testimony, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 619, 636 (1984) ("Assuming, for the sake of argument,
that jurors will have some tendency to defer to a scientific expert, the belief that they will
defer to different experts equally is difficult to sustain.").
654. Id. at 658; see McCord, supra note 30 at 1183-1189 (arguing that rape trauma
syndrome testimony is not of a kind likely to overawe the jury).
655. See Doyle, supra note 653, at 658.
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the examiner also will be necessary.6 6 Consequently, not only should
advance notice of the intention to use scientific evidence-particularly
novel scientific evidence-be required, but so should the opportunity
for full disclosure of all bases for the expert's opinion. 57 Full dis-
closure is not achieved effectively by procedural rules requiring that
the opposition be provided reports of scientific experts, for such re-
ports often provide little insight into the expert's opinion.6 5 Moreover,
depositions should be permitted for discovery purposes, not simply to
preserve evidence for trial.659 Early and thorough discovery not only
will increase the effectiveness of adversary attack at trial but also will
offer the defense an opportunity for a careful and well-reasoned as-
sault on the admissibility of the evidence.
Despite repeated calls for reforms of this type," ° the rules gov-
erning pretrial discovery of scientific testimony in criminal cases have
changed little. Unless and until those calls for reform are heeded, pleas
for improved discovery procedures will be of no value to defendants
hoping to mount an effective attack on the dog scent lineup evidence
at trial.
Constitutional grounds for pretrial discovery might, of course, be
raised. The prosecution has a due process obligation to disclose to the
defense, upon request, evidence that is material to guilt or punishment
and favorable to the accused."' When the prosecution is in possession
of evidence that the defense might use to impeach prosecution wit-
nesses, the test of materiality is clear: "the evidence is material only
if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been dis-
closed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different." ' 6 2 The argument might be made that dog scent lineups have
such a powerful impact on the jury that any evidence regarding the
limits of witness expertise, the circumstances under which the dog at
issue has performed accurately or inaccurately, the expert's knowledge
of studies calling the accuracy of scent lineups into question, and so
656. See Giannelli, supra note 250, at 1242.
657. Id. at 1240-43; Giannelli, Scientific Evidence: A Proposed Amendment to Federal
Rule 702, 26 JuanaRmics J. 260 (1986).
658. Giannelli, supra note 250, at 1242.
659. Id.
660. See supra notes 654-657.
661. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
662. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). Because of the multiple opinions
in Bagley and its uncertain impact on United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), the due
process rule in situations other than the prosecution's nondisclosure of impeachment evidence
is unclear. But see W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 487, at 77 (Supp. 1989) (characterizing
Bagley as creating a single standard for all nondisclosure cases).
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on, might change the outcome of the proceeding and must, therefore,
be disclosed.
663
In practice, however, the materiality test is difficult to meet be-
cause the court must speculate on the likely impact on jury perceptions
of impeachment at trial. Moreover, absent improved discovery tech-
niques, it is difficult for defense counsel to know when the prosecution
is aware of material impeaching evidence that it does not disclose. The
defense is placed in the awkward position of relying primarily on the
good faith of zealous prosecutors.
B. Adversary Attack
Effective adversary attack upon scientific testimony turns on sev-
eral factors, including: the availability of experts in the field to educate
the lawyer, prepare him for cross-examination, and testify on his client's
behalf; the availability of substantial scientific literature exposing the
potential weaknesses in testimony concerning the subject in question;
the competency of counsel; and the jury's willingness to reevaluate its
preconceptions in light of the expert's testimony.
Few well-qualified experts with a substantial background in the
science underlying dog scent lineups are now available. Moreover, not
only is the literature on the accuracy of scent lineups sparse, but unless
there is a significant increase in the funding available for basic re-
search, this circumstance is unlikely to change soon. 665 Furthermore,
the assumption of counsel's competence is all too often unjustified,
666
although a vigilant interventionist judge may to some degree offset
this problem.
Additionally, the little research available suggests that jurors resist
expert testimony that is dramatically inconsistent with their funda-
663. Brady generally has not been interpreted as dictating when disclosure must be made.
W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 487, at 760. Some courts have interpreted the Brady
doctrine as imposing upon the defendant the burden of establishing that the "lateness of that
disclosure so prejudiced [defendant's] preparation or presentation of his defense that he was
prevented from receiving his constitutionally guaranteed fair trial." Id. For the reasons noted
in the text, a strong argument can be made that disclosure must be made pretrial or a particular
defendant will be unable to prepare effectively for cross-examination. This approach also
would be consistent with the prosecutorial custom of disclosing Brady material pretrial, id. at
760 n.18, and with the recommendation of some courts that the prosecution disclose Brady
material as soon as possible. See id. at 760-61 & n.18 (noting the "recommendation of
numerous courts" that Brady materials be disclosed as soon as possible, preferably pretrial).
664. See generally E. IMWINKELRIED, METHODS OF ATTACKING, supra, note 317; Giannelli,
supra note 250, at 1239-45; McCord, supra note 30, at 1188.
665. See Interview with Dr. I. Lehr Brisbin, Jr. (June 1, 1989).
666. See Doyle, supra note 653, at 656.
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mental preconceptions. 667 The myth of the dog's infallibility, pressed
upon jurors in newspapers, film, and television, therefore is likely to
be reconfirmed by prosecution experts and affected insubstantially, if
at all, by defense cross-examination and defense expert witnesses. De-
spite the best of intentions, behavioral experts tend to frame their tes-
timony in conclusory terms that offer little help to the jury."8 The
combination of these factors makes it likely that, in a battle of scent
lineup experts, the prosecution will win.
C. Demonstrations and Independent Testing
At least one appellate court has noted its reservations in accepting
dog scent lineup evidence, conceding that "jurors may give such ev-
idence considerable weight." 669 This court suggested that future use
of demonstrations in the courtroom or on film, or other "independent
verification" of the dog's abilities, would be advisable. 670 Nevertheless,
the court upheld the admission of the lineup in the case before it de-
spite the absence of such "independent verification.' '671
Requiring a combination of videotaping the lineup at issue, a so-
lution thus far not suggested by any court, and hiolding fairly-designed
videotaped or courtroom demonstrations of the dog's abilities, pref-
erably under the auspices of an independent, court-appointed expert
(a modification of the solution suggested above) may greatly assist the
jury. Such an approach also would aid the court in making its initial
admissibility decision. For example, Phil Hoelcher, a well-known dog
trainer, maintains that his observations of videotapes of one of Pres-
ton's dogs revealed that the dog was not "working," meaning the dog
667. If the discrepancy between the expert's opinion and the juror's preconceptions is great,
the likely attitude change will be small. C. FREDERICK, supra note 652 at 173-174. People
generally resort to various strategies to resist changing their opinions, including derogating the
source ("the defense expert just was not as impressive as the prosecution expert"), distorting
the message ("the defense expert's position was ridiculously extreme"), and paying closest
attention to the counter-arguments to the expert's views. See id. at 156-57. Although some
commentators have suggested that jurors remain skeptical of the views of behavioral experts,
whom the jurors see as fallible humans, it is likely that the jurors will-because of a belief in
the dog's mythic infallibility-view prosecution scent lineup experts as merely reporting the
results of an infallible "machine" (the dog) and defense experts as fallible humans reporting
their own flawed observations of canine behavior.
668. Cf. D. BAZELON, QUESTIONING AUTHORITY: JusTicE AND CRMjiNAL LAW 54 (1989)
(noting the tendency of psychiatric experts on the insanity defense to testify in "misleading
and conclusory terms").
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was not concentrating heavily on the scent being followed. 6 2 Ac-
cordingly, Hoelcher concluded that the dog's "alerting" had to be
caused by something other than the dog's locating a "matching"
scent. 673 Videotaping the lineup on which the prosecution is based would
offer an opportunity for defense or court-appointed experts to uncover
at least the most egregious instances of fraud or incompetence, both
of which Hoelcher charged Preston with committing.
Videotaping, however, is likely to be less effective in providing
the jury with a lineup "recreation" subject to the jurors' independent
scrutiny. A videotape cannot "record" a scent, and even if the scent
could be recorded, the jurors lack the biological ability to detect that
scent and evaluate the "match" independently. Unlike videotapes of
visual lineups, therefore, a videotape of a scent lineup will do little
to reveal suggestion. On the other hand, merely because videotapes
are more interesting, they may increase the impact on the jury of such
obvious suggestive factors as the defendant's being the only male in
the line or the only one wearing a blood-stained shirt.
Independent testing offers a much more effective opportunity for
challenging the dog's abilities. Indeed, the administration and failure
of a court-ordered and supervised test of a dog's abilities led one court
to exclude a handler's testimony at trial.674 If both sides have input
on the design of the test, and if the test is administered by a court-
appointed expert, it will be difficult for anyone to cry "foul." More-
over, multiple tests are more likely to reach useful results. If some tests
are passed and some are failed, this information will be of critical use
to the defense if the evidence is admitted at trial. On the other hand,
if consistently successful results were reached, either those results were
obtained contrary to defense recommendations for a fair test and can
be impeached at trial, or the tests complied with defense recommen-
dations and the court and the jury can have greater confidence that
the particular dog is trustworthy.
The success of independent testing of the particular dog depends,
however, on the state of scientific knowledge regarding the abilities
of dogs and on what constitutes a fair test. A well-developed body
of scientific knowledge can prevent drawing unwarranted conclusions
from a small number of tests. Adequate knowledge also can aid in
detecting subtle unintentional suggestive influences. The uncertain state
of scientific development regarding the accuracy of scent lineups thus
672. Tracking the Tracker, supra note 42 (voice of, and interview with, Phil Hoelcher).
673. Id.
674. Id.; see also supra note 153 and accompanying text (discussing Preston's court
problems).
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may suggest that such lineups still should not be admitted at trial.
Nevertheless, if lineups are admitted, a requirement of repeated in-
dependent testing of the dog's abilities, combined with the videotaping
of the original lineup, at least will let the jury make a judgment that
will be more informal than would otherwise be true.
D. Jury Instructions
Recent psychological studies, although admittedly preliminary,
suggest that jury instructions rarely are understood and often do not
have their intended impact on jury verdicts. 675 Many of these same
studies conclude that instructions can be redrafted to achieve greater
comprehension and impact.6 7 6 Redrafting, however, can take lengthy
and expensive psychological research aimed at the particular instruc-
tions in question, and the efficacy of instructions in overcoming the
effects of prejudicial evidence still is questionable.
67
In scent lineup cases, the courts have relied on two primary types
of instructions. The first type simply articulates for the jury the ex-
istence and meaning of the corroboration requirement, 678 the problems
of which have been detailed earlier in this Article. The second type,
based upon a common instruction in tracking cases, 679 cautions the
jury not to give scent lineup evidence "undue weight." One such in-
struction read as follows:
Evidence has been presented in this case that law enforcement au-
thorities conducted portions of their investigations with the aid of
a trained dog. Because it is of course not possible for the dog to
communicate its findings to us directly, we must rely on the inter-
pretation of the dog's actions provided by the testimony of its trainer,
witness John Preston. Because of the nature of this evidence, you
are instructed to receive it with caution and not to give it undue weight.
It is to considered as a part of, and along with, all the other evidence
in the case in your deliberations. 60
675. See A. ELwoRK & B. SALES, MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE 3-24 (1982)
(addressing the problem generally); Strawn & Buchanan, Jury Confusion: A Threat to Justice,
59 JUDICATURE 478, 481 (1976) (50% of instructed jurors interviewed did not understand the
principle of the presumption of innocence).
676. E.g., A. ELWORK & B. SALES, supra note 675 (devoted to consideration of ways to
improve the understandability of jury instructions).
677. See id. at 22-42; infra note 681.
678. See United States v. McNiece, 558 F. Supp. 612 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); see also supra
notes 642-643 and accompanying text (discussion of additional instructions given by the McNiece
trial court on burden of persuasion).
679. E.g., State v. Streeper, 113 Idaho 662, 667 & n.8, 747 P.2d 71, 76 & n.8 (1987)
(tracking case); State v. Wagner, 36 Wash. App. 286, 287-88, 673 P.2d 638, 639 (1983) (same).
680. United States v. Gates, 680 F.2d 1117, 1119 (6th Cir. 1982).
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This type of instruction-one that vaguely cautions the jurors not
to give the evidence "undue" weight-is likely to be ineffective in
controlling jury misuse of evidence. 68' A much more effective instruc-
tion would explain why there is a concern that the evidence will be
given improper weight and would outline what factors might affect
the weight of such evidence generally and of the lineup before the
court specifically. A similar approach, the "Telfaire instruction," has
been followed with eyewitness identification evidence. 62 If the in-
struction is given both before and after the trial, as all instructions
ideally should be, and is phrased in simple, understandable lan-
guage,63 the instruction might help the jury understand why scent lineup
evidence may differ from other evidence and how the evidence should
be evaluated.
Nevertheless, the sparse and conflicting research on the effect of
instructions on juries and the suggestion in some research that specific
psychological tests are necessary to determine the efficacy of the re-
drafted instructions684-tests not yet conducted for scent lineup in-
structions-make it difficult to determine with any confidence that
jury instructions can "cure" the ill effects of scent lineup evidence.
E. A Multi-Pronged Attack
Although each of the "full disclosure alternatives" outlined above
has some problems, the combination of these alternatives might have
a significant impact on the jury's assessment of dog scent lineup ev-
idence at trial. Emphasis must be placed on the word "might," how-
681. NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, INC., JURYWORK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES § 2.04(2)(c) (2d
ed. 1983) (concluding that jury instructions are an ineffective cure for general bias); C.
Frederick, supra note 652 ("instructing jurors to ignore information or to use it in a specific
and restricted fashion may be ineffective"); Sheehan, supra note 652 (noting that some
cautionary instructions cause jurors to overattend precisely to what they have been told to
avoid); cf. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (constitutional error to try one
defendant where the jury has before it another, non-testifying co-defendant's statement
implicating the first defendant, even if cautionary instructions warn the jury that the statement
is only admissible against the non-testifying co-defendant).
682. United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 558 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The Telfaire instruction
focuses the jury's attention on many of the factors that can affect the accuracy of eyewitness
identification but does not tell the jury why they are being so instructed or direct their attention
to the scientific studies calling the accuracy of eyewitness testimony into question. Professor
Grano has proposed an eyewitness identification instruction that goes further than Telfaire by
focusing the jury's attention on the expert evidence that raises concerns about such evidence.
Grano, supra note 562, at 796-97. The instruction suggested here would go even further than
Professor Grano's suggestion by also alerting the jury to its own potential tendency to overvalue
lineup evidence.
683. A. ELWORK & B. SALES, supra note 675, at 12-24, 45-49.
684. Id. at 25-44.
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ever, because without further studies, it is difficult to assess whether
the various techniques for controlling jury weight assessments ever can
be adequate to overcome social myths. Of course, legal decisions often
must be made in a world of uncertainty, but the law should minimize
those uncertainties when a single, questionable item of evidence might
decide an individual's fate. An even "weightier" objection to the full
disclosure alternative is that it -turns on wider systemic reforms in the
treatment of scientific evidence that have thus far proven elusive.
Without such broader reforms, there are too many doubts concerning
lineup evidence to justify admitting the evidence at trial.
Conclusion
Dogs have served, and can continue to serve, a special and val-
uable function in law enforcement. New ways for the dog to use its
talents to aid law enforcement officers can and should be explored.
This, however, does not necessarily justify admitting evidence of the
dog's efforts at trial. All evidence must be scrutinized to determine
its relevancy and appropriate weight, and evidence generated through
the use of dogs should be treated no differently. Yet courts have treated
the dog scent lineup very differently from other forms of evidence.
Relying upon an untested set of assumptions regarding the abil-
ities of the canine nose, courts have admitted scent lineup evidence
without adequate consideration of the trustworthiness of the technique
or of its impact on juries. This judicial blindness reflects on inaccurate
and irrational belief or mythic faith in the dog's infallibility. That
same myth pervades the public understanding, suggesting a danger that
jurors will overvalue such evidence and ignore any real inquiry into
its appropriate weight. Expert evidence that is so likely to "over-
awe.'the jury is precisely the kind of evidence that courts traditionally
have treated with special caution, inquiring carefully into the scientific
bases for the evidence in a search for guarantees of trustworthiness
that are independent from the mere word of the export or the un-
informed preconceptions of the jury.
Since experimental research on the reliability of dog scent lineups
is in an incipient stage, the proper weight to be accorded such evidence
in any particular case cannot yet be determined. Nevertheless, because
of the public's affection for dogs and its mythic belief in their scenting
powers, juries are unlikely to approach scent lineup evidence with ap-
propriate skepticism. Consequently, although there may be some ac-
ceptable judicial uses for scent lineups, 685 they should not be admitted
as evidence of guilt at a criminal trial.
685. Cf. State v. Maya, 126 N.H. 590, 599, 493 A.2d 1139, 1146 (1985) (dog tracking
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Some studies suggest the possibility that further research will, in
the not too distant future, specify circumstances under which scent
lineup evidence can be trusted. Should this come to pass, the courts
nevertheless must continue to be alert to the scientific nature of scent
lineup evidence. Specifically, courts must pay close attention to the
presence of suggestive circumstances; the qualifications of the expert
witness; the proper "calibration" of the dog; the need for active ju-
dicial intervention to ensure the complete disclosure of expert data
before the jury; and the careful drafting of understandable, inform-
ative, and useful jury instructions designed to counteract the popular
misconceptions of canine scenting prowess. Anything less than such
scrutiny raises the danger of convictions based more upon superstition
than upon a rational belief in the guilt of the accused, and such con-
victions are inconsistent with our society's fundamental commitment
to fairness in the system of criminal justice.
evidence could be considered in establishing probable cause even though the traditional
foundational requirements for admission of such evidence at trial were absent). This does not
mean, however, that courts considering non-trial uses for scent lineups may ignore the validity
and reliability of such evidence or its mythic impact. See supra notes 66-96 and accompanying
text.
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